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My "freedom toward death" (Being and Time, p255, SUNY Press, 1 Jan 1996) is key for authenticity, according to Heidegger.

It seems obvious that he means that this freedom is me, and that claim for be found in the secondary literature (where it is called "freedom for myself", Time of Life, The: Heidegger and Ethos, By William McNeill, p62).

Does any of the secondary literature claim that freedom towards death is for others, not for me? Either correcting Heidegger, or his interpreters.

I don't think Levinas (whom I've read) does, despite his work with Heidegger's philosophy and over-arching interested in the "Other".


I'm asking because I've read it claimed that authenticity is freedom to be whatever you want (a fascist, a communist, whatever).

I think that if my freedom is for others then my authenticity would not fall foul of that.

  • i am NOT pushing a personal philosophy, the question is correctly worded. i am still angry with the way people vote here –  Aug 05 '19 at 02:44
  • seems like a perfectly reasonable question to me. i guess i don't understand the site. –  Aug 05 '19 at 03:08
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    Is "freedom toward death" the opposite of "freedom from death"? In, "I've read it claimed..." what does "it" refer to? - I do these kinds of things too; I find that my intent comes out clearer when I try to explain as on to the mediocre, but read as from a teacher. – christo183 Aug 05 '19 at 05:55
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    I am down-voting this because I cannot make sense of the post; I cannot parse this into an answerable question. "Freedom toward [x]" is not proper English, it has no generally recognised meaning. I have no idea what you mean by "Levinas". And "authenticity is freedom to be whatever you want" demands at least a link to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_(philosophy). The post should be edited to better explain what the question is about. Until then I am keeping my -1, because post cannot be answered without an edit. – MichaelK Aug 05 '19 at 08:48
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    @another_name I think there is certainly an interesting germ of a question here, but we simply need more context from you to be able to provide a targeted answer. Your question involves some reasoning that you have done on your own that is opaque to us, and includes non-standard terminology. Try to reconstruct the reasoning you are doing here more slowly, defining terms, and explaining the references you make, etc. At least briefly. It is not that you don't have a legitimate question in your head, but rather that we do not see that question communicated clearly in what you've written. – transitionsynthesis Aug 05 '19 at 18:08
  • it's standard heideggerian terminology! sheesh @MichaelK –  Aug 05 '19 at 18:33
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    @another_name It remains that no one understands your question. If you are unwilling to work with us on that, then I'm not sure what you expect out of this. – transitionsynthesis Aug 05 '19 at 18:38
  • it'd be easily understood by anyone with a broad familiarity with Being and Time! @transitionsynthesis –  Aug 05 '19 at 18:40
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    @another_name I have plenty of familiarity with B&T, and I can see the outlines of what you're gesturing towards. It sounds like the start of an interesting discussion, but you haven't provided me with enough material to provide any kind of authoritative answer to the question. Having a chat about a vague idea is different than posing a targeted question that actually has a legitimate exegetical answer on a Stack Exchange. Hopefully someone else will come along that disagrees and answers the question. – transitionsynthesis Aug 05 '19 at 18:42
  • then what don't you understand @transitionsynthesis i'll work on the wording –  Aug 05 '19 at 18:43
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    @another_name Again, the way I read it, this question sounds like it is based on some reasoning that you have done on your own that you have found in a secondary source outside of B&T. Connect the dots for us on the reasoning you've already done to set up the question. – transitionsynthesis Aug 05 '19 at 18:45
  • @transitionsynthesis done? –  Aug 05 '19 at 18:46
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    Is "sheesh" also "standard heideggerian terminology"? Please educate us fools that are wallowing in ignorance. Or put in plain unadulterated English: put your question in plain unadulterated English, that does not require people to have have read Heidegger, Heidegger, that boozy beggar, just to answer your question, a'ight mate? – MichaelK Aug 05 '19 at 19:06
  • how does someone get offended by 'sheesh' @MichaelK –  Aug 05 '19 at 19:10
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    How does someone get offended by being asked to clarify their question? And what "offends" - annoys, is a much more appropriate description - about "sheesh" is its arrogance, its lack of cooperative spirit, and its complete waste of time for all involved instead of just doing what is asked on order that the question may be resolved in the most efficient manner. It also annoys in that is suggests that whoever posted that simply does not care about any of this and the whole post is a waste of perfectly good bandwidth. So, kindly get on with it and just clarify the question, please. – MichaelK Aug 05 '19 at 19:23
  • same to you @MichaelK –  Aug 05 '19 at 19:32
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    @MichaelK There is absolutely nothing wrong in using special terminology if the context is made clear. If the language is used by authors in weird ways (and Heidegger had a tendency to do that), should we omit technical terms in order to write in plain English what people not acquainted with the material cannot answer anyway? I do not claim that the question was perfect in the beginning, but as framed now, I think it to be quite well-framed, although adding the edition/chapter of Being and Time for better reference would help. – Philip Klöcking Aug 05 '19 at 19:39

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There's a helpful question here on the notion of "freedom toward death" (Can "freedom toward death" have 'freedom' translated out of it?).

For this question, I find the first sentence to be a bit imprecise:

My "freedom toward death" (Sein und Zeit, p266) is key for authenticity, according to Heidegger.

Authenticity for Heidegger is precisely to be conscious of one's being towards death. So my freedom towards death is the ability to relate to the possibility of one's own death freely and without looking away from it.

Thus,

Does any of the secondary literature claim that it is for others, not for me? Either correcting Heidegger, or his interpreters?

it does not make sense to speak of "it" (this freedom?) as being for others rather than for the Da-Sein (the I) because the freedom is precisely to face up to one's own utmost possibility in death.

I'm asking because I've read it claimed that authenticity is freedom to be whatever you want (a fascist, a communist, whatever).

This definition of freedom as radical freedom is more Sartre than Heidegger. For Sartre, authenticity is to be the source of one's own values and to not merely receive anything passively. In other words, it is to recognize that all choices and all of the contexts for choices stem from a radically free self. (This is Sartre's view -- I am not claiming it is true here).

In contast, Heidegger's idea of authenticity (more properly Eigentlichkeit) is being one's own self -- which for Heidegger is a being that will eventually die. Thus, the "authentic" element here is not that I believe I make all of the choices about my life and values but rather that I recognize that my existence is predicated on the possibility and eventual actuality of my own death. The only sense in which others can have my "freedom towards death" is that they can kill me and that is one possible way that I can die.

It should be noted that a common accusation against Heidegger is that he lacks a political philosophy and an ethics. In fact, authenticity (again Eigentlichkeit) is according to Heidegger not a moral category. (This does not mean Heidegger is right about its nature).

Sources

virmaior
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  • great answer, thanks. –  Aug 06 '19 at 01:30
  • `relate to the possibility of one's own death freely` I may be mistaken but it seems to me this "freely" is not necessary and not very Heideggerian. There is being towards death (with its concomitant authenticity if it is experienced as my and the true possibility), not freedom towards death. Freedom is rather an important consequence of this, of the being and the authenticity. To repeat, I may be incorrect. – ttnphns Aug 06 '19 at 08:18
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    I think you're putting something into freely that occurs in the normal definition but that I am not trying to say in my answer here. Specifically, I'm addressing the quoted wording "freedom towards death" which is definitely not Heidegger's most normal articulation, but appears to be what he writes. My adverbially usage is perhaps inept to express that because it might invite the very point you are raising, but I took the more salient question here to be the one about whether others can experience Da-Sein's "freedom towards death" -- to which the answer is no. – virmaior Aug 06 '19 at 14:11