Short Answer
There's not a pat answer for your question, because your question requires an articulation of certain metaphysical presumptions including those on ethics, agency, and free will.
My brief response would be there's probably contradiction in the two positions you list, because most people have contradictions in their ethical beliefs, and largely operate on intuition and social conditioning. To be free of contradiction is to be an expert in formal and informal logic, and anecdotally, I'd argue very few of those exist. In fact, one group of philosophers, believe that ethical claims are largely emotive.
Long Answer
There may not be a scientific contradiction, because appearance can serve psychologically as a shortcut in the decision making procedure. In fact, one popularly cited cognitive bias might be at the root of your question: the fundamental attribution error. From WP:
In social psychology, fundamental attribution error (FAE), also known as correspondence bias or attribution effect, is the tendency for people to under-emphasize situational and environmental explanations for an individual's observed behavior while over-emphasizing dispositional and personality-based explanations. This effect has been described as "the tendency to believe that what people do reflects who they are",8 that is, to overattribute their behaviors (what they do or say) to their personality and underattribute them to the situation or context.
And generally, one's personality often is correlated with one's appearance and the immutability of one's traits.
From a philosophical standpoint, many argue that morality is largely an emotional gut reaction, a metaethical position known as emotivism. It's likely there's a contradiction buried in their somewhere! That's true of most theories, particularly those not vetted by thinkers. It may be that whatever contradiction you can distill from your question largely reduces to psychological rather than logical motivations. (See What does it mean for a proposition to be without cognitive content? (PhilSE)).
Whether there is a contradiction is based on your metaphysical presuppositions. In plenty of cultures, it's not immoral to judge someone based on their looks. In fact, genocide is partly fueled by xenophobia, and it's argued that the impulse towards in-group/out-group thinking is endemic to the human condition.
People judge. Actions? Sure. Looks? Sure. Immutable traits? Sure. In contemporary social-democracies, there's an emphasis on multiculturalism and that's the push to reduce judgements against things, ideas, people, etc. that are different to facilitate eusocial behavior. Certainly, on the plains of Africa a million years ago, tribal competition and the hostility of the environment favored snap judgements. Evolutionary psychology has a lot to say about how the brain makes snap decisions. An excellent work on this topic is Thinking, Fast and Slow by Nobel-prize winning behavioral economist, Daniel Kahneman.
Now, is it true that you cannot chose your beliefs? Perhaps, but why are you so sure? If you chose to educate yourself at some point, did you not expose yourself to a series of claims that you thought about to arrive at the point of new beliefs? One fascinating thing about beliefs is that people work very hard to maintain them, which is a choice of sorts. Don't the Three Wise Monkeys say something about how people avoid beliefs by isolating themselves from experience? You might not be able to choose a belief in the immediate sense, but don't you bear some responsibility for choosing to open yourself to new experiences that might transform your beliefs? Let's say you're a bishop, and you have ultraconservative views on human nature, and then you volunteer to work in the slums, and then find your beliefs transformed so that you now believe in very liberal views on human nature. Have you not indirectly chosen these beliefs? Of course, an answer to this question revolves around your beliefs on free will.
