Questions tagged [sense-and-reference]

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Why is it wrong to answer a question with a tautology? Isn't "2+2" correct when answering 'What is "2+2"'?

Many times in class, we are asked to answer, "What is 2+2?" or "What is the derivative of the function x?". It would not be the intended answer to write "2+2" or "The derivative of the function x". But, why not? A tautology is technically a correct…
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Do we cause words to mean things, or do words cause us to mean things?

This question occurred to me while reviewing a skeptical argument from Kripke regarding semantics: Suppose that I’ve never dealt with numbers larger than 57. (Given our finite nature and the infinitude of the natural number series, there will…
Kristian Berry
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How many instances of 1 are there in the expression "1+1"?

Is it just two marks/numerals representing a singular number 1, or are they actually two instances of 1? And what about in a set with repetition such as {1, 1, 2, 3}? And if these are actually multiple instances of 1, how could that be, when in the…
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What is the nature of the term 'variable', and is it used differently in math, computer science, and logic?

Say I'm given an expression and talk about x changing what do we really mean by this linguistically? What inferences can be drawn about the nature of variables from their practical usage? When we talk about 'different' values of x is this simply…
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On Searle's _Proper Names_ (1958)

I just read Searle's article Proper Names (1958) which was published before Kripke's seminal take on the subject in Naming and Necessity (1980). I think it is a very lucid article but I have a question regarding the first example he raised. Searle…
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Is there a difference between "is an intensional element of" and "is an extensional element of"?

There is a version of set theory according to which there are two flavors (types? categories?) of elementhood relation, and if it's ultimately coherent, it does offer a solution to Russell's paradox (with perhaps paradoxical consequences of its…
Kristian Berry
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Why Can't We Replace Names with Descriptions?

If the descriptivist theory says that the sense of a name is a description, then why do the cognitive values of the two differ? i.e. One could believe the first, but not the second. Superman is Superman. Superman is the flying man with a red…
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"Hesperus", "The Evening Star", and externalist theories of concepts

If two names, "N1" and "N2", are introduced into the language for exactly the same purpose, but are made known to a speaker, S, in different circumstances, then it's possible for the sentences "S believes that N1 = N1" and "S believes that N1 = N2"…
Remster
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How does assignment work?

The only place that 'assignment' is dealt with in any kind of formal context is in formal logic, the idea of a variable assignment function is one I wish to understand in simple terms to allow me to understand the concept of assignment in less…
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Justification values

The concept of truth values is sometimes expressed in terms of "truth as an object vs. truth as a property." My in-a-slogan understanding of this alternative is "sentences being predicated of truth vs. truth being predicated of sentences." My…
Kristian Berry
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Universals, object-concept and sense

I am confused about "concept", "sense" and "properties" which may have some similarity but fundamentally are different. I explain my understanding as follows : Object-Subject : Frege argued that "thought" is composed of object and concept which can…