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I don't mean "human rights", which has a question already. I suppose that not all rights are human rights, though that may not be the case: I think people may actually have a right not to be lied to, but I don't think it is a violation of my human rights to be lied to (perhaps by my government).

I assume Kant thought that all rights are inviolable, because all duties are absolute and do not conflict.

Does anyone who can couch (perhaps even in part) their meta-ethics in terms of "rights" claim that some rights can forfeited? At face value, I have a "right" to basic freedoms, to non-coercion, but criminals and the insane seem to forfeit those. Supposing I do have less duties to them, does that mean that not all people have equal weight in our moral judgments?

  • not sure the question is good, and i probably should have googled it –  Mar 22 '23 at 09:42
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    See [Wellman's book](https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/rights-forfeiture-and-punishment/):"*The rights forfeiture theory of punishment contends that punishment is justified when and because the criminal has forfeited her right not to be subjected to this hard treatment. Because of a number of apparently devastating objections, this account has very few advocates. In this essay I aim to rehabilitate the rights forfeiture account by offering responses to the standard criticisms.*" This may not apply to some "basic human rights" (life, basic needs, minimal dignity, no torture, etc.). – Conifold Mar 22 '23 at 10:49
  • any idea what the devastating objections are? they would make for a good answer @Conifold –  Mar 22 '23 at 11:01
  • They are reviewed specifically in his [2012 paper](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663791), of which this is an abstract. – Conifold Mar 22 '23 at 12:05
  • thanks, but i don't have access @Conifold fwiw, i am less concerned with 'punishment' than i am coercion in general, and in what way moral character (etc.) might **limit** the right not to be coerced –  Mar 22 '23 at 12:27

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