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While reading this question about the existence of free will, I thought that the implications of stating nonexistence of free will can be at least as important (and interesting) as the main question itself.

Assuming that one accepts no free will. I thought about two levels in which it can affect our lives:

  1. as an individual:

Assume a person is told that she lacks free will. As a typical person, she ends up thinking:

"OK. Since whatever I do is predetermined, then I can do whatever I want (in some sense)."

and then she goes crazy (e.g. starts smoking, stops exercising and starts breaking the law etc.) completely deactivating her self-control.

Well, in my opinion, her thought seems only partially true. It is true that whatever she does is already predetermined and she can't control it whatsoever. But she is forgetting that all our actions have consequences (smoking significantly increases the chance of lung cancer, inactivity can lead to a heart attack). So although she can't choose what she does, her actions depend on her current state of mind which should've changed, after reading this statement (or in some other way).

So now she realises that her actions are as inevitable as their consequences, and to avoid those consequences, she should avoid the actions (and hopefully activate her self-control again)!

  1. as the society (the system of justice):

At first, not having free will may seem really horrible for our justice system. After all, no one can be held responsible for their actions. It is just the circumstances that led them to this point.

Again, I should disagree. Not inculpating anyone for their actions can be a perfect idea! In our current standpoint, we tend to demonise the criminals and cage them like animals (e.g. solitary) and then reason since they had free will, something intrinsically evil about them caused them to do bad.

Instead, if we accept they didn’t have a free will, we can concentrate on the causes of their actions like poverty, poor education or even psychological disorders. So, this view definitely doesn't say that we should let all criminals free. We should control and monitor them in whatever way appropriate and more importantly try to solve their problems as well.

Also, I think there should be some punishment involved. Not because we want to punish the person since they are evil, but to impact the mental state of society. So, in my first example (when that person decides to do whatever they want), thinking about this punishment would change their state of mind and prevent them from breaking the law.

I wish to know:

  1. Are there any other dilemmas when accepting the premise of no free will? What are the solutions to them?

  2. How reasonable are my solutions to the two problems above?

KFkf
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  • The implications are well-explored in the Wisdom literature. On this view freewill would be an illusion, as would agency. –  Feb 27 '18 at 12:13
  • This might be of interest: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/84518/if-free-will-is-proven-illusory-is-there-a-case-for-suppressing-the-finding – Futilitarian Jun 29 '22 at 06:25
  • Maybe we could agree that we are *less free than we would like.* – Scott Rowe Jan 30 '23 at 03:40

8 Answers8

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  1. are there any other dilemmas when accepting the premise of no free will? what are the possible solutions to them?

There are logical dilemmas. If there is no free will, you can not do any accepting. You have no choice. Acceptance would be an illusion, and you would be simply watching, observing, recording all that is happening. You couldn't even have thoughts about what you were observing because that would require decisions. A solution would be to show people they do have free will.

  1. how reasonable are my solutions to the two problems above?

If one believes they have no free will then the solutions are unreasonable. Without free will, there can be no deciding how to solve problems. Without free will, no one can do anything about anything. For someone who wants to solve problems caused by people believing they do not have free will, there are some good solutions proposed, but they would be difficult to apply on a large scale. Also, excessive law and punishment becomes an infringement on free will, which historically has magnified issues.

takintoolong
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How reasonable are my solutions to the two problems above?

I mean most of the language you use in 1. and 2. is still active verbs. You're still arguing from a framework of free will. Like "she" wouldn't be deliberately acting, contemplating, making decisions, reflecting upon her decisions. Because in determinism "she" would never have existed in the first place. The concept of her, would only ever have made sense to an external observer who sees a body doing stuff and so projects attributes upon it.

But inside herself there wouldn't be a sense of a self. It would just be an organic computer or some sort of machine that simply interacts passively with it's environment. So knowledge about it wouldn't make "her" change, you'd just manipulate it's inputs and so maybe get a different result maybe get the same result.

Now you can argue "But what if the human consciousness is a result of a deterministic process". Like tons of different organs and organisms formed a Leviathan to do the macro-management and make decisions. And that "thing" actually makes decisions, processes things and reflects upon is inputs and generates algorithms on how to deal with nature and sets them into action by signalling the respective organs. And because of it's usefulness to the other organs, actually "thinks" of itself as an agent because not being an agent and able to run ones algorithms is detrimental and works against the inner workings which would deterministically act against that.

Then the question is: Will that be substantially different from a free will. Would the individual be able to tell the difference? And does it even matter to the individual?

Like seriously the most likely scenario is that the other person will simply laugh at you if you tell them that they are a human robot. For all intents and purposes they have no reason to believe you. I mean cogito ergo sum (I think therefor I am) has once been postulated as pretty much the most fundamental piece of knowledge and marks the foundation for all further knowledge, so whatever you come up with as an explanation for why I shouldn't exist can only be wrong. Because the rejection of ones own self is incomprehensible for one's own self. So if it makes literally no sense, why should you reasonably accept that conclusion rather than questioning the premises?

Like even if you think of dream or coma, then no, dream is the self interacting with itself (I'm still present in that) and coma isn't real for the self. Sure people might tell you that tons of time have passed while you were in deep dreamless sleep (I don't know how coma actually works), but for all intents and purposes they are probably just lying. I mean you can convince yourself that they aren't actually deliberately lying by idk looking at other people in coma, figuring out how recordings work and that people are not smart enough to fake them, but that still doesn't change the fact that for the self it's on/off situation with nothing in between so there is no concept of what the in between is like. It's almost impossible to comprehend that ("almost" only because I don't know if you couldn't enter a stage of insanity where it makes sense). So no the most likely reaction is to ignore it, reject it, get defensive because of what this act of dehumanization might entails and so on.

What you seem to be thinking of is not so much if you were actually a deterministic machine, but if someone erroneously told you that you are (or you think they are erroneous in that). Like if people told you they can't actually see you and you thought "Great! I'm invisible" and started fooling around with that idea until you get bored with it.

  1. as the society (the system of justice):

Well nothing really changes. If you can't comprehend the ways in which another things is acting you might as well assume it's a subject rather than an object. I mean seriously look at how people treat their computers or cars for that matter. They essentially assume a "personality" in things for which beyond any reasonable doubt know, that they are inanimate objects with a deterministic logic. But as they don't comprehend how it works and just observe inputs and outputs of it they still derive a way to interact with them.

So you could argue that we're doing it wrong, because we don't understand how humans work. But then again what has changed? I mean it's not like we aren't already trying to understand how humans work. Or that even if our actions are based on completely fallacious logic, still don't achieve at least some desirable outcome (for the people doing them, not necessarily for the people upon whom they are done). So similar to kicking your computer and seeing it work again, things might not work because of our narrative but despite of it. But again that isn't remotely new and doesn't change anything, does it?

So it's a question of whether you apply a reductionist perspective that tries to understand humans by it's parts and their interaction or whether you look at them in terms of a holistic approach and try to make sense of them as a blackbox and the sum of their interactions with their environment. Though both approaches are currently so shallow in their explanation of humans that it doesn't yet matter and we kinda apply both, aren't we. So regardless of the question of free will and determinism to which most are kinda agnostic ("it matters when it matters otherwise we don't know and don't care").

Also in terms of your statements on what that would entail. Well it could be that or it could be the complete opposite of that.

At first, not having free will may seem really horrible for our justice system. After all, no one can be held responsible for their actions. It is just the circumstances that led them to this point.

Even with free will many crimes are a result of their circumstances. Like yes it might be a choice between options, but being left with shitty options and no positive perspective (either because there is none or because you're not aware of it) is a result of your circumstances.

Not inculpating anyone for their actions can be a perfect idea! In our current standpoint, we tend to demonise the criminals and cage them like animals (e.g. solitary) and then reason since they had free will, something intrinsically evil about them caused them to do bad.

I mean determinism would really dehumanize and objectify the "other thing" and it could very well be "intrinsically evil" like something in their algorithm processes harmless information in a very wrong way. So reactions like "keep it away" and "kill it with fire" might be "rational", though not very thought through but rather simplistic and brutal.

Instead, if we accept they didn’t have a free will, we can concentrate on the causes of their actions like poverty, poor education or even psychological disorders.

Nothing stopping you from doing that regardless. And you seem to be aware that this is not conclusive that determinism will lead to more understanding and less punishment as you yourself argue for punishment because of it.

So yeah that's pretty much a non sequitur and you can be a good person or an asshole regardless of free will or determinism (at least what we currently think of that).

The problem that I see with determinism is that people are too easy to accept that for other people and thus treat them as tools and as expandable, but are almost incapable of accepting it for themselves so that this assumption often has nasty side effects.

haxor789
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    Good comments. +1 for agency-- all the "should" language presupposes a DECIDER, which determinism prohibits. +1 for noting that how one should pragmatically interact with people would not change, as the determinists assume their algorithms produce the same outputs as free will. ++1 for noting the moral/psychological effect of belief in determinism often leads to IMMORAL behavior and less agency by the holder. -1 for assuming that determinism must mean reductive eliminativism vs selfhood. Many current determinists are eliminative -- but determinists CAN accept causation runs thru mind/self. – Dcleve Jun 29 '22 at 14:43
  • +1 for agency, yes. The word of the century, as we try to create it ourselves with AI. Figure out how to deny free will after *that* happens! – Scott Rowe Jan 27 '23 at 21:21
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The philosopher Peter F. Strawson did a lot of thinking on this topic. He was in the determinist camp but he had some interesting thoughts and conclusions on the subject that may save the OP from having to reinvent the wheel. Do search: Peter F. Strawson on free will; check out the first one up. As with all reading in philosophy, it takes a bit of work to acclimate yourself to the philosopher's particular use of terms, vocabulary and so on.

Gordon
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    “Do search: Peter F. Strawson on free will; check out the first one up.” — Why are you so confident that the first link will be useful? Note that the first link *you* get on *your* search is not necessarily the first link someone else will get on *their* search. To begin with, they may use another search engine. Or use the same search engine, but in another country. And thanks to personalization, even the same search engine in the same country may give different results, or order them differently. – celtschk Feb 27 '18 at 05:57
  • @celtschk Yes, you are correct. Thank you for pointing this out to me. – Gordon Feb 27 '18 at 14:02
  • Search engines seem strangely non-deterministic. I wonder what they are trying to pull? – Scott Rowe Jan 27 '23 at 21:32
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If we have no free will, then when we go from believing we have it, to unbelief, there is some deterministic cause for the switch. Afterwards, we might not ever think of ourselves in general deterministic terms, because whatever would trigger that thought might not come into play. The cause of our unbelief would be a one-off event, perhaps.

So afterwards, how many of our actions would be caused by our unbelief? But suppose they were caused by other beliefs, or by things besides beliefs altogether. Then we would be doing whatever those things caused us to do, and we might not even take into consideration how the old free-will question was "relevant." If we saw a person being violent, we might be caused to run away in fear, and ignore information about how the violence turned out on a larger scale. Or some local cause (perhaps some local belief) might prompt us to intervene. But I don't know that the mere general unbelief in free will would be doing much causing of actions, then.

This whole issue reminds me of Kant's talk of "acting under the idea of freedom." Suppose all our actions are caused by our desires. But then suppose we strongly desire, indeed more than anything else, that our actions be effects of free will. So our mere (quasi-physical) concept of free will, under our desire, will cause our actions. So how would this cause have a deterministic effect? But then it seems that, if we had no free will, nothing would ever cause us to have a belief in it, much less a desire for it to be real (if we thought it might not be real in the first place).

Kristian Berry
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    This answer gets into the internal psychology of how our minds would work in a deterministc world. One argument is that they would be no different, hence belief in determinism would have no effect whatsoever. However, I have read in multiple places, determinists admit they find they cannot live their lives according to a determinist mindset, so while they think determinism to be true, yet they LIVE like they have free will. This last point, is actually evidence FOR free will -- as belief in determinism DOES have a detrimental effect on the person, and society, – Dcleve Jun 29 '22 at 14:56
  • "nothing would ever cause us to have a belief in it, much less a desire for it to be real" An agent in a deterministic universe might develop a desire not to be manipulated, controlled, or too easily predicted by *other agents*, and then upon learning about determinism, might anthropomorphize laws of nature + initial conditions as a sort of super-agent that is manipulating/predicting them, and dislike the idea for this reason, defining "free will" in a basically negative way as something that defies that sort of determinism (IRL the def. of libertarian free will seems purely negative). – Hypnosifl Jun 29 '22 at 17:51
  • @Hypnosifl, true, depending on what concept of free will we're talking about, we might be talking about a concept whose possession by us can be deterministically caused. I have had a hell of time over on r/philosophy arguing over this very point – Kristian Berry Jun 29 '22 at 21:15
  • @Hypnosifl I'm just wondering why something with no power of choice would manifest 'desires'? I haven't noticed rocks yearning for things, or leaves weeping as they fall from trees. Nature doesn't seem to produce non-functional attributes. Peacock tails have a function... Rainbows, well, they actually occur in our minds. – Scott Rowe Jan 27 '23 at 21:29
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    @ScottRowe - I would say an important distinction here is Darwinian natural systems vs. non-Darwinian ones like falling rocks or rainbows. You yourself mention peacock tails as having function right after saying "Nature doesn't seem to produce non-functional attributes", but isn't Darwinian evolution an example of how nature can produce function without a conscious mind needed? (unless you don't believe the theory is right) As for minds, there are theories of how the brain produces intentional behavior that involve quasi-Darwinian processes of variation and selection among groups of neurons. – Hypnosifl Jan 28 '23 at 19:49
  • @Hypnosifl yes, I gave rocks as an example where desire could have no purpose, because rocks don't DO anything, and peacock tails as having some purpose. But they don't have desires (the tails). I was saying that desire couldn't arise in a system that has no choice, no function, no actions. Because desire is evident, choice therefore must be operative. No one seems to buy such simple answers though, they want to go to college for 9 years first. No, just accept the obvious. – Scott Rowe Jan 28 '23 at 23:47
  • @ScottRowe, mathematics and science would teach us to doubt our intuitions about "obvious" things even if philosophy did not teach this, so it doesn't seem fair to expect people to "accept the obvious" when what is obvious is contradictory, no less (e.g., it's obvious to some people that they have free will, it's obvious to others that they don't). – Kristian Berry Jan 29 '23 at 00:23
  • Then they are both wrong. – Scott Rowe Jan 29 '23 at 12:48
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    @ScottRowe must they be? Must no contradiction ever be true? Or, at least, what if some people have free will, and others lack it, or some have weaker wills than others? Perhaps those who live lives of "indulgence" both fail to cultivate their free will, and even undermine what they start out with. So perhaps some people can literally "perceive" their *own* lack, or possession, of free will. I'm not really sure... – Kristian Berry Jan 29 '23 at 12:55
  • I think you are on to something. – Scott Rowe Jan 29 '23 at 12:57
  • @ScottRowe "I was saying that desire couldn't arise in a system that has no choice, no function, no actions" I agree, but there are senses of "choice" that don't require indeterminism, for example a computational system that models various possible actions in order to decide which best satisfies its preferences. I think the human brain is probably an example of such a computational system. And again, you yourself seem to acknowledge no non-determinist element is needed in the case of "function", unless you think the function of the peacock's tail required a designer with libertarian free will. – Hypnosifl Jan 30 '23 at 03:17
  • @Hypnosifl I consider the issue of free will and determinism to be a red herring. – Scott Rowe Jan 30 '23 at 03:33
  • @ScottRowe Then do you agree the “power of choice” could be compatible with determinism? – Hypnosifl Jan 30 '23 at 04:28
  • @Hypnosifl I'll agree if you agree to stop thinking about a useless, toxic, misleading concept. Did you know that there are tiny worms curled around the base of your eyelash follicles? Sure. Lots of things to creep yourself out about. But, there are useful ideas that need us to work on them. "*Thus far*" is a helpful phrase. – Scott Rowe Jan 30 '23 at 11:41
  • @ScottRowe Which concept do you find misleading/toxic, "free will" or "determinism"? I am interested in determinism not because I want to creep myself out, but because I'm interested in the "unity of science", the idea that all the high-level regularities and complexity we see in nature can in principle be derived from some fairly simple base-level laws of physics governing the evolution of some initial conditions at the big bang, with humans as just as much a part of that natural emergent complexity as everything else, an idea I find elegant and beautiful rather than unpleasant. – Hypnosifl Jan 30 '23 at 15:09
  • The last paragraph seems like a pretty good description of irrationality, more than (directly) having much to do with free will. If you desire that something is true more than you desire to know what is true, then you're more likely to have flawed reasoning and end up believing something that's false. – NotThatGuy Jul 05 '23 at 13:57
  • @Dcleve How would someone "LIVE like they have free will" (or not)? Any attempt to incorporate your thoughts being deterministic into how you think is generally doomed to fail, because such an incorporation would in itself be determined. That certainly isn't "evidence FOR free will", it's just the practical reality of living with determinism. As for determinism having detrimental effects, this is something I see claimed by people arguing against determinism (mostly without evidence), more than by advocates for it (and whether or not it's detrimental wouldn't change whether it's true). – NotThatGuy Jul 05 '23 at 14:17
  • @NotThatGuy -- this question here cited evidences that show detrimental effects from believing in a lack of free will. My reply was that we are SO capable of cognitive dissonance, that the detrimental effects are likely not to be realized over the long term. https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/84518/if-free-will-is-proven-illusory-is-there-a-case-for-suppressing-the-finding IE living "like we are determined", IF we have free will, leads to negative consequences. For my critique of a hard determinist, see my comments here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YztCgd-CqtA – Dcleve Jul 05 '23 at 17:05
  • @Dcleve My point is that it makes little sense to "live like we are determined" or to "live like we have free will", because how we think is how we think is how we think, free will or not. – NotThatGuy Jul 06 '23 at 00:22
  • @Dcleve Also, what right do you have to decide what other people are allowed to know? Many people believe they'll live forever. As part of that belief, many discriminate, harass, oppress and murder. Accepting that life is finite from there may be hard, but many people have gotten through that, and have come out better on the other side. The issue is less about accepting that life is finite, and more about accepting that when you've been taught you're super special your entire life. But that doesn't justify keeping the lie going forever and hiding the truth from those who wish to know it. – NotThatGuy Jul 06 '23 at 00:22
  • @NotThatGuy, Kant doesn't make his comment in a vacuum; this is Kant we're talking about, who knew how to combine single and plural quotation marks with colons, semicolons, and em dashes to turn one sentence into an entire paragraph. His fuller picture is that using empirical information, all events can, ideally, be fit into a unified causal pattern, including all apparent expressions of human will. However, he notes that mental action *on* empirical information, in forming the ideal, inverts the total limit of human knowledge upon itself, blocking us from knowing beyond local causality. – Kristian Berry Jul 06 '23 at 01:49
  • @NotThatGuy -- humans have fallible characters and psychology. I will not tell a known alcoholic where a hidden stash of wine is. Will you? As we are morally obligated to be our brother's keeper, sometimes that might call for misleading some of our brothers. One of the most interesting studies I have seen on lying, is the study of school age swim clubs. Lyng to ONESELF, about how good a swimmer one was, increased the win rate of those swimmers who did that. The small fraction of self-deceivers in the local meets, turned into the majority of swimmers in the statewide meets. – Dcleve Jul 06 '23 at 02:12
  • @Dcleve Not a great analogy, because "alcoholic" already implies them drinking is bad, and they themselves likely don't want it. And you're talking about telling an individual something vs making yourself the arbiter of what the public is allowed to know. Hiding knowledge from the public is a dangerous path (and also rarely works well), so it should come with a high burden of avoided harm. And no-one is suggesting forcing this knowledge down anyone's throat, but people who seek knowledge, or choose to engage in debate, accept the risk of being exposed to relevant facts they may not like. – NotThatGuy Jul 06 '23 at 09:03
  • @KristianBerry That (having limited knowledge) doesn't seem to have much to do with what you said in your answer (desiring to have free will will lead to not rejecting that we have it). – NotThatGuy Jul 06 '23 at 09:08
  • @NotThatGuy the part of my answer about acting under the idea of freedom, in terms of desiring to be free, is not an exact quotation or paraphrase of Kant, it is an interpretation/illustration of his subthesis. He seems to hold that transcendental freedom can't *per se* manifest in empirical matters, yet it is somehow discernible there nevertheless (since we use empirical information to describe specific duties). Perhaps this is one of the (seeming or not) contradictions of his system, or a contradiction in my interpretation of his system. – Kristian Berry Jul 06 '23 at 13:16
  • @NotThatGuy -- The alcoholic is not an analogy, it is a test case example that refutes your "we never have a right to hide information" presumption. The "no hide" principle is not universal, which you have now agreed to. We ALL are fallible and subject to bad judgement, not just alcoholics, so the principle of hiding VERY detrimental information from the general public is at least worth discussion. Note that the detrimental consequences of an organized effort to deceive the public was explicitly and extensively discussed in the answer I posted to the other question. – Dcleve Jul 06 '23 at 16:03
  • @Dcleve It just comes across as extremely egotistical and condescending: "all those poor souls can't handle the truth, so I need to protect them from it". I prefer to live in a world where we don't treat other people like children. Worse than children, perhaps, because your general goal with children should be to educate them about the world and teach them how to deal with facts that they may find to be uncomfortable, not just hide things from them indefinitely. – NotThatGuy Jul 06 '23 at 17:06
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If she is forgetting the consequence, then either she was pre-determined to forget them, or determinism is wrong.

Also, for our justice system, whether we demonize criminals, or hold them responsible, or let them off entirely, is also pre-determined. If we concentrate on a cause, that was as predetermined as anything the criminal did as a consequence.

You can not choose anything in a system of determinism.

Mary
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Consequences to oneself: none (or some)

There are no (rational) consequences to oneself to accepting that one doesn't have free will.

You would still have the exact same thought processes with or without the belief that free will exists, and regardless of whether or not those thoughts are entirely driven by external forces.

To think that "I don't have free will so I can do whatever I want" is to make a decision, which undermines the very principle driving that decision, which is that you can't make your own decisions.

It would be like a (non-AI) computer trying to argue that, because they were programmed by a human, they can do whatever they want without concern. This very reasoning process will need to have been included in their programming, and what they're able to do would also need to be included in their programming. So for them to say they're able to do whatever they want is simply false, because they must still consider the ramifications of their actions (assuming they were programmed to do this). If you're looking for a reason to be a bad person, then one can certainly convince oneself that a lack of free will (or a bad childhood, or one of a number of other things) provides that for you, but it just doesn't. You'd just be choosing to be a bad person. The only real difference is whether it would theoretically be possible to know what you'd choose in advance.

You can decide to be a good or bad person, to harm others or help them, and you don't get to absolve yourself of moral responsibility for that decision by saying "well, I don't have free will", because you did get to make that decision, and your decision caused harm, and that's the part that makes you morally responsible.

Should thinking about the consequences of your actions counteract believing you don't have free will? Yes, and no. You should think about the consequences of your actions whether free will exists or not. That's just how you act morally. Consequentialism is a decent (but not perfect) moral principle.

Recontextualising guilt

Accepting that we don't have free will can help one accept one's past mistakes.

Rather than feeling guilty, you can realise that your past mistakes were influenced by your environment, and you can figure out how to not make such mistakes again in future.

I think, in general, guilt is not a particularly healthy emotion (with or without free will). Yes, it helps us to realise when we did a bad thing, and that's good, but we should strive to not do bad things in future, rather than dwelling on the bad things we did in the past.

On a related note, I consider the best apology to be not doing it again.

Consequences to society / justice: some

(but it's a complicated question)

You certainly touch on many of the correct ideas.

On a basic level, yes, we can realise that other people's actions are driven by their environment.

This would mean we:

  • Fix societal problems leading to crime, like poverty, poor education and poor mental health support. Although just being a decent human being should make one want to address those things.
  • Possibly let some criminals go free, if they aren't deemed to be a threat to others.
  • Have human conditions in all prisons. But again, just being a decent human being should make one want this.
  • Don't just lock people up in prison and forget about them for a while, but try to figure out how to help them understand why their actions were wrong and how to stop them from doing it again. As an example, if someone did harm to others due to racism, one might push them towards social work with people of other races, in order to get them to not see those people as inferior, but rather as equals (this particular idea may or may not work, it's just a very basic idea).
  • Retain some consequences for harmful actions, as a deterrent for future criminals, and as "justice" for victims*. Although prison sentences (particularly long sentences) is a questionable/unlikely deterrent to crime, and may even have the opposite effect, and even the US Department of Justice, of all institutions, agrees.

* "Justice" may perhaps not be entirely rational, but then humans aren't entirely rational. We may want to "punish" a criminal just because they did a bad thing. While we shouldn't run too far with that, we could potentially keep some remnants of that for particularly egregious crimes where criminals may otherwise meet criteria for release, just because we don't want to live in a world where someone can do such a thing and "get away with it".

NotThatGuy
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Your question is internally inconsistent. If it is true that we have no free will, then the consequences are already visible for you to see, since you live in a world in which we all behave deterministically. How we decide to treat criminals, for example, is all out of our control, as, indeed, is the choice about whether we accept we have free will.

Your question on the one hand assumes we have no free will, and on the other assumes we are free to choose how we respond to that limitation.

Marco Ocram
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  • The question is not internally inconsistent. The free will concept is inconsistent. Cuz a free assumes that someone was a slave. So, all wills are determined by moving from slave condition to free condition. Main that wills/wishes is already determined by the initial slave state. That is inconsistent. – άνθρωπος Jan 29 '23 at 08:26
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(adapting my other answer regarding consequences of (dis)belief in free will)

How (dis)belief in free will and agency affects human behavior has been tackled by scientists and obliquely by some philosophers. Philosophical arguments, for example, about responsibility or rationality related to free will are obviously relevant to consequnces about (dis)belief in free will.

Experiments have hinted at how disbelief in free will and agency tends to increase both aggression and conformity as well as attitudes towards criminal behavior and punishment.

Does disbelief in free will reduce people's willingness to exert the effort needed for autonomous thought and action rather than simply conforming to group norms? Three studies tested the hypothesis that disbelief in free will would be associated with greater conformity than a belief in free will. In Study 1 (correlational), participants who expressed a greater belief in free will reported that they were less likely to conform in a variety of situations than participants who expressed greater disbelief in free will. In Study 2 (experimental), participants who were induced to disbelieve in free will conformed significantly more to the opinions of ostensible other participants when judging paintings than participants in free will and control conditions. In Study 3 (experimental), participants who were induced to disbelieve in free will conformed significantly more to experimenter-provided examples than participants in a meaning-threat control condition, as well as more than those encouraged to believe in free will. These findings suggest that belief in free will contributes to autonomous action and resisting temptations and pressures to conform.

Determined to conform: Disbelief in free will increases conformity

Laypersons' belief in free will may foster a sense of thoughtful reflection and willingness to exert energy, thereby promoting helpfulness and reducing aggression, and so disbelief in free will may make behavior more reliant on selfish, automatic impulses and therefore less socially desirable. Three studies tested the hypothesis that disbelief in free will would be linked with decreased helping and increased aggression. In Experiment 1, induced disbelief in free will reduced willingness to help others. Experiment 2 showed that chronic disbelief in free will was associated with reduced helping behavior. In Experiment 3, participants induced disbelief in free will caused participants to act more aggressively than others. Although the findings do not speak to the existence of free will, the current results suggest that disbelief in free will reduces helping and increases aggression.

Prosocial benefits of feeling free: disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness

Do free will beliefs influence moral judgments? Answers to this question from theoretical and empirical perspectives are controversial. This study attempted to replicate past research and offer theoretical insights by analyzing World Values Survey data from residents of 46 countries (n = 65,111 persons). Corroborating experimental findings, free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors and support for severe criminal punishment. Further, the link between free will beliefs and intolerance of unethical behavior was moderated by variations in countries’ institutional integrity, defined as the degree to which countries had accountable, corruption-free public sectors. Free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors for residents of countries with high and moderate institutional integrity, but this correlation was not seen for countries with low institutional integrity. Free will beliefs predicted support for criminal punishment regardless of countries’ institutional integrity. Results were robust across different operationalizations of institutional integrity and with or without statistical control variables.

Free will beliefs predict attitudes toward unethical behavior and criminal punishment

Philosophically it has been argued that free will is a necessary ingredient for rationality and acting in rational ways.

In this thesis, I give an a priori argument in defense of libertarian free will. I conclude that given certain presuppositions, the ability to do otherwise is a necessary requirement for substantive rationality; the ability to think and act in light of reasons. ‘Transcendental’ arguments to the effect that determinism is inconsistent with rationality are predominantly forwarded in a Kantian manner. Their incorporation into the framework of critical philosophy renders the ontological status of their claims problematic; rather than being claims about how the world really is, they end up being claims about how the mind must conceive of it. To make their ontological status more secure, I provide a rationalist framework that turns them from claims about how the mind must view the world into claims about the ontology of rational agents. In the first chapter, I make some preliminary remarks about reason, reasons and rationality and argue that an agent’s access to alternative possibilities is a necessary condition for being under the scope of normative reasons. In the second chapter, I motivate rationalism about a priori justification. In the third chapter, I present the rationalist argument for libertarian free will and defend it against objections. Several objections rest on a compatibilist understanding of an agent’s abilities. To undercut them, I devote the fourth chapter, in which I give a new argument for incompatibilism between free will and determinism, which I call the situatedness argument for incompatibilism. If the presuppositions of the thesis are granted and the situatedness argument works, then we may be justified in thinking that to the extent that we are substantively rational, we are free in the libertarian sense.

A rationalist argument for libertarian free will

It has been argued, for example by G. Strawson, that ultimate responsibility is impossible, thus belief in free will, regarding (ultimate) responsibility, is in some sense useless. For an answer to Strawson's argument and similar arguments see the post: Strawson on Free Will: What are the most persuasive challenges to his position?

Further references:

  1. Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will
  2. Determined to conform: Disbelief in free will increases conformity
  3. Prosocial benefits of feeling free: disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness
  4. Belief in free will: Integration into social cognition models to promote health behavior
Nikos M.
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