0

For the sake of argument, let us say that gender identity exists and is analytically and ontologically distinct from sex.

Let us also say that:

  • Gender identity is accessible through introspection, when people 'out' themselves as being as such it is often known to them beforehand, in at least some cases through entirely their own mind/brain.
  • Gender identity cannot be publicly empirically observed (even through neuroscience).

Does this necessarily mean that another, private entity must be responsible for such self-knowledge, i.e. the mind, so dualism is true? Surely such an identity cannot be explained by physical processes? Or am I guilty of making what Ryle objected to as the 'Category Mistake'?

Matthew Christopher Bartsh
  • 489
  • 2
  • 14
sket
  • 115
  • 6
  • 2
    I kind of remember there is neurologic research about gender dysphoria. It could be interesting to look this way, as it would undermine your second point. – armand Jun 06 '23 at 13:34
  • 1
    @MauroALLEGRANZA That would only be true if sex were the _only_ material aspect of a person, which is obviously not the case. We also assume height exists, is distinct from sex, and is still material. – JMac Jun 06 '23 at 14:57
  • 1
    It's unclear to me why gender identity would be any different from all the other mental phenomena that are used to justify dualism. As in "Surely qualia/free will/consciousness cannot be explained by physical processes" – tkruse Jun 06 '23 at 15:55
  • How would the "transgenderism" you describe differ from, for example, a person's belief they were a fire hydrant? There is no physical evidence (no neuroscience). There is physical evidence the other way. So the only available evidence is the person's "outing" themself. Does a person's sincerely held belief they are a fire hydrant require there to be a soul? In other words, your question is insulting to transgender persons. And possibly fire fighters. – Boba Fit Jun 06 '23 at 19:26
  • unicorns and pegasus are "ontologically" distinct from horses, but they are not exist, because an existence is not an analogy of something, an existence can't be prove with analytic. – άνθρωπος Jun 06 '23 at 22:02
  • @tkruse Most of those mental states can be reduced to (analytically, or ontologically), or made sense of by physical behaviour or brain states, however as far as I am aware neuroscience nor physics, biology or chemistry in general cannot explain gender identity. – sket Jun 07 '23 at 09:56
  • What is "ontologically distinct" even supposed to mean? I smell circular reasoning here. What is ontological and what is distinct is in a bidirectional relation to what your ontology is. The question that is ignored is whether an ontology is necessary to be considered *at all*. – Philip Klöcking Jun 07 '23 at 10:26
  • Btw, the same arguments hold for the difference between noziceptive neural activity (biological/physical) and pain (subjective/reported). Would you say that pain needs a dualist ontology? – Philip Klöcking Jun 07 '23 at 11:42
  • @PhilipKlöcking What I mean by that is that they are different in existence and different in language. The morning star/evening star are the same in existence but different in language. Whilst for the purpose of the argument, gender and sex are different in existence and in language. My prime question is whether this distinction means positing the existence of a mind as well as a brain/body. – sket Jun 07 '23 at 12:41
  • @BobaFit How is it insulting to transgender people to posit the existence of a 'soul'/mind to explain gender? – sket Jun 07 '23 at 12:46
  • @sket I understand your question perfectly well. My comments aim at provoking the thought that this whole fetishism around "existence" (ontology) is questionable in the first place. – Philip Klöcking Jun 07 '23 at 13:02
  • @PhilipKlöcking Apologies, patronising you was not my intent. Surely if we cannot have any simpler explanation an ontology is necessary? – sket Jun 07 '23 at 13:05
  • @sket The simpler explanation is not always to be preferred, especially if it leads to inconsistencies and more inexplicable problems. And no, we do not need an ontology. We can simply say that there are different domains/categories of practical interaction with the world that present themselves to us in certain ways, e.g. the physical, the mental/subjective, and the social. Those all are important realities in daily practical life. You can do philosophy about ontic entities without the need to have any ontological commitments. And I was serious above: pain is real but not physical. – Philip Klöcking Jun 07 '23 at 21:04

1 Answers1

1

I find four questions in your question. They are linked, so that is not complaint.

  1. "Does gender identity require a dualist account of consciousness"?

NO. It requires a social perspective on sex. As you say, sex is used, in this context, to mean something biological, physical. But sex is built in to social forms in all sorts of ways, and so, by distinguishing the biological functions from the social dimension of sex, it is possible to articulate the concept of gender identity as a social role. A complication here is that the distinction between the biological and the social contested, so that issue is more difficult than it might seem.

2."Does this necessarily mean that another, private entity must be responsible for such self-knowledge, aka the mind...?"

It depends what you mean by "private" and "entity". It is obviously possible for people to have beliefs and thoughts that they do not tell other people. That doesn't amount to an entity. But clearly it is possible for people considering gender identity to tell other people, so it isn't private in the sense required by Dualist theories. So the answer to this question is, No.

Many philosophers think that privacy postulated by Dualist theories is incoherent. In that case, the answer to your question is No. For more about this See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Private Language

  1. "Surely such an identity cannot be explained by physical processes?"

There don't seem to be agreed explanations of any kind available at present, but explanations by physical processes may well become available one day. In the mean time, explanations by psychological and social processes are available and might well prove helpful.

I should point out at this point that since gender is a social role, it needs no more, and no different, explanation that the choice to get married or become a philosopher.

  1. "Or, is this guilty of making what Ryle objected to as the 'Category Mistake'?"

It's not clear what "this" refers to. If you mean "another, private entity" then the answer is Yes. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Categories

Ludwig V
  • 2,247
  • 4
  • 22
  • "it is possible to articulate the concept of gender identity as a social role" - But is it different to be feminine and to be a woman? – rus9384 Jun 07 '23 at 14:45
  • Nice question. People talk of some males as being "effeminate" (unfortunately, and unnecessarily, this is usually a term of abuse or at least denigration). So I think that "feminine" applies to the gender role. Some people think that "woman" applies to the gender role as well as to people classified as female sex, but others question that. There are many complications and much debate about nearly everything about this topic. Feminism seems mainly to question gender roles as such. Why should some activities be allocated to one or other sex? I don't think there is general agreement about this. – Ludwig V Jun 07 '23 at 16:31