Questions tagged [counterfactuals]
17 questions
3
votes
2 answers
Can one determine the meaning and truth value of counterfactual statements without invoking the existence of possible worlds?
Usually, philosophers explain the meaning and truth value of counterfactual statements using possible world semantics. However, that approach requires one to accept the existence of possible worlds. Now, a disbeliever of possible worlds can simply…
user107952
- 4,798
- 21
- 36
3
votes
1 answer
Why does Nozick rely on closest possible world in his tracking theory?
According to the truth-tracking theory of Nozick,
S knows that P iff
(1) P is True,
(2) S believes that P,
(3) If P were not True, S would not believe that P, and
(4) If P were True, S would believe that P
But when explaining the third…
Abdul Muhaymin
- 297
- 2
- 13
3
votes
2 answers
Is the nature of morality counterfactual?
I know that just because some action or state of affairs is morally right, that does not mean it will actually happen. So, does that mean morality is counterfactual in nature? Or am I misunderstanding something?
user107952
- 4,798
- 21
- 36
2
votes
1 answer
Does counterpossible reasoning limit the value of using folk intuitions as a parameter in conceptual analysis?
It's too long to quote as well as I'd like, but the section on moral responsibility in the SEP article on empirical moral psychology includes as an example:
... Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner (2009) [...] described agents preforming…
Kristian Berry
- 9,561
- 1
- 12
- 33
2
votes
0 answers
Value from arbitrary restriction vs value from sharing
Let's take a simplifying example to illustrate two opposite worldviews:
Some people see value in intangible things when access to these things is restricted as if sharing was leading to a value loss: for example, people who will keep things private…
Vincent
- 241
- 2
- 5
2
votes
1 answer
What is 'Ability to Do Otherwise'?
Many times in discussions elsewhere and in answers here, certain distinctions and claims hinge on Ability to Do Otherwise. However, whether those distinctions are meaningful or claims likely or able to be true, depends on what exactly the term…
vicky_molokh
- 121
- 4
2
votes
1 answer
Lewis's truth condition for counterfactuals
According to SEP, Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals defines truth for counterfactuals as follows:
[...] the truth condition for the counterfactual “If A were (or had been)
the case, C would be (or have been) the case” is stated as…
Rainer_Zoufal
- 137
- 4
2
votes
1 answer
Counterfactual truth condition
I've read somewhere that sentences of the form "If P were the case, then Q would be the case" should be interpreted in the following way (I write P>Q to abbreviate the counterfactual conditional).
P>Q is true in w iff in the closest possible world…
PwNzDust
- 395
- 2
- 8
2
votes
1 answer
Counterfactuals in Premises for Arguments
Can counterfactuals in premises make an argument sound and valid?
I understand that soundness requires both validity and true premises whilst validity requires the premises to follow to the conclusion.
farce
- 21
- 2
2
votes
1 answer
Is imaginative resistance evidence against, or for, moral fictionalism?
There's an entry in the SEP called "Imaginative Resistance" which goes over an account of a problem with our ability to entertain moral counterfactuals:
The phenomenon of “imaginative resistance” refers to psychological difficulties otherwise…
Kristian Berry
- 9,561
- 1
- 12
- 33
1
vote
1 answer
A question about David Lewis's refutation of taking possibility as consistency
I’m reading a chapter from David Lewis’s counterfactuals. He says something which I’m confused about, wondering if any of you guys can explain what he's saying...
“ We might take…. ‘Possibly P’ [to mean] that P is a consistent sentence… If a…
zzz
- 43
- 2
1
vote
2 answers
How do philosophers answer the following question about a counterfactual notion of free will?
So let's assume that free will requires the ability to have done the opposite.
Suppose we abstract from the world (and from our mind) and can reproduce an event in the same conditions as given including exact time and space (and exact mental…
random_user
- 141
- 1
- 8
1
vote
1 answer
Lewis's Counterfactual theory of conditionals
I'm starting to read Lewis' theory of counterfactuals. In his 1973 book, he specifies on page 10-11:
"The left-hand counterfactuls make trounle for the theory that the counterfactual is a strict conditional [...] if Ψ is true at every accessible…
PwNzDust
- 395
- 2
- 8
1
vote
0 answers
What is the theory of defining consciousness by the ability to use counterfactuals called?
I'm aware there are a number of ways of defining if something is conscious or sentient. Such as the ability to experience qualia, or the ability to be aware you're experiencing qualia. Another theory I came across was to measure it on the ability to…
Simon K
- 160
- 7
1
vote
0 answers
Does denying the Limit Assumption in counterfactual logic lead to contradiction?
According to the similarity semantics for counterfactuals, a counterfactual A > C is true iff on the most similar class of worlds to the actual world (or any given world the counterfactual's truth value is judged on) where A is true, C is also true.…
Daniel Prendergast
- 638
- 4
- 9