Typically, in epistemic logic, you have a k-operator for, "It is known that..." however often accompanied by a b-operator for, "It is believed that..." (and also often enough, these are indexed to specifiable epistemic agents as in, "It is known/believed by So-and-so that..."). However, if knowledge comes in different forms, wouldn't it be more accurate(?) to have multiple elementary k-like operators? For example:
- It is intuitively known (by whomever) that...
- It is discursively known (by whomever) that...
Now insofar as the concepts of discursion and inference go together, it would seem that (2) has a clear place in epistemic logic, yet it requires (1) to make a difference (or else all knowledge is discursive and there is no reason to emphasize the relevant trait). On the other hand, Kant, for example, seems rather to have understood knowledge as a combination of intuitive and discursive functions. Yet even then, we might say instead that the k-operator can be decomposed into, "It is intuitive that..." and, "It is discursive that..." so that kS goes to, "It is both intuitive and discursive that..." in the translation limit.
How many elementary epistemic operators can be assumed before blurring the picture of epistemic logic as logic and not as something like mathematics or cognitive science?
