According to Kant's Universalizability principle, may I say LGBT is morally impermissible?

Question

Kant's universalizability principle (theory), which he set out in 18th century, tells us that if a course of action cannot be universally adopted it must be morally impermissible. So in that case what is the actual standing of LGBT?

(I'm not good at English, pardon me.)

Kant's principle when phrased so simply is clearly nonsense: it would not be possible for everybody to be a full-time teacher, since then there would be nobody left to (say) produce food, but it's nonsense to conclude from that that it is impermissible to be a full-time teacher. Or even worse, it's impossible for everybody at once to live in Decatur, so can we conclude that it's morally impermissible to live in Decatur (noting that that same line of logic would rule out living *anywhere*)? — Noah Schweber, Jan 23 '20 at 18:58
Yup, _forcing_ everyone to be LGBT would be morally impermissible as that wouldn't work for everyone. Likewise, _forcing_ everyone to be not-LGBT would be morally impermissible as that wouldn't work for everyone. A morally permissible solution might be something like _allowing_ people free choice. — Nat, Jan 23 '20 at 19:59
I think everyone else covered the direct problems with the the question, but to explore the question a little.... why couldn't "LGBT" be universally adopted? — Uueerdo, Jan 23 '20 at 21:30
What Kant proposes is that if it is fine for one person chooses to be an LBGT person it should be fine for us all to do it. It is not necessary that everybody actually becomes one. Nothing wrong with Kant's imperative when properly applied. He says nothing whatsoever about the merits of LGBT membership. . . — , Jan 24 '20 at 11:08

score 5 · Answer 1 · edited Jun 17 '20 at 08:34

5

No, you cannot.

As I explained here, that's just not how the categorical imperative works.

1. For any application of the categorical imperative, you need a maxim

A maxim is a general practical rule which has the structure "If I am in situation X and want to achieve the goal Y, I will do Z." - a structure which hardly is to bring into conformity with sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is not an action you can perform, according to every credible scientific account of it it isn't even a choice (except for those who choose to "be" - rather pretend to be - LGTB or heterosexual out of social calculus without feeling it).

2. There are amoral behaviours

If there is no voluntary choice involved, it makes no sense to even speak of it being moral or immoral. Is it immoral for the tortured to confess to a crime they did not conduct, ie. to lie? Is it immoral to grab my spoon with my left rather than my right hand when I am alone at home? Is it immoral to have (not speaking of act according to) the character traits one has? In the latter two cases, I could construct moral reasons to work on certain things in practice, ie. in certain social contexts, but per se, these things are just amoral.

3. Being LGTB is no course of action

Morality is a social phenomenon. And it involves spheres of freedom. If two LGTB people live their lives and sexual orientation without bothering others - why should that restrict any third party's freedom in any way? If they offensively show off their sexuality in the public sphere that's another game, but there are limits to this regardless the sexual orientation. For example, there are countries where public kissing is morally and legally forbidden - for heterosexual partners no less.

4. Let's talk about sex

But hold a second, there obviously are actions involved! What about them? Having put obvious problems like public sex etc. out of the way, this is still worth additional consideration.

Let's take "If I want my sexual needs to be satisfied, I will only do so with same-sex partners". This obviously is not universally acceptable, so homosexuality is immoral to Kant, isn't it?

Well, probably not. This proposed maxim is probably simply too specific to actually be a maxim of the kind Kant had in mind there (for more detail and sources for further reading, see the link above). If you take "If I want to satisfy my sexual needs, I will only do so in a consensual manner with the sex I prefer" instead, there is no internal or general inconsistency in having it universally adopted (as far as I am aware of).

So what's the difference here? The CI asks you exactly to step back from your very personal inclinations and demands you to adopt only those acting principles (maxims) which a) are reasonable to be adopted by all rational beings and b) do not end up in inconsistencies if that happens. And, accordingly, there are maxims which allow for LGBTQ+ without any problems and if they are what you are enacting, there's nothing morally wrong with it. But if your maxims are only involving your own personal feelings and gain, this will end up being morally wrong.

Mind, two different maxims may result in the very same action, but moral worth, for Kant, is determined by the principles behind your action - your character as he calls it in later works - not the action itself.

TL;DR

As long as it is not enacted in a morally wrong way, sexual orientation as such is amoral. And this has nothing to do with the categorical imperative at all. And if you are LGBTQ+ wanting to have sex, you may very well act following a morally permissible maxim.

edited Jun 17 '20 at 08:34

Community

1

answered Jan 23 '20 at 20:47

Philip Klöcking

13,015
3
39
69

The thing you said about achieving something ("If I'm in a situation X....") isn’t it hypothetical imperative and not categorical? – Mobin Jan 25 '20 at 03:49
@Mobin This is the structure of a *maxim*, which is closely related to hypothetical imperatives, but more like a general behavioural disposition. – Philip Klöcking Jan 25 '20 at 08:17
All well I think until #3: Morality cannot be not purely social. To say so goes against the Kant's very own premise of universality, which would sidestep the OP's framework of reference required to answer the question. The example given: "live their lives ... without bothering others" ignores the applicability of the universalizability principle. Not all good or ill is a function of "bothering" others. The question deserves examination of the aspects of policy that would be moral and immoral as judged by application of the universalizability principle, and not just by social opinion. – pygosceles Jan 27 '20 at 06:06
@pygosceles I tried to boil it down to the level the OP shows. But morality for Kant *definitely* is a social phenomenon. The very idea of law is inherently social and even duties against oneself are justified with aspects which consider others/humanity. This does not mean that it is *opinion*, it is part of the universalisation itself. – Philip Klöcking Jan 27 '20 at 07:16
1

My understanding of the principle - admittedly based on secondary sources - is that something is moral only if theoretically *everyone* (not *anyone*) can do it, so it doesn't matter if it's possible for homosexuals to live their lives without bothering others in the real world; the real question is whether a theoretical world without any procreation can be adopted. Could you cite Kant for your three points to clear up any possible misunderstanding of his position? – b a Jan 28 '20 at 14:46
@ba I agree. Mutual exclusivity is not defined exclusively through social phenomena. As I understand it, social and personal feelings and preferences are taken into account after mutual exclusivity issues have been resolved. This is touched upon somewhat in the following tutorial contrasting "perfect" and "imperfect" duties: http://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/160/questions/kant.html – pygosceles Jan 29 '20 at 22:18
@ba I edited this answer, but refused to adopt a different style here. The answer linked at the top of this one includes several references. – Philip Klöcking Jan 29 '20 at 23:38
@PhilipKlöcking This still sidesteps the consequences, for example, of inability to reproduce if all people were to adopt a homosexual lifestyle. – pygosceles Jan 29 '20 at 23:45
@ba But to answer directly to the concern raised, maxims and actions are not bijectional, ie. the same maxim may end up in different particular behaviours while the very same behaviour may be grounded in different maxims. This is why the maxim towards sexual acts adopted by a homosexual person does not necessarily demand same-sex practices from everyone if universalised. – Philip Klöcking Jan 29 '20 at 23:47
@pygosceles The consequence of the maxim mentioned is that there is procreation since the majority still prefers the other sex and is free to act accordingly. What exactly is there not to be understood? There are maxims where several sexual practices can be subsumed under. Full stop. See my last comment. There is no question that demanding everyone to adopt "homosexual lifestyle" - whatever that may be - is immoral. No homosexual person in their right mind does that. Conversely, it's equally immoral to demand from them to act against their personality. – Philip Klöcking Jan 29 '20 at 23:53
@PhilipKlöcking This is why in my answer I adopt universal quantification over situations; it isolates the actions and is not situational, i.e., it is the most "raw" expression of policy. I address the matter of *heterosexual abstinence* implied by *following the homosexual preference*, which eliminates the "if..." clauses in your situational statements. I show that if one adheres to the policy regardless of situation, the consequences are dire. It cannot be claimed that no such policy could or does exist. Also, propensity does not indicate need, it indicates preference. – pygosceles Jan 29 '20 at 23:56
@PhilipKlöcking The existence of personality/preference in itself indicates nothing about morality or immorality, and can be contradicted by duty. Let's be consistent and use the same framework for deciding morality or immorality of a policy. I see what you are saying about making the preference conditional on personal preference, however that presupposes that not everyone thinks his sexual proclivity can be satisfied only through homosexual activity, which is a logically dangerous presumption. It still hazards extinction based on circumstance or feelings and so wouldn't pass a CI test. – pygosceles Jan 30 '20 at 00:05
@pygosceles Then you do not universalise **maxims**, ie. you do not apply the Categorical Imperative **correctly**. Maxims do and have to contain situational "ifs". It's in the texts, by word of god (Kant). You cannot simply put anything in there and say "since the consequences here are dire, it is morally wrong according to Kant". This is fallacious. If one adheres to a policy regardless the situation, this will end up in problems almost **all of the times**. What you did there is exactly the hallowing out of the CI that results in Fichte's and Hegel's formalism criticism being correct. – Philip Klöcking Jan 30 '20 at 00:06
@PhilipKlöcking Universal quantification is a valid situation. "In every case" is as valid as any other condition triggering a policy. Pan-situational is in that sense "situational". Furthermore, the policies "limit", "exclude", or "select" already apply discriminators to the behavior by closure. Such limiting conditions are included in my answer. "Turn over every red piece on the board" contains a situational trigger for the action. Hegel's criticism seems nihilistic and non-connectionistic, and is self-defeating in that it assumes no actor of the policy, which itself raises contradiction. – pygosceles Jan 30 '20 at 00:27
@pygosceles If anything, you have shown that the particular formulations/iterations you chose result in problematic outcomes. That's not saying much. I still do not see how my suggestion would fail the CI test just because it leads to problematic consequences *given premises that are not reasonable*. Kant's Anthropology makes it explicit that in order to correctly apply his morals, one needs to know a whole lot about *how the world is*. I think it more logically dangerous to consider *what ifs* instead of *facts* when evaluating whether a world with the maxim universally adopted is consistent. – Philip Klöcking Jan 30 '20 at 00:37
What I'm asking is just if your application of the categorical imperative is faithful to Kant. You prefer to phrase the maxim "If I want to satisfy my sexual needs, I will act in accordance with my sexual orientation" (universalizable) over "If I want to satisfy my sexual needs, I will do so with a homosexual partner" (not universalizable) but to Kant (I assume) the concept of sexual orientation wasn't available but homosexuality was. In other words, could you clarify, is this Kant, or is this a neo-Kantian meditation that takes Kant as a starting point? – b a Jan 30 '20 at 00:59
@ba Kant did not write much on sex, but what he did implies that he himself rejected any kind of sex which does not serve procreation (MM 6:224-27, Anthr 7:276-77). The former reference involves musings about unnatural use of one's sexual capacities, suggesting a theologically influenced natural teleology of sexuality. This is not surprising considering his time, though (Fichte lost his chair at Jena for being godless). – Philip Klöcking Jan 30 '20 at 01:19

score 0 · Answer 2 · answered Jan 27 '20 at 05:57

Kant's universalizability principle (theory), ... tells us that if a course of action cannot be universally adopted it must be morally impermissible. So in that case what is the actual standing of LGBT?

Philip makes a good point that one's un-enacted sexual desires or background inclinations of various sorts do not cause a person to commit evil, or any other action upon which we could pass moral judgment. It would be like saying "I felt a temptation to steal, which was contrary to my own will, and I resisted. Therefore I am a thief!" Only giving way to an inclination or temptation brings upon oneself the moral consequences of the action.

Kant expressed his categorical imperative as "Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature." (emphasis added)

This means that one must consider actions and policies of action in order to apply the imperative. Philip is right that a background condition that is unrelated to one's choices is not a candidate for a maxim (policy) of action and thus cannot be evaluated in this framework, being amoral. However, since our society routinely conflates circumstance with intentional action (and not infrequently via these labels), I think it would be worthwhile to examine various policies and see what we can deduce by applying Kant's imperative.

Therefore, the answer without qualification would be: Yes and no. Yes with regard to behaviors or policies arising from LGBT inclinations, and No with regard to the inclinations themselves.

While it might be impossible to cover every possible scenario, let's consider several simple policies. Enumerating every consequence may also be possible, but naming a few should help us to apply Kant's principle.

Homosexual activity maxim: Limiting all sexual activity to within the same sex. Consequences include: Failure to reproduce, extinction of the race.
Bisexual activity maxim: All people engage in sexual acts with both sexes. Consequences include: Polygamy, polyamory, lack of marital and single-partner fidelity. Some potential to reproduce, but with dissolution of atomic families.
Transgender identity maxim: Claiming a different gender identity than one's biological sex, potentially including abiological labels. Consequences include: Similar to (2), arbitrary combinations of sexual partnering become the norm. Any advantages or specializations of biological sex and the ability to distinguish accurately between the sexes are lost.
No sexual activity maxim: Due to gender confusion or same-sex attraction or other fears or beliefs, engage in no sexual activity. Consequences include: Potentially, failure to reproduce and extinction of the race, depending on the prevalence of the conditions and beliefs that lead to lack of engagement. Could also include reproduction for some of those not excluded by their beliefs.
Heterosexual activity maxim: Limiting all sexual activity to between partners of the opposite sex. Accurately self-identifying individuals by biological sex. Consequences include: Ability to reproduce and replenish the race. Potential for strong atomic families not torn by any sexual jealousies. Advantages of distinct and accurate designations and specializations of sexuality.

Personal maxims 1-3 (and 4 in the most restrictive case) fail the universalizability test, in that they each inflict harm to society and civilization when the individual maxim becomes a universal law. We can expect and can observe these same effects empirically at the individual scale.

Again, the applicability of these analyses depends on whether an inclination is acted on, or becomes a personal maxim of behavior. Hence it behooves us to differentiate in our language between merely experiencing a proclivity or perception and acting in such a way that embodies that perception as though it were true. We cannot apply the categorical imperative to circumstances, but we can apply it to behaviors.

Your examples are no maxims proper. Take this: If I am to look for a sexual partner (situation) in order to feel well with them (goal), I should only follow my inclinations (means) as long as no third person is involved (*ceteris paribus* condition, part of every situational constraint). The argument here shows similar oversimplification as the OP does. — Philip Klöcking, Jan 27 '20 at 07:23
The effects mentioned can be demonstrated regardless of the intent or goal. The situation is as described. The maxims are not oversimplified, since the consequent can be shown regardless of all possible values ascribed to other parameters. *Ceteris paribus* clearly does not apply to potentially procreative activities, and I don't see it as a dogmatic constraint on the ability to test for universalizability in a Kantian framework. I believe you may be prematurely narrowing the scope of the test to feelings in a two-party framework, when it has already failed a mutual exclusivity test. — pygosceles, Jan 29 '20 at 22:11
Your examples are on par with the classical "It is immoral to want to go to the court and play tennis on Sundays at 10am because if everyone did that, the courts would be overcrowded at that time and nobody could actually play tennis" - this kind of example shows that this cannot be how the CI is meant to work like and why I (and Timmermann, and Allison, and probably Korsgaard) am convinced that they are based on a wrong understanding of what kind of 'maxim' should be universalised here. Again, if sexual orientation *was* a choice, things may be different. — Philip Klöcking, Jan 29 '20 at 22:27
@PhilipKlöcking There is actually nothing physically preventing people from building more courts until their desired condition is gratified. Furthermore wanting to go is not the same as going. Everyone can want to go, no problem. The example seems contrived and would generally refute the CI as a logical method if it illustrated a universal monkey wrench in the phenomenon. No such contradiction arises in the above examples; contention over scarce resources is not in the imperative. One's choice to engage in homosexual behaviors or to label oneself *are choices*, as I illustrated. — pygosceles, Jan 29 '20 at 22:35
I added a point to my answer to express more clearly what I am getting at here than possible or adequate in comments. Btw, the example is a classic in literature, it's not mine. — Philip Klöcking, Jan 29 '20 at 23:41
@PhilipKlöcking Classic in literature is fine, but it's still flawed: If everyone determines to become supreme king of the universe, then we run into a genuine contention, and we find that this policy fails the CI test. This is not because the CI test is flawed, but rather because the policy is immoral; it cannot be made into a universal law. Failure to respect others' rights is mutually exclusive and hence immoral. If there were a million men on the Earth and only one woman, it would not be immoral for the men to have the policy, "*one* of us should marry her." It results in no contradiction. — pygosceles, Jan 29 '20 at 23:47