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Classical Theism is one of the main forms of monotheism, and dominant in at least Christianity. It says that God has aseity and also is immanent, transcendent, simple, immutable, impassable, and timeless. But these attributes are not just seen as being true independently, they arise from aseity. Chow explains:

The fundamental premise of classical theology is that God is the absolute source of everything that exists and is dependent on absolutely nothing for his own existence and nature. I will follow Plantinga in calling this the “sovereignty-aseity intuition.”
Chow, Dawn Eschenauer. Analogical Models of God: An Account of Religious Language. p79

In my readings it appears that Classical Theism is in turn dependent on realism, most notably in its explanation of simplicity: God's aseity means that God cannot depend on anything else. Realism would mean that, for example, goodness exists by itself, and so God cannot depend on goodness, and he does not then have an attribute of goodness. Instead concepts and attributes like goodness are equivalent to God's own essence (as is often said, the being of God is identical to the "attributes" of God), and any more complex attributes of God, like those that appear to be in tension like his justice and mercy, are only analogies.

My question is whether this philosophical realism is so integral to Classical Theism that anyone who is a conceptualist or a nominalist could not be considered a Classical Theist? Or if someone maintains all of the doctrines of Classical Theism but supports them through a philosophical foundation not based on realism, can they still be called a Classical Theist? In order to make this question not opinion based, answers could refer to when the label "Classical Theism" was coined and defined and what exactly its originators thought it entailed.

curiousdannii
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  • By your own definition of realism above "*Realism would mean that, for example, goodness exists by itself, and so God cannot depend on goodness, and he does not then have an attribute of goodness*", then it immediately contradicts the referenced classical theism which asserts that God possesses the attribute of goodness on its own per aseity. So it seems per your definition classical theism is anti-realistic.... – Double Knot Oct 10 '22 at 23:18
  • @DoubleKnot "the referenced classical theism which asserts that God possesses the attribute of goodness on its own per aseity" Which reference says that? – curiousdannii Oct 10 '22 at 23:29
  • *Whereas most monotheists agree that God is, at minimum, all-knowing, all-powerful, and completely good.* – Double Knot Oct 10 '22 at 23:31
  • @DoubleKnot That doesn't mean that Classical Theists think God has an *attribute* of goodness, instead they'll often say that God is good or goodness itself. God's essence being identical to goodness (and justice, and truth, etc). – curiousdannii Oct 10 '22 at 23:38
  • Even with this divine simplicity view identifying the essence/attribute or Thomistic quiddity of goodness with the existence or Thomistic esse of goodness, I see no issue we could say God so defined has the essence/attribute of goodness which is fully consistent with our everyday reading and understanding of "*God is good*"... – Double Knot Oct 10 '22 at 23:44
  • I wonder if divine simplicity is *easier* to defend from a conceptualist/nominalist viewpoint. I would suspect that it is, since one need not pose the question of God sharing general abstract properties with other things, and nominalist existence is not even a particular abstract property of anything (so fusing God's nominalist essence with His existence would also be easier as such). I would look into Ockham, here (per his nominalism): isn't he a classical enough theist to boot? – Kristian Berry Oct 11 '22 at 00:58
  • Put thusly: spacetime simplicity is a nominalist simplicity, is way more intelligible on its surface (as a true description of a particular thing) than generic simplicity, and so if it's the only kind of simplicity that's even *possibly* at stake, I think you could have the classically simplicitarian deity without general realism about abstract properties. – Kristian Berry Oct 11 '22 at 01:01
  • @KristianBerry I think it is too, but I'm wondering if that puts me outside the official Classical Theism box. – curiousdannii Oct 11 '22 at 01:14
  • Realism is always realism about *some* things. Classical realism concerned universals, and considering that the founding fathers of nominalism, like Abelard and Ockham, were theists, *that* realism, at least, was not a part of it. Also, God not depending on goodness does not entail that goodness exists by itself. If goodness is just God's will, as some theologists assert, he would not "depend" on it. Moreover, the persistence of [Euthyphro dilemma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma) in theism indicates that extreme form of aseity is not integral to it either. – Conifold Oct 11 '22 at 04:06
  • @Conifold Not all theists are Classical Theists. I'm not sure if Abelard and Ockham would qualify, hence this question asking whether realism (about universals) is integral to the definition or not. – curiousdannii Oct 11 '22 at 04:31
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    In classic theism nothing can exist by itself without and except God thus your goodness cannot either, contrary to your definition. Once you delete that while God remains to have attribute of goodness then most classical theism could certainly be said to be a form of realism (God is the most real) except perhaps with the famous Scotus's *univocity* (that's why Dun Scotus is not in your reference list) since otherwise men's goodness must be real too under univocity, not an attribute, which as moral realism is not the uniform metaethics position apparently... – Double Knot Oct 11 '22 at 06:01

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The answer is really going to depend on what you think is the essence of classical theism. If you think that Divine Simplicity is the core doctrine of classical theism, then all Catholics are bound to believe this as de fide credenda dogma, so any faithful Catholic must hold this view. Indeed, an argument can be made that Divine Simplicity is central, as Thomas Aquinas relies heavily on the doctrine to demonstrate how other, more complicated Church doctrines must be true. He even takes care to show how Church doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, never contradict Divine Simplicity. Whether one is convinced by him or not, the fact is it is clearly important to him and to others in the classical tradition that this dogma of simplicity be respected.

The "father of nominalism," so to speak, is William of Ockham, a Catholic friar of the Order of Friars Minor. Assuming that William did not reject any de fide credenda doctrines, he would have had to agree with the dogma of Divine Simplicity, which would make him a classical theist if that is all that is required for the categorization, and, hence, nominalism must be compatible with classical theism.

On the other hand, Ockham was a fideist, which means that he rejected the notion that reason played a part in coming to believe or understand theological truths. If you are more inclined to think that classical theism is a sort of rational framework for investigating truths related to God as classically conceived (as Divinely Simple, as Being Itself, etc), the Ockham, and probably any nominalist, cannot be a classical theist. Remember that Ockham's reason for fideism was his nominalism, since he had rejected any universals, he could not be convinced by reason of theological truths. Any honest nominalist theist, it seems to me, must go down the same route.

I think that either of these understandings of classical theism is compatible with your quote. The "fundamental premise" is a less-eloquent way (in my opinion) of stating the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. However, the fact that it is taken to be a premise implies that classical theism or classical theology is a framework.

jaredad7
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    "The answer is really going to depend on what you think is the essence of classical theism." Not what *I* think is the essence, but what the coiners of Classical Theism think. – curiousdannii Aug 23 '23 at 20:59
  • @curiousdannii my point is that I don't know if they would all agree. A thomist might try to make you adhere to the 24 thomistic theses, for instance, whereas a Muslim scholar would not, though his religion has scholars who are generally acknowledged to adhere to classical theism. – jaredad7 Aug 24 '23 at 12:39