I would like to hear some opinions on a question I am asking myself due to contradictions in the references of my term paper.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics" states:
Aquinas was not the only historically important paradigmatic natural law theorist. Thomas Hobbes, for example, was also a paradigmatic natural law theorist. He held that the laws of nature are divine law (Leviathan, xv, §41), that all humans are bound by them (Leviathan, xv, §36), and that it is easy to know at least the basics of the natural law (Leviathan, xv, §35). He held that the fundamental good is self-preservation (Leviathan, xiii, §14), and that the laws of nature direct the way to this good (Leviathan, xiv, §3).
Those are exactly the points they described earlier in the article as the foundation of the natural law theory.
However other references very clearly depict Hobbes as the one philosopher who rejects political Aristotelianism, for (I am translating the reference myself here) "he replaces the cooperation anthropology with a conflict anthropology; the teleological nature concept with a mechanistic-causal nature concept; the substantial reason (Vernunft), in line with nature, with an instrumental and strategic rationality; the unity of nature and politics with the opposition of nature and politics; the theory of a good life with a theory of self-preservation; the concept of the political community as natural purpose with the concept of the commonwealth as an utile instrument, with the clever and antisocial egoist correcting the coexistence deficits of the first nature" etc. Altogether many reasons to question his ability to defend the natural law without contradicting himself.
Why are the references in disagreement? Is it plausible to defend Hobbes as a natural law theorist? If not - why does the Stanford Encyclopedia still consider him to be one?
Edit: Political Aristotelianism and the natural law were for many centuries one tradition. Assuming that Hobbes is the antagonist of political Aristotelianism, is there a way to defend his position as a natural law theorist (can there be a natural law in a "mechanistic-causal nature concept"?), or is this the point in history where the natural law turns into a law of reason?