If we believe that calculus satisfactorily solves Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, conceptual clarity about real analysis was not achieved before Cauchy's definition of the limit (in “Cours d'Analyse”, 1821).
But in Descartes’ time there was only some sort of proto-calculus, not even calculus on the level of Newton or Leibniz.
How was this acceptable for Descartes?
Descartes himself didn't accept infinitesimals. He judged the concept behind dx/dt to be confused and vague and not reaching his standard of a “clear and distinct” idea. He even got into a quarrel with Pierre de Fermat on this issue.
This means that there was no solution available to him. Just doing differentiation algebraically by “unproven” rules (like for polynomials) is no solution.
Did Descartes ever defend his choice to accept something as vague as motion in his philosophy? Something of which contemporary mathematicians only had an inchoate understanding of, and which they handled in a “mysterious” conceptual framework?
Zeno's paradoxes, at least, show that the human mind struggles with the concept of motion.
Descartes must have known Zeno, so he couldn't have simply claimed that we possess an innate, clear and distinct idea of motion.