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Generally, propositions are modelled as sets of possible worlds, and Bayesians define a credence function on the set of those propositions. They then adopt new credence functions in response to new evidence in a way determined by Bayesian conditionalization. I'm interested in how to adapt this framework to hyperintensional semantical theories, in which logically equivalent propositions are distinguished. Can anyone point me in the direction of work on this problem, or suggest a strategy for solving it? I'm not mathematically sophisticated enough to see if there is a natural way of doing it. Thanks.

  • To distinguish hyerintensionality from logically equivalent propositions if it's possible, you'd better find a way to assign them to different sets of propositions or perhaps with different weights of all those hyerintensions you're interested in to a same proposition. Then you have chance to arrive at an applied hopefully computable math problem with your credence functions... – Double Knot May 20 '22 at 02:45

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