2

I cannot help but notice the increasing tendency of late to ambiguate the term “critical,” ostensibly in the service of rhetorical ends.

My concern here is with the sense of that term in the concept of “critical realism.” Is it the traditional sense of the term, such as expressing or involving an analysis or evaluation of a phenomena, in this case “realism?” As in the term “critical thinking:”

“[T]he analysis of facts to form a judgment. The subject is complex, and several different definitions exist, which generally include the rational, skeptical, unbiased analysis, or evaluation of factual evidence. Critical thinking is self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of their use. It entails effective communication and problem-solving abilities as well as a commitment to overcome native egocentrism and sociocentrism”

As is suggested here:

“One of the most common forms of post-positivism is a philosophy called critical realism. A critical realist believes that there is a reality independent of our thinking about it that science can study. (This is in contrast with a subjectivist who would hold that there is no external reality – we’re each making this all up!). Positivists were also realists. The difference is that the post-positivist critical realist recognizes that all observation is fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable. In other words, the critical realist is critical of our ability to know reality with certainty. Where the positivist believed that the goal of science was to uncover the truth, the post-positivist critical realist believes that the goal of science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting it right about reality, even though we can never achieve that goal! Because all measurement is fallible, the post-positivist emphasizes the importance of multiple measures and observations, each of which may possess different types of error, and the need to use triangulation across these multiple errorful sources to try to get a better bead on what’s happening in reality. The post-positivist also believes that all observations are theory-laden and that scientists (and everyone else, for that matter) are inherently biased by their cultural experiences, world views, and so on. This is not cause to give up in despair, however. Just because I have my world view based on my experiences and you have yours doesn’t mean that we can’t hope to translate from each other’s experiences or understand each other. That is, post-positivism rejects the relativist idea of the incommensurability of different perspectives, the idea that we can never understand each other because we come from different experiences and cultures. Most post-positivists are constructivists who believe that we each construct our view of the world based on our perceptions of it. Because perception and observation is fallible, our constructions must be imperfect.”
[Let’s call this critical1.]

Or, on the other hand, is the sense of the term “critical” that of big “CT” “Critical [social/literary etc.] Theory,” which presupposes the metaphysical existence of abstract entities, such as systems, structures, etc., with causal powers. [See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/.] For instance, as in:

Critical theory is a social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole. ... Critical theories aim to dig beneath the surface of social life and uncover the assumptions that keep human beings from a full and true understanding of how the world works. [and/or]…an approach to social philosophy that focuses on reflective assessment and critique of society and culture in order to reveal and challenge power structures.

And which has

…a distinctive aim: to unmask the ideology falsely justifying some form of social or economic oppression—to reveal it as ideology—and, in so doing, to contribute to the task of ending that oppression. Drawing particularly on the thought of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, critical theorists maintain that a primary goal of philosophy is to understand and to help overcome the social structures through which people are dominated and oppressed. Etc.
[We can call this critical2.]

So when the term “critical realism” is used in 2021, are we to think “critical1 realism” or “critical2 realism?” Or are there actually two senses of the [properly used] term, coincident with two corresponding language games, perhaps corresponding to disparate domains.

gonzo
  • 1,837
  • 9
  • 12
  • Only your second quote actually uses the term "critical realism", if you haven't seen this term used in connection with either broader notions of "critical thinking" or with "critical theory" then that probably suggests its a specialized term distinct from either of those other two. Also I don't think "critical theory" normally is taken to postulate the "metaphysical existence of abstract concepts, systems, structures, etc., with causal powers", it may analyze society in terms of systems and structures methodologically, but that isn't the same as a metaphysical or mereological claim. – Hypnosifl Jul 12 '21 at 21:31
  • @Hypnosifl I respectfully disagree. But I take your point. – gonzo Jul 12 '21 at 21:40
  • @Hypnosifl I have edited my question replacing the term "abstract concepts" with the term "abstract entities," about which, as I recall, there is some controversy as to whether certain types do in fact have causal "powers." Maybe this helps. – gonzo Jul 12 '21 at 22:08
  • It means, as it always did, different things in different contexts. There are specialized terminological uses, some [disambiguated in Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_realism), one it does not mention was a [label in Soviet literary criticism](https://revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv6n2/socialreal.htm) for realistic portrayal with "appropriate" social critique, supposedly surpassed by "socialist realism". Beyond that, I would not take it to mean anything in particular other than what the author in question specifies it to mean. – Conifold Jul 13 '21 at 00:39
  • @Conifold Your socialist realism reference strikes me as on point and I'll peruse it. But I did not fortuitously lead the Q with "I cannot help but notice the increasing tendency of late to ambiguate....in the service of rhetorical ends." Despite the consonance between your own predilection and the rhetorical ends of those who are ambiguating critical1 and critical2, which smuggles in causally active abstract entities, the difference between thinking "critically" and thinking "Critically" is certainly on your radar. So WTF has "critical realism" come to mean in the mainstream? – gonzo Jul 13 '21 at 03:30
  • 1
    Frankly, I doubt that most of those pursuing rhetorical ends care for, or are even aware of, such refined metaphysical matters as universals with causal powers. Critical theory does not need them for its social causes. Social structures can be read as labels for large scale behavior without any such extravagance, and most social constructivists are openly hostile to platonism of even much tamer sort, they are anti-realists or physicalists. As for "critical realism", it is too obscure to be of much use anyway, "critical thinking" is a far more recognizable platitude for hijacking. – Conifold Jul 13 '21 at 03:52
  • 1
    @Conifold I agree with everything you say [cf, for instance, how in terms of use/meaning there appears to be little difference between "structuralism" and "post structuralism"]. In particular, I agree that in many contexts, the term "critical thinking" is a more apt trojan horse than "critical realism." But the minds of ordinary philosophically naive volk (say in a 101 course in the humanities, or a corporate seminar) are easier to mobilize/marshal/teach when fixtures/furniture ["real" res] are posited/presupposed. The [fictional?] hinge it provides is more durable/robust, so to speak. – gonzo Jul 13 '21 at 16:53
  • 1
    @Conifold Moreover, it is my understanding that in the context of constructivist post positive realist theory things like identities, structures, systems, are both constructed and metaphysically "real." That is, they possess causal power/efficacity. – gonzo Jul 13 '21 at 17:07
  • 1
    In popular modern forms of mathematical platonism abstract objects are real, but only derivatively. They are maintained by rule-based practices of mathematicians that endow them with stable attributes resisting arbitrary treatment and making them behave similarly to physical objects in some ways. Even as if they had causal powers, albeit those too are derived from the underlying practices. This does not strike me as particularly wrong headed when applied to social structures as well, that much is close to common sense. People are indoctrinated to follow rules and wreak havoc acting in concert. – Conifold Jul 13 '21 at 20:10
  • *it is my understanding that in the context of constructivist post positive realist theory things like identities, structures, systems, are both constructed and metaphysically "real." That is, they possess causal power/efficacity.* When you say "constructivist post positive realist theory" is this intended to mean the same thing as "critical theory", or "critical realism", or something else? Could you point to some prominent thinkers who you would label with this term, & do they specifically say that concepts like "structures" are meant to have *metaphysical* reality, or is that an inference? – Hypnosifl Jul 13 '21 at 21:26
  • 1
    (cont.) If it's just an inference, I'd note that in philosophy of science one can find plenty of advocates for the utility of high-level terms like "ecosystems", "organisms" etc. among thinkers who nevertheless feel that all physical events are in principle explainable using the laws of physics alone, so that these high-level entities have no *independent* causal powers. Not that most critical theorists would likely advocate this sort of physical reductionism but I suspect they usually don't address such metaphysical questions one way or another. – Hypnosifl Jul 13 '21 at 21:32
  • @Hypnosifl Have a look at Satya Mohanty’s Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics, which I cite here: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/57420/looking-for-a-book-to-compliment-zammito-and-mohanty-in-understanding-the-ethos, or his co-authored Postpositivist Realist Theory: Identity and Representation Revisited, here https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327892mcp0804_3. – gonzo Jul 13 '21 at 23:26
  • @Conifold As you are well aware, at least since Kant's Critique, to some extent, epistemologically, everything that is "real" is such "only derivatively", or, which amounts to the same thing, inferentially. This is precisely conundrum (I know you hate it when I use that word) which gives so much nonsense purchase (or nonsense so much purchase) nowadays. What enables charlatans. – gonzo Jul 13 '21 at 23:40
  • 1
    Do those two works you cite include any clear positive metaphysical claims (as opposed to the negative claim of anti-realism)? BTW, there's a paper [here](https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/29202227.pdf) you might find interesting, analytic philosopher Cathy Legg discusses the version of pragmatism put forth by Charles Sanders Peirce which is similar to the quote you gave about "critical realism" in that it sees truth as something a community can approach in the long term but never can be sure we've reached in any finite amount of time. – Hypnosifl Jul 14 '21 at 03:08
  • (that link in my last comment isn't working for me any more, but there's an archived version [here](https://web.archive.org/web/20210623182130/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/29202227.pdf)) – Hypnosifl Jul 14 '21 at 19:49
  • @Hypnosifl I am a big fan of CS Pierce and his brand of Pragmatism (he was the original pragmatist) , or as he later came to call it after the concept was hijacked by James/Dewey Pragmaticism. As introductory texts, check out his Fixation of Belief, and How to Make our Ideas Clear. And his very short Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. His main thesis re ideas being habits of action, etc are akin to Wittgenstein's later meaning=use/forms of life/language game notions. He was WAY ahead of his time. I'll check out the essay you recommend. – gonzo Jul 15 '21 at 16:29
  • @Hypnosifl as for Mohanty's Literary Theory.... YES, he makes positive metaphysical claims. Initially he discusses how garden variety postmodernism/poststructuralism's nihilism will not get Theory's lets-change-the-world project done by mass deconstructing, so he explicitly comes up with postpositivistic realism (one of the very first to do so-first by debunking Humen skepticism re causation). His 6th chapter is called "On Situating Objective Knowledge," where he shows how CS Pierce to Richard Rorty antifoundationalism leads not to PoMo, but to the "social situatedness of knowledge.' – gonzo Jul 15 '21 at 16:51
  • @Hypnosifl As for Nice Derangement of Epistemes, Zamitto is an intellectual historian, not a philosopher, So what he does is critique the breathless hyperbolic misreading of many of the great 20th C's philosopher's of science (Duhen,, Quine, Davidson, Kuhn, etc.) by the PoMo crowd (conflating the histrionics of postmodernim and the more moderate postpositivism). Sounds like a book should read, and would enjoy the experience.. But he expressly says very little about pragmatism (this is a strict history of phil of SCIENCE - not history of knowledge - in the 20th C. – gonzo Jul 15 '21 at 17:07

0 Answers0