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My questions arise after listening to Chomsky and Tim Maudlin talk about Newton's theories.

Maudlin:

"it turns out that at this moment in history [now] the physicists have to a large extent either abandoned or are not very good at addressing directly the question that Aristotle was interested in which is fundamentally what exists and the tend to get a little sketch when you try to pin them down on what exactly their physical theories postulate to exist, but that's kind of a historical accident, you know Newton was very clear about what he was postulating" https://youtu.be/-aRu75QIPcM?t=690

(I take it that Maudlin's last line means Newton was clear about what he was postulating to exist)

Chomsky:

"Newton disproved it [that the world is a machine (that it is an intelligible concept, and machinelike], he showed that the world is not a machine in this sense, he didn't believe it he thought it was so absurd that nobody with any scientific understanding could possibly believe this because that's why he called his major book mathematical principles not physical principles he said I don't have a physical theory all I have is mathematical principles that seem to work, he was sharply condemned." https://youtu.be/kzRkho1s5FA?t=3202

So it seems like they both agree that at some point science became unintelligible (operational?). Do philosophers agree about this larger point, that science recently became operational? And who is right about Newton here? Could Maudlin be talking about separate works of Newton that did postulate what exists in intellgible ways, and Chomsky referencing other works that gave up that idea? Or is there a real conflict, and who is more correct about Newton?

άνθρωπος
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J Kusin
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  • Can you elaborate on the link between "unintelligible" and "operational"? What do those 2 words mean here? – Frank Feb 26 '23 at 20:29
  • @Frank I don't know if they mean the *exact* same thing. But unintelligble comes from Chomsky, he thinks we as "non-angels" (his terms) have hard biological limits to understanding. We can't understand/conceive motion or chemistry of water (but can predict with math), we are too limited "much of what we seek to understand might lie beyond our cognitive limits". Operationalism is don't get bogged down with metaphysical questions or what exists, plow ahead with what works. An example of an operational theory is QM, it doesn't strictly say what exists but is extremely accurate in predicting – J Kusin Feb 26 '23 at 20:35
  • To the extent that something is correct, it will be unintelligible. It is easy to understand stuff that's wrong. – Scott Rowe Feb 26 '23 at 20:41
  • i don't understand the question, but i like second old man, +1 – άνθρωπος Feb 26 '23 at 22:20
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    Neither Maudlin nor Chomsky talk about unintelligibility of physics, let alone operationalism. Maudlin talks about physicists being sketchy on ontology, and Chomsky about the world not being a machine. One reason physicists are sketchy is that current theories are considered temporary, and everybody waits for quantum gravity to tell us what "really" is. Another is that the primary candidate for the latter, string theory, has a slew of equivalent formulations with incompatible ontologies. So what is would be some intangible abstract structure. But that is platonism, not operationalism. – Conifold Feb 26 '23 at 22:47
  • @Conifold I did not expect this response tbh. Chomsky really seems to say the world is not a machine mostly because machines are intelligible and the world is no longer plausibly intelligible. Maudlin claims physics was not sketchy on ontology with Newton, but Chomsky says Newton only presented mathematical properties, not ontology. Another reason current physics is sketchy on ontology besides not being final is there is no ontology to “textbook” QM. There is only a “recipe” according to Maudlin. I’m more concerned with whose take on Newton is correct b/c they seem to agree on recent physics – J Kusin Feb 26 '23 at 23:20
  • @JKusin I would offer that even if an understanding of eg the hydrogen atom is as a wave function, it is still an "intelligible understanding", so I would deny that the world is "no longer plausibly intelligible". As for ontology, why should physics be dragged into that debate? For now, it seems more productive to stay operational. If ever that approach can lead to some ontological claims at some point, why not. But ontological claims tend to be too speculative to be interesting. I think it's misplaced to force physics to make ontological commitments. – Frank Feb 26 '23 at 23:43
  • @Frank I appreciate that. It seems like physics was bogged down by ontology with Aristotle and now it’s not. I’m curious where the shift happened. Chomsky says Newton, Maudlin seemingly says much more recently. As a wave function…what *is* a wave function :) I get your point though. I think we can do better than Chomsky says for the record, even motion is unintelligible and always will be to Noam – J Kusin Feb 26 '23 at 23:58
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    @JKusin Not sure when it historically happened, but I personally think it is a welcome development in the sense that physics is now more focused on objectively describing, rather than speculating. Of course "objective" is a big word here, since physics is more like a series of approximations. Also, it is a bit limiting to require an explanation of nature to be "intelligible" and it is also a bit presumptuous: nature is what it is, even if we our best descriptions are not immediately "intelligible". There is no reason nature should be intelligible in Chomsky's sense, even if we would like to. – Frank Feb 27 '23 at 01:06
  • @frank Good points. Does this mean one would not be realist about science since this shift you talk about happened? – J Kusin Feb 27 '23 at 01:14
  • @JKusin There are obviously many opinions out there about realism and science (and I'm not sure here what version of "realism" you have in mind). The modern story about science and realism is IMHO complicated and nuanced. It may also be different per science and per theory. But really, the picture is quite nuanced. – Frank Feb 27 '23 at 01:24
  • @JKusin For example, Newtonian gravity works really well for everyday purposes on small scales, whereas general relativity corrects it on larger scales or when bigger masses are involved. And gravitation can be disregarded on atomic scales where we have other theories that work very well, like QM. Which one is the more realistic description of nature? It is often a game of approximations that leaves one with a sense that we don't really understand "the reality" behind all this. – Frank Feb 27 '23 at 01:24
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    @JKusin Here is an example of how some physics is/was actually conducted in the 20th century: https://vixra.org/pdf/2002.0011v2.pdf. The sense of groping in the dark alongside making perpetual mistakes is quite palpable. – Frank Feb 27 '23 at 01:30
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    Chomsky says that Leibniz (with monadology ?!) was a mechanist, and extrapolates Newton's *hypotheses non fingo* from gravity to everything on the basis of... the title of *Principia*. Never mind that Newton was very much into hypotheses even on gravity, just could not come up with a suitable one. It is true that physicists walked away from mechanistic models since the fall of aether, but the idea that *only* such models are intelligible would have Plato turn in his grave. It is also true that increased complexity of models makes them less accessible, but that is orthogonal to operationalism. – Conifold Feb 27 '23 at 05:38
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    Maudlin's "methodology" of opposing anonymous modern "physicists" to specifically Newton is also out there. Why not take Hooke and Boyle, who were not much into philosophizing, and oppose them to Einstein or Penrose instead? For what it is worth, Greene is only too happy to tell us what is (going to be) should string theory prevail, with superstrings, branes, extra dimensions, Big Bang, God particle and the rest, and Tegmark to put platonist metaphysical foundation under it. So happy that Smolin is unhappy with this much metaphysical speculation and few experiments. – Conifold Feb 27 '23 at 05:57
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    Chomsky's comment seems to reflect a very poor understanding of Newton's approach. Maybe with "Newton disproved that the world is a machine" he would refer to N's rejection of Cartesian physics. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 27 '23 at 09:18
  • Ok thanks everyone. Seems I latched onto some pretty hyperbolic (and even incorrect) opinions of these philosophers. You’ve given me lots of perspective – J Kusin Feb 27 '23 at 16:27

2 Answers2

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While it's true that Newton didn't focus on the question of what exists but on the relationships that govern interactions between objects, I would imagine that was because Newton would have thought it obvious what did and didn't exist. If you read the English translations of his main works there is no sense of ontological uncertainty in them- you get the impression that he considered his laws to describe interactions between real objects that you can see, feel and touch.

Physics has become much less intelligible since the advent of quantum theory, in part because the mathematical formalism is impenetrable if you haven't studied it and in part because you can no longer picture what is 'really' going on in terms of familiar objects. When I was a kid, I could imagine atoms as little billiard balls, etc, and it was possible to imagine all of high-school physics in terms of everyday concepts. Modern physics is quite different- you have to put aside the tendency to want to have a common sense mental picture, and instead be guided by the maths and some key principles about symmetry, conservation and so on. I will say without a hint of pride that I was exceptionally gifted at physics at school, but I completely lost the plot at university, precisely because the professors could not explain anything to me in terms I could relate to. I wanted to know how long is a photon, how wide is it, what actually is interfering in a two-slits experiment with individual particles and so on. I wanted to imagine quantum phenomena in classical everyday pictures, and that isn't possible (as far as we know). Indeed, it might be that Tim Maudlin is wrong to suppose that there must be a more intelligible ontology for quantum theory- perhaps nature at the quantum level is utterly different from the macro models of the world that our brains have evolved to create and understand.

Marco Ocram
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If science were intelligible to all, regardless of talent, experience and education, then everyone would be a scientist and nothing would be unintelligible.

The universe is under no obligation whatsoever to make sense to everyone and anyone. What makes sense to an astrophysicist studying galaxy formation in the early universe will make no sense at all to an office manager in a room full of insurance claims adjusters. That fact does not render science in general "unintelligible".

niels nielsen
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  • Okay I like that there are degrees of intelligibility. They might disagree where Newton lies on that scale – J Kusin Feb 27 '23 at 04:08