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In reading about the feud of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism, there seems to be some arguments based on how cognition/reasoning works. However, an argument of the form (vaguely put by me) because it aligns with our cognition, it aligns with reality is very problematic; common sense is a demonstration of this.

That leads me to think that some epistemologists define truth as an experience, not as the property of propositions gained when they describe reality. If the former, then epistemologists are just trying to create a framework that describes truth in a way that is both, in its premises and conclusions, in alignment with our cognition and experiences. If the latter, epistemologists are trying to create a framework of which can derive information about reality.

So, what do epistemologists usually mean when they use the terms truth and true?

user1113719
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  • We usually says that a statement or belief is either true or false; the reality is what it is: there are no "false reality". – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Mar 03 '23 at 07:10
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    Realists describe truth in terms of correspondence between propositions (or rather theories) and reality, anti-realists in terms of verifiability, deflationists reduce it to a mere linguistic device, see [SEP](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#AntReaTru). "Truth as experience" is more common in religious contexts, but some continental philosophers also defend it, e.g. [Gadamer](https://brill.com/previewpdf/book/9789004409231/BP000031.xml):"*Truth is not to be understood in an abstract sense; truth is given in the concrete experience of man, in his historical word.*" – Conifold Mar 03 '23 at 12:58
  • @Conifold It seems anti-realists and deflationists are really talking past the realists. By referring to a concept via a pre-established word does not necessarily mean one is claiming this concept-word correspondence is representative of how people speak. The word is a tool, and the concept is the object of study; to start speaking of how the word is used is an irrelevant reply, taking the symbol, its language, and the language's speakers, as its objects of study. – user1113719 Mar 04 '23 at 03:26
  • Sounds like you're dealing with the [symbol grounding problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem) in semantics of languages. Anti-realists tend to speak of truth as if it's just some silver star which is relative, while realists tend to regard truth as absolute gold stars... – Double Knot Mar 04 '23 at 04:12
  • It is not really talking past, it is rejection. What deflationists are saying is that realists took a mere tool for a substantive concept, and built misguided mythology around it. Anti-realists are saying that too, but also offer an alternative. – Conifold Mar 04 '23 at 04:58
  • @Conifold You cannot reject a concept on the basis of some symbol that has been assigned to it. You may be able to reject a concept on the basis that the concept is impossible, in some way or respect, but such a rejection cannot include information regarding the symbol. Let us say they call the concept for "oogabooga"; now, how can the arguments of the anti-realists and deflationists be used to reject the concept now referred to as oogabooga? – user1113719 Mar 05 '23 at 00:23
  • @DoubleKnot Not dealing; more like dealt. To me, this is a very simple issue. Meaning is complex and subjective. But humans are capable of looking past the meaning that infects symbols, and instead use symbols as the representation of whatever referent has, in that setting, been assigned to it. If I redefine "banana" as "an animal with functional legs", then the sentence " a banana can walk" makes complete sense under this redefinition, regardless of whatever meaning is attached to "banana". With more fundamental symbols however, the meaning can be more stubborn. But that is just an obstacle. – user1113719 Mar 05 '23 at 00:31
  • Your second sentence is trivially false. One can reject a concept on the basis that it is misleading, not just "impossible", and what misleads may well be linguistic use of associated "symbols". For instance, linguistic nominalization often misleads people into reifying what is nominalized (like redness). It would make no difference whether one calls the truth predicate "oogabooga" as long as it is used for the same purposes, and one can claim that those uses (like [disquotation](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/#HistDefl)) suggest "correspondence" where none exists. – Conifold Mar 06 '23 at 04:57
  • "(...) and what misleads may well be linguistic use of associated "symbols." In that case, the concept itself is not misleading, it is our treatment of it. The concept is not at fault; the concept cannot be rejected on this basis. You can reject the assignment of a symbol to a concept, from a prescriptivist or descriptivist point of view, but you cannot reject a concept itself simply because someone at some point assigned it some symbol. You can reject the symbol of "truth" as it is most often used, as a symbol assigned to too many, or no, referents. – user1113719 Mar 06 '23 at 19:22
  • Symbol grounding not merely language is responsible for successful meaning informing and attention transforming capable of generalization which is critical as a non-reflex rational learning agent and unfortunately natural language as an abstract symbol system is highly contextual *extensional* usage embedded and (multi) modal, perhaps you need to examine and reflect upon your own *perceptual* symbol system entangled and mirrored in your embodied sensorimotors from a first person perspective to have a penetration, thus epistemologists' truth cannot escape their respective aligned moral system… – Double Knot Apr 04 '23 at 05:10

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