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An argument is premise-circular if its conclusion is contained among the premises, and rule-circular if it endorses the reliability of the inference rule by which it was attained.

A rule-circular argument might go as follows:

Induction, say, is the rule that if most observed A's are B's, then most A's are B's.

Is Induction reliable? Well, yes:

  1. Most inductive inferences have been successful so far, so
  2. most inductive inferences are successful.

Reliabilists argue that rule-cirularity (in contrast to premise-circularity) is alright because the only thing that matters for the justification of the conclusion is whether the inference rule is in fact reliable; others object that this is too permissible. I'm quoting Stathis Psillos (The Scope and Limits of the No Miracles Argument, 2011):

But couldn’t any mode of reasoning (no matter how crazy or invalid) be justified by rule-circular arguments? Take for instance what may be called (due to Igor Douven) Inference to the Worst Explanation:

Scientific theories are generally quite unsuccessful - These theories are arrived at by application of IWE - What is the worst explanation of this? - That IWE is a reliable rule of inference

Let’s call this, following Boghossian the bad company objection. How can it be avoided?

I am wondering about his response:

The reply here is that the employment of rule-circular arguments rests on or requires the absence of specifi c reasons to doubt the reliability of a rule of inference. We can call this, the Fair-Treatment Principle: a doxastic/ inferential practice is innocent until proven guilty. This puts the onus on those who want to show guilt. I take this to be a fundamental epistemic principle.

What about this "Fair-Treatment Principle", is there anything to say in favor of (or against) it?

Why should it be fundamental?

Is there any specific literature about it?

Mogli
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  • Not sure what "solid" means. It is controversial, as is reliabilism generally. In practice, the difference between rule and premise circularity often turns on how exactly the argument is parsed, so it is also somewhat obscure. But philosophers of pragmatist persuasion often endorse such a maxim quite broadly. In his essay Psillos echoes Peirce, who wrote:"*We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have... A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it*". – Conifold Jan 06 '22 at 12:48
  • I was unclear - I am wondering if there's anything to say in favor of (or against) it? You say it's controversial, as is reliabilism generally; alright. But if we can agree on reliabilism, what about the principle? It's not a consequence of reliabilism, I guess ... – Mogli Jan 06 '22 at 14:47
  • @Mogli "*An argument is (...) rule-circular if it endorses the reliability of the inference rule by which it was attained*" I think you would need to provide examples of rule-circular arguments in your presentation. – Speakpigeon Jan 06 '22 at 17:25
  • Psillos himself discusses some objections and rebuttals in his essay. You can also look at [Newman's paper on NMA](https://www.rhodes.edu/sites/default/files/Online_version_of_NMA_Reliabilism_and_a_Methodological_Version_of_the_Generality_ProblemE.pdf) for a critique. It is not a consequence of reliabilism, it is rather a predisposition for adopting reliabilism in the first place, an instance of [anti-foundationalism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/#ObjeClasFoun). It lowers the justification threshold from the classical one that demands reasons for acceptance upfront. – Conifold Jan 06 '22 at 23:39
  • It's fundamental since it's one of the hallmarks of coherentism of epistemic justification which is generally regarded superior in modern philosophy literature. It's like a ship in the sea, it's innocent and fine until some cracks or major damages found. Even this occurs, we can still try to fully repair it to be seaworthiness continually... – Double Knot Jan 07 '22 at 04:48
  • Thanks, Conifold, I'll have a look at Newman's paper. @Double Knot: I'm afraid I don't understand your comment - it's hardly true that coeherentism is "generally regarded superior in modern philosophy", nor do I see how you'd relate this to reliabilism? – Mogli Jan 08 '22 at 09:28
  • @Mogli -- Coherentism has been adopted by a large number of philosophers of science as the best solution to Agrippa's Dilemma. It was what was advocated by both Quine and Wittgenstein. Double-knot, renaming the dilemma to Munchausen's Dilemma, is a critique of coherentism. The Baron's horse could not pull itself out of the mud, but the Baron, by pulling on his braid, thus lifting his feet, which lifted the stirrups, this lifting the horse, COULD pull them out of the mud! The point is that coherentism just making the circle larger does not remove the logic error of circular reasoning. – Dcleve Jan 08 '22 at 17:49
  • Reliabilism concerns the nature of justification or action while coherentism concerns the form of justification or truth property, so reliabilism isn't necessarily only applicable to foundationalism though most literatures confine to modern foundationalism after Alvin Goldman. The main argument for it is the compatible non-dogmatic coherentism especially those striving for the unique set of beliefs that people actually hold such as Blanshard's *absolute* or Quine's *network*. The argument against it is the 'new BIV problem' thus one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified. – Double Knot Jan 09 '22 at 01:14
  • @Mogli I doubt anyone makes arguments using the rule that if most observed A's are B's, then most A's are B's. Rather, we usually just *believe* that most A's are B's when most of the A's we observed were B's. Not a rule, just a belief. We usually understand the rule is not true so we don't use it. And we have no reason to question this belief because we keep observing that although not necessarily true, it is effective enough on the whole. Humans believe this most likely because it is in our nature. – Speakpigeon Jan 10 '22 at 18:05

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The rule-circular reliability paradigm is functional-pragmatic; we can do things with it. Obviously we could invoke other rule-circular paradigms and apply them self-consistently, and obviously we should give them 'fair treatment' for analytical purposes. But unless we can do something with them (aside from being argumentative) why should we hang onto them?

Interestingly, this is why I'm more sympathetic to religious and spiritual arguments than most science-minded people. Even something as ridiculous as creationism has a distinct moral use in human society. It may not carry any scientific weight, but it is meant to assert the uniqueness and nobility of the human spirit. Creationists are genuinely upset that human beings are equated animals, because that undercuts the moral/ethical framework that the religious use to create a 'good' society. There's something of human value there that shouldn't be denied.

We can talk about Inference to the Worst Explanation (IWE) as a kind of intellectual stalking horse, but when the rubber meets the road IWE has no functional-pragmatic use (aside from giving us headaches). I mean (to leverage an old joke of mine) I could replace the concept of 'gravity' in physics with the concept of 'love', so that massy bodies are drawn together by their intrinsic affection for each other. But what practical use is that? I suppose we could empirically test if romantic partners have a stronger gravitational attraction than people who hate each other, but even if that were true, what could we do with it?

Ted Wrigley
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