0

There is a certain philosophy that social status seeking motivations stand in opposition to finding out the truth.

  • A social-status-motivated person will look first at status markers on arguments, when deciding what to believe:
    • the social status of the person making the argument
    • whether the argument shows high social status by its stylistic flourishes, or its purely stylistic similarity to other high-status arguments
    • the social status of others who believe the argument
    • the tribal affiliation of others who believe the argument
    • whether the argument would cast doubts on the person's tribe or tribal leaders
  • A social-status-motivated person will be reluctant to admit they are wrong, when evidence of this arises, because doing so would cause them to diminish in social status.

All of these are fallacious reasons to accept or reject an argument; to pursue the truth, we should be motivated only by the justification of the argument itself. We should set aside style and pomp, look past it, and consider only the substance. To the extent we trust authority, we should do so only if they are a relevant expert authority in the field - as distinguished from our own tribal leaders - and only if we ourselves are not qualified to evaluate the argument on our own.

See this article by Robin Hanson, an economist and sociologist. But he's not a philosopher, or at least not called one.

My question is: which philosophers are most strongly affiliated with this position - the position that social status-seeking motivations are a primary opponent of the truth?

causative
  • 10,452
  • 1
  • 13
  • 45
  • 1
    The list will be too long, you'd have to include most classics starting with Plato. In recent times, the ideal of social value-free science was articulated and defended by Lacey, see [SEP](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/#ObjeAbseNormCommValuFreeIdea). It is more interesting to see why this ideal is qualified, especially after Kuhn, even by some science friendly philosophers like Dupre and Putnam. Not that they would endorse crude conformism and tribalism, but rather that social concerns must inevitably exert more subtle influence on scientific judgments. – Conifold Sep 28 '21 at 19:36
  • @Conifold Well, "value-free science" is kind of related, but at least the discussion in that article is not the same thing I'm talking about. Yes, you have deeply held values and they may influence the process and that's not necessarily bad. That's not the same as having a pernicious tendency to believe and say whatever you think will gain you social status in your tribe - which a sociologist would say is *extremely* common, and has very little to defend it. Such a tendency is not so much a "value" as it is a two-faced cheat. – causative Sep 28 '21 at 21:29
  • It's everywhere, too - in academia and outside it - and implicitly tolerated because you generally can't get ahead without doing it, and criticizing the process often makes you a victim of it. Robin Hanson is one of the few people talking about it, with concern and an eye to potential systemic solutions; who else? – causative Sep 28 '21 at 21:34
  • 1
    It sounds like you are talking about one aspect of cognitive biases. You should look at Donald Hoffman on why we can't trust evolution to give us dispassionate unmotivated information about reality. Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of bullshit, 'speech intended to pursuade without regard to truth', where liars also deceive themselves, helps us link Ancient Greek sophists to modern politics. Discussed here: 'Wisdom and John Vervaeke's awakening from the meaning crises?' https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/82325/wisdom-and-john-vervaekes-awakening-from-the-meaning-crises/82333#82333 – CriglCragl Sep 28 '21 at 23:57
  • 1
    Antonio Gramsci and his work on cultural hegemony comes to mind. – armand Sep 29 '21 at 04:59

0 Answers0