Suppose that, "This sentence is false," is neither true nor false. Let's use the correspondence, coherence, and truthmaker theories of truth to specify the original statement:
- This sentence corresponds to an anti-fact.
- This sentence anti-coheres with the general set of true sentences.
- Something makes this sentence false.
Now, what is falsity, then?
- If this sentence corresponds to an anti-fact, then this sentence doesn't correspond to a fact.
- If this sentence anti-coheres with the general truth set, then this sentence doesn't cohere with the general truth set.
- If something makes this sentence false, then nothing makes this sentence true.
Or we could say:
- This sentence anti-corresponds to a fact.
- This sentence coheres with the antiset of truth (the set of anti-truth).
- This sentence is made anti-true.
What the above hopefully brings out is that, "This sentence is false," and, "This sentence is not true," are almost identical, and a proposed solution to the falsity-framed version is only as good, eventually, as a proposed solution to an untruth-framed version. To wit (we'll leave evaluating the coherence/truthmaker versions as an exercise for the reader):
- This sentence doesn't correspond to a fact.
- If (10) is not true, then (10) doesn't correspond to a fact.
- Any sentence that is what it says it is, corresponds to a fact.
- Therefore, if (10) doesn't correspond to a fact, then (10) corresponds to a fact.
- Therefore, (10) does and does not correspond to a fact. QED
And so on. Now, the weakest premise is (12), or at least it is open to an interpretation such that we might say, "If something is fully X and fully not X, then there is no difference between being X and being not X/not being X." In other words, here, for, "This sentence is not true," there is no difference between being true and not being true. This can be seen by plugging the sentence into the truth biconditional:
- (TB) "S is X," is true if and only if S is X. E.g., "Kittens are cute," is true if and only if kittens are cute.
- "This sentence is not true," is true if and only if that sentence is not true. (Note: there is a sort of "indexical degeneracy" here in that we cannot repeat the left-hand "This" on the right-hand side of the biconditional or else we form a degenerately nested sequence of right-hand sides.)
- "This sentence is true," is not true if and only if that sentence is not true.
- "This sentence is true," is true if and only if, "This sentence is not true," is not true.
- Therefore, "This sentence is true," is true if and only if, "This sentence is not true," is true.
- "This sentence is true," eventually means the same thing as, "This sentence is not true."
- Therefore, the liar and honest sentences are equivalent as to their truth-conditional semantics.
- Therefore, for these two sentences, there is no distinction between truth and untruth.
- If there is no difference between A and B, then saying, "X is both A and B," is the same as to say, "X is both A and A," or, "X is both B and B," which is redundant.
- There is no difference between the liar sentence's being true and the liar sentence's being untrue.
- "X is both A and A," is not actually a contradiction.
- Therefore, the liar sentence's being true and untrue is not a contradiction. QED
Incidentally, fuzzy logics or other logics with partial values of truth (not exactly the same thing as partial truth values, but we'll not go over that topic here) do not claim that a sentence whose truth value is 1/2 is "both true and false" just like that. They might say, "Such a sentence is partly true and partly false," but this is not so as to conform to either bivalence or a truth-predicate application of the LEM (fuzzy logic is normally about as far from bivalent as can be, though using "just true" and "just false" as endpoints in the sequence of possible truth values is perhaps a higher-level sort of bivalence).