Following this question; given that Kantian Categories are required to sythesise Concepts and for the conditions of experience; does this mean that we are born with them?
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Good question. Since according to Kant categories are the only way to make sense of phenomena, not just us but anything capable of learning must have them. So I am guessing yes. – Conifold Sep 20 '14 at 01:46
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1My answer to that basically answers this question as well. No, we are not born by *any* rational concept including Kantian Categories. Rational concepts emerge from conscious distinction between sensual phenomena which in turn takes place after adequate sensual experience by the infant which usually takes months. – infatuated Sep 20 '14 at 05:07
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@infatuated:Kantian categories aren't 'Rational'; they're *a priori*; how do you suppose sensual information is organised by the infant mind? – Mozibur Ullah Sep 20 '14 at 05:37
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If we have experiences, the conditions to have experiences must be fulfilled. So do babies have experiences? I'd say: Yes. Are we born with them? Most def! - if you follow Kant that is. – Einer Sep 20 '14 at 08:17
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I don't know that the premise is true--that we require Kantian categories to synthesize concepts. Mathematical/statistical clustering provides an alternative possibility. So I'm not sure whether Kantian categories are innate...it's a good question! – Rex Kerr Sep 22 '14 at 18:52
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2I wonder if the premise, that categories are required to conceptualize, is not a given. If consciousness can subsume experience - which it clearly does as the "self" can think about and research the nature of its own thinking - then categorical underpinnings are moot. Consider, how could Kant arrive at seeing categories as a priori unless he could get behind / above them, as it were? Just because Kant's semi-objectification excluded thinking as priori in his analysis (concepts of concepts) does not mean the *process* of observation requires definition to work. He anthropomorphized experience. – Howard Pautz Sep 23 '14 at 00:44
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@RexKerr How would that concept of statistics work without any underlying instinct toward quantity? Something cannot be 'more likely' without 'more'-ness. How can we correlate behaviors with positive outcomes without the underlying category of quality? Something cannot be pleasant or unpleasant without the notion of 'being a certain way'. Etc. etc. for each of them. – Sep 23 '14 at 14:35
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@jobermark - It needn't be formulated quantitatively, just implemented that way. For example, our eyes absorb photons which (indirectly) reduces the flow of ions into our photoreceptor cells. Do we say this is an "instinct towards quantity"? – Rex Kerr Sep 23 '14 at 15:24
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@kerr: thats at the external physical level; rather than at the interior subjective layer. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 23 '14 at 15:34
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@RexKerr Go all the way. That we have evolved neurons based upon the balance of quantities of ions available, and not some other kind of system for interacting with sensory input constitutes an instinct toward quantity. It has as its effect that a foetus can judge how far to move its arm when the mother stands up, so as not to have its whole weight land on the fragile structure. We judge quantity, and we cannot escape it, because of how we are constituted. – Sep 23 '14 at 15:41
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The question is not about how the unconscious process might formulate this as a statement. It is about whether something that will eventually become conscious (human) thought is *necessarily* dependent upon a limited range of mechanisms. If so then, those are inescapable components of thought. Whehter you get there by looking at the brain, or by looking at things more 'spritually', you get the same list. – Sep 23 '14 at 15:48
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Kant's contention is that thought necessarily involves quantity (and each of the other categories). We might know, for humans, that this is a side effect of the way the body does physics. But the question is whether there is anything we could consider thought that would not require and proceed from some analog of this physiology. – Sep 23 '14 at 15:51
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@jobermark - I think that it is critically important whether we include a foundational mentally manipulable model of quantity or category, or just note that we are embedded in a universe observationally indistiguishable from the output of a Turing machine. The latter renders Kantian categories utterly uninteresting, as everything is quantifiable. (Headline: "People in universe are made of the stuff of the universe.") Examining the parallels between formal epistemology and internal construction of knowledge is where the question of Kantian categories is of interest. – Rex Kerr Sep 23 '14 at 16:59
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1So, what constitutes 'mental manipulation'. If you want a clear external vision of your own instincts as a precondition for thought, then most four-year olds don't think. But I see them trick me, and I resent being dumber than something that does not think. – Sep 23 '14 at 17:07
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Even if you do not think instinct is thought, and 'thought' arises later, it arises at a point where you have experienced enough of your own purely instinctual behavior that those forms of thought are necessarily well-modeled in your mind. You begin thinking about getting what you want when you already have the habit of wanting it. You scheme for more once 'more' means something. – Sep 23 '14 at 17:13
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That something is discovered materially, does not mean it is necessarily simply an aspect of matter. Analysis can follow that and discover a deeper form of necessity that it already assumed. – Sep 23 '14 at 17:16
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@jobermark - wouldn't Kant consider non-thought based instinctual behavior also as a category? @ Rex Kerr, if being fully embedded in a mambo Turing machine makes categories uninteresting, wouldn't that also ultimately mean we have no need to question anything? Why would a cog wonder about his or her cog-ness? Interesting topic! – Howard Pautz Sep 24 '14 at 01:32
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Actually instinct is already more than a category, and is using them. Space is an instinct, whereas only quantity is a category. IMHO genes think -- after all, they solve problems -- others have a more stringent definition. But I think that even if there is a place where you pass over into thinking from mechanism, but it necessarily requires the mechanism to proceed to that point anyway, the attributes of the mechanism remain necessary for thinking and will necessarily be observed by the thinking process. The question is whether there would be a way to get to 'thinking' without it. – Sep 24 '14 at 16:14
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@jobermark:'Genes think': Strictly speaking though that is straying outside of Kants project - though thats not to say that one can't assign them some kind of subjective sense; but it would be wholly alien from ours. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 24 '14 at 17:24
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@jobermark - Mental manipulation revolves around having internal states that can be decoupled from external stimuli but which are akin to them in that similar processing can occur on both. Of course you can chase the question down until you find out that we don't have a great account of what mental manipulation _is_, but that is pointless since we know perfectly well that it has very different properties to typical e.g. chemistry. The question is open precisely because we do not have an exquisite theory of what mental manipulation is. – Rex Kerr Sep 26 '14 at 06:26
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@HowardPautz - Being (equivalent to being) embedded in a Turing machine makes it unsurprising that we can find qualities that match those of Turing machines. That was my only point. – Rex Kerr Sep 26 '14 at 06:29
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@RexKerr But I thought you were saying instincts like our spatial perception do not signify as thought in this regard, as long as they are just taking impressions. They clearly give us an internal state that gets this processing. But at least initially, there is no ability to *manipulate* in the sense of applying a will to choose when and how to process in this way, or to back off from the results of the process and disbelieve them. – Sep 26 '14 at 18:52
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@HowardPautz, how do we come by this crazy Turing machine obsession? Either Goedel, or Heisenberg basically says we do not live in any kind of Turing machine, with or without quantum oracles. If we take the whole of orbital dynamics or something just insanely more powerful than computation as an oracle, then who cares? – Sep 27 '14 at 17:07
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@jobermark - had to chuckle. Indeed. Orbital dynamics is a great example of circumventing all classes of the three-body problem. To me, the Turing machine and Schrödinger´s dead-alive cat, are examples of what I'd call 'meta-level false philosophical dilemmas' - Turing "built" that infernal machine, Schrödinger "put" his dear cat in that deadly-lively box. Meta-anthropomorphism? Aren't combinatorics just powerful extensions of human thought? Gödel and Heisenburg just showed the world doesn't fit in neat boxes - it's a messy place. We just haven't gotten over that yet ... – Howard Pautz Sep 27 '14 at 22:17
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They are not false dilemmas, they are statements of limits. The Copenhagen interpretation really allows for the silly cat -- if you can't deal with that, don't use it. Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem was a genuine question, and we got the answer we didn't want -- your computer cannot make sense even of itself, don't expect so much. – Sep 28 '14 at 15:14
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'They are statements of limits' is precisely the *meta* false dilemma: "to limit or not to limit," that is the false dichotomy. Put Schroedinger's thinking brother in with the cat, but even if the wave function of the box they are in has not yet collapsed, the Copenhagen interpretation thus collapses. (And I expect my computer to make me coffee, no more ... :)) So aren't Kantian Categories similar to making statements of limits (true, false, arbitrary, or undefined) or at the same level as combinatorics, which is just a numerical analog representing boundaries (limits) ? – Howard Pautz Sep 29 '14 at 00:36
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@HowardPautz Thought is not what makes observation. We do not presume quantum mechanics waited for us, to begin. So the cat and the brother might still both be dead and alive as long as the system remains isolated and closed. It was Hilbert, and half of the people in the world who miss the point of the proof, not you personally, who expected more of computing. However 'meta' these remain not false, and not dilemmas. You cannot wish them away like this. They establish real limits. – Sep 30 '14 at 00:58
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@HowardPautz The question behind Kantian categories is whether there is are things that all though must have in common in order for us to recognize it as thought. If your thinking rocks do not have categories, Kant would suggest, we are unlikely to be able to tell that they are thinking. He imagines we do not need something as serious as *time* in common with a thinking being to know it is thinking, (since he is a good Christian who believes in Angels) but we need something. Basically, we need adjectives. – Sep 30 '14 at 01:04
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@HowardPautz I am not sure that has anything to do with limitation or its lack. It is just pushing back against the naive notion that we need the whole material world, just as it happens to be, in order to think. – Sep 30 '14 at 01:08
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@jobermark - understood and ditto here. The old mind-body problem in all its forms and derivations frequently con-fuddles discussion :)) – Howard Pautz Sep 30 '14 at 16:19
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1Related: Förster in *The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, p. 127, explains why Kant thinks that judgements of tastes are understood as being universal and refers among others to 5:219. Essentially the story is that beauty is the fruitful and animating interplay and accordance of imagination and understanding (two faculties every finite rational being shares!). Same faculties means we can presuppose that others share this feeling. This implies the supposed identity of faculties to a certain extend (by Kant himself) and could easily - as a faculty - be described as "we are born with them". – Philip Klöcking Dec 29 '16 at 15:21
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Some categories, like the notion of quantity that underlies space and time, have to be inborn, or the remainder could not possibly gain traction.
We do not learn that time passes, we have already experienced it doing so before we leave the womb. An unborn child shifts in its sleep in response to its mother's posture, so it is already dealing with space and time and thus the category of quantity.
A baby cries when you scare the breath into it, (to the extent that people still do that) so it has a notion of (pain, and therefore pleasure and therefore) beauty and the underlying category of quality.
Something has to exist as a seed for meaning to accumulate around, and Kant has attempted to isolate the most minimal kernel for that seed. So the categories, and quite a bit of instinctive correlation around them clearly enter the mind before birth.
Later:
I do not mean to beg the question here, or to misleadingly affirm the consequent. Clearly that we are born with these things can be established without establishing that that phenomenon proceeds from our premise in any way.
And I am only saying that a few of the categories Kant believes in need to exist for the very young.
A category is that which can be asserted of any thing, regardless of what it is, regardless of what you are. From that definition, for me, the question hinges on the necessity of asserting things, when you are a foetus, or a baby.
I am saying that things like 'I have fallen on my arm, and I would be more comfortable if it moved.' are in fact asserted by foetuses, if only unconsciously, as they do move their arms. And given that very minimalistic example, I am challenging whether anyone can imagine beginning to acquire knowledge from a position where nothing would ever need to be asserted in this sense.
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1**Please take long talks to rooms.** Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been [moved to chat](http://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/17610/discussion-on-answer-by-jobermark-are-we-born-with-kantian-categories). – Joseph Weissman Oct 03 '14 at 20:22
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Truth (the idea causing correspondence between words and what words portray), which relates to categories, is certainly a priori knowledge, otherwise children would not be able to learn to speak.
Marquard Dirk Pienaar
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That's a good point but the question still stands, are they born with it as the ability emerges several months after birth? – infatuated Sep 09 '17 at 18:12
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"Being born" with a priori Truth does not mean, when babies emerge they have it. That is not the idea of a priori. A priori refers to knowledge, all humans have, naturally. Other talents people are born with, like ball sense or musical talent are, in my view, currently, not a priori knowledge, which refers to something all humans get. The meanings of words are not most important, because, without a doubt, all people do not acquire the same view of quality, a priori, which was one of the categories of Kant – Marquard Dirk Pienaar Sep 09 '17 at 19:57
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I know what the idea of a priori in Kant means. In fact I have very extensive views on the relation between human cognition and his biological evolution. However the OP is specifically asking whether we are born with Kantian categories. Your answer doesn't address that. – infatuated Sep 10 '17 at 02:20
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I assume the question was meant absolutely literally and did not consider rebirth. Probably a priori knowledge is inborn because at animals, i.e. beavers build dams naturally; instinct is inborn. Some similarities between animals and humans exist, therefore "probably" without knowing for certain, in this case. – Marquard Dirk Pienaar Sep 10 '17 at 07:58
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Maybe relation is inborn. If a new born baby is naturally un-attracted to some people and attracted to others, it could mean relation was a priori inborn. – Marquard Dirk Pienaar Sep 10 '17 at 08:06
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Well, particles also get attracted and repelled, not all behaviors require consciousness or thinking. Even humans attraction isn't always driven by thoughts. think of sexual attraction. It has more to do with bodily inclinations and visual perceptions than thinking. – infatuated Sep 10 '17 at 11:17
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In my experience attraction changes as ones get older. It also becomes intellectual with longer term views, added to the natural visual short term perceptions. – Marquard Dirk Pienaar Sep 10 '17 at 12:21
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No. We are born into a priori circumstances and operative conditions (Kant's 1st Critique is sitting on the shelf), but we are not born with these understandings at birth. Rational thought and understanding require language, which we acquire later. Agree that infants begin to learn some of the basics of causality very quickly, but it is through experience, in conflict with the a priori definition.
[Wittgenstein reference added]
My philosophy of language bias shows in my answer, underscored by Wittgenstein: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" Tractatus, 5.6 (1921). Prior to any means for recording or understanding concepts as made possible by language, the fetus and newborns mentioned have fairly limited room for rational introspection. Moreover, I think any insight gained is a posteriori, i.e., after they have experienced something (a fallen arm, etc.). At the earliest of developmental stages, prior to any language, all they truly have to go on is experience.
[Phil.SE re: Chomsky reference added]
Here is a related 2014 site post by some of the same participants in this thread: Is Chomskys universal grammar synthetic a priori?.
Based on these inputs, but in line with my previous arguments, I'll argue further that it seems grammar can be used to represent an analytic judgement (X is Y, or X means Y, or X inheres in Y) representing Kant's form of understanding, whereas an associated synthetic judgement (X relates to Y, or X causes Y) are instances of the realization of knowledge itself, converting analytic understanding to synthetic knowledge. This process I believe can be called synthesis (as used by Descartes, Fichte, Kant).
As we unpack this, I see the role(s) of grammar emerge from Kant's 4x3 categorical framework, with an ability to describe both analytic and synthentic judgements. Like grammar, Kant's classes play similar roles as adjectives, nouns and verbs. If it is done prior to any experience (as with math/geometry), it is a priori, or pure. If not, no harm, it is simply an empirical pursuit.
I may not have this fully sorted out as yet. I am still learning Kant and Chomsky. But I truly think these arguments move us closer to Kant's epistemic intention, with some modern day semantic/analytic support ("role of grammar") from Chomsky's UG.
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To clarify: It is correct that we are born with them in the sense that they are modes of the synthesis of intuition, it is wrong that we are born with them as concepts. Ability yes, concept no. – Philip Klöcking Dec 16 '15 at 22:12
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-1: I'd go along with Klockings clarification; this is what I was *essentially* asking about. – Mozibur Ullah Dec 17 '15 at 04:12
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But it's unsurprising that the gist of the question wasn't caught, as the question was short and ambiguous; I'd probably say born *with*, as opposed to born *into*. – Mozibur Ullah Dec 17 '15 at 04:20
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Ok, I suppose I should defer, but I did some more digging, and found Noam Chomsky had some ideas on this (attributing the ability for inductive reasoning to newborns .. and kittens, by the way). @MoziburUllah do you find the language argument as a prerequisite for understanding and deductive reasoning not a factor in this? – sourcepov Dec 18 '15 at 04:36
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I will. Always digging. Some days, it's like a treasure hunt. Thanks for the feedback. – sourcepov Dec 19 '15 at 18:46
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Is this question about Kant or about innate capacities?
I have absolutely no idea how Kant might deal with an idea like "being born," and I do not see an answer here, though I personally would be very interested to see one.
My own naive understanding is that Kant was setting out the preconditions of any "rational being." We might even add, whether "born" or not.
It is unclear, at least to me, whether "birth" is to be considered "experience" or perhaps an amphibian a-priori-posteriori transition. One can image Hegel dealing with this, but not Kant.
This is very interesting, I believe, from a feminist perspective, in that philosophy does a very poor job of sorting out universal human conditions like "in utero" or "being born."
I would like to hear more on this. The great challenge posed by Kant is that we cannot, I believe, simply turn the categories into "instincts" or Chomsky's presumably embodied categories.
To me, "being born" with "Kantian categories" really mixes or "materializes" incommensurable perspectives, effectively discrediting idealism. And it would be good to settle this incommensurability in some way.
Nelson Alexander
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Yes, I should be posting a question rather than an answer. But my implied "answer" is that the question seems to mix terminologies in a way inappropriate to Kant's theories. The categories are logically "prior to" physical processes, such as birth. We may reinterpret them as instincts, but they are no longer "Kantian categories." I sort of agree with @sourcepov that "born within" might be better, since "born with" could imply their dependence on a particular physical process. Still, I agree it's good question.... raising the idea of an "in utero epistemology." – Nelson Alexander Dec 19 '15 at 18:09
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Thanks @NelsonAlexander, you picked up on my train of thought. I am taking 'understanding' literally here, which perhaps is dangerous with Kant, but think "Pure Categories of the Understanding" still means an act of rational thought. You need words for that, I think. Newborns simply have experience, coupled with genetically inherited motor responses: hot/cold, pain/comfort (their "need to move my arm" trigger), hungry/not hungry .. – sourcepov Dec 19 '15 at 18:54
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Especially like your idea @NelsonAlexander of spawning question(s) from this one, especially if they further prompt implications of Chomsky. Researching this question prompted a deeper dive on him than I'd taken before, and his deep or universal grammar is fascinating .. – sourcepov Dec 19 '15 at 18:56