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I'm posting this despite the fact that I've little or no knowledge in metaphysics. The eliminativists claim that phenomenal consciousness is not "real". Would it help if we notice that phenomenal consciousness actively affects our decision making? For instance, I like the "feeling" associated with the color red. If I'm asked to pick an object from a collection of objects whose physical nature is identical except for their color, then I'm likely to pick the object whose color is red. But then, if we assume an eliminativist standpoint, something not "real", namely the "qualia" associated with the color red, is affecting something "real", namely the act of picking a particular object.

Is this a valid argument? Kindly direct me to related sources if possible.

General Grievous
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    No, this does not help. According to eliminativists, it is the underlying brain state that causes both the decision and the "qualia", so the "feelings" and and the "liking" do not cause anything, they are just idle icing on the cake, see [Problem of mental causation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_mental_causation). – Conifold Feb 05 '20 at 20:50
  • I think people generally get confused about eliminative materialism. Imagine we're in pre-chemistry times; now, we all know that there are four elements: earth, water, fire, and air. But some future traveler comes along and says, no... that whole thing is fundamentally wrong; our entire theory of elements is flawed. And he's right. But that doesn't mean there's no such thing as water; it means water isn't really an element. Analogously, an e.m. isn't necessarily saying there's no such thing as seeing red, but rather, that there's something wrong about your theory of seeing. – H Walters Feb 06 '20 at 03:40

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