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G. E. M. Anscombe criticizes the following happiness principle of utility in Modern Moral Philosophy as an adequate judgement for moral behavior (midway, page 7 of the link):

"The greatest happiness principle ought to be employed in all decisions."

This made me wonder whether the happiness principle of utility really is a good thing? How would we learn without some pain? How would anything change if we were always happy with the way things were, if the greatest happiness principle were attainable?

Stephen Nathanson writes this about utilitarianism:

Utilitarians believe that the purpose of morality is to make life better by increasing the amount of good things (such as pleasure and happiness) in the world and decreasing the amount of bad things (such as pain and unhappiness).

He further explains what utilitarians believe about suffering and unhappiness:

Likewise, on the negative side, a lack of food, friends, or freedom is instrumentally bad because it produces pain, suffering, and unhappiness; but pain, suffering and unhappiness are intrinsically bad, i.e. bad in themselves and not because they produce some further bad thing.

But are suffering and unhappiness "intrinsically bad" if they motivate improvements? That is the motivation for my question. Perhaps unhappiness is also a principle of utility.

What moral philosopher explores various unhappiness principles as good? I would like to read a philosophical account of such a perspective, so a reference would be useful.


References from comments:

Other references found indirectly from the above sources:

Frank Hubeny
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    Eugene Thacker comes to mind... – Joseph Weissman Mar 01 '19 at 19:22
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    Motivating improvements does not contradict "intrinsically bad", it just means that expected utility down the road can outweigh the bad. Making unhappiness into *the utility* would mean pursuing unhappiness *for its own sake*, not for motivating something else. This does not quite apply even to Sacher-Masoch, and moral masochism is considered more in the medical literature, see e.g. [Depression and Moral Masochism by Markson](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8307700). – Conifold Mar 01 '19 at 22:37
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    I doubt you will find notable philosophers openly endorsing what is still largely seen as a disorder or perversion. But see [Trigg's Pain and Emotion](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184104), and [Hookom's 2011 dissertation on the ethical significance of pain](https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1087&context=philosophy_theses). – Conifold Mar 01 '19 at 22:37
  • @Conifold Hookom's thesis was exactly what I was hoping to find. Thanks. – Frank Hubeny Mar 02 '19 at 10:58
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    The Perennial philosophy takes the view of unhappiness you describe. Without it we would be in the position of the gods and never have the motivation to escape life and death. A problem arises for your idea that pain is the opposite of happiness, however, since for the skilled practitioner of Yoga pain would not affect happiness. They seek the cessation of suffering but this is not the end of pain, just the end of our ownership of it, and in the end both happiness and unhappiness are transcended, This view does not see suffering as intrinsically bad or even intrinsically real. . . . –  Mar 02 '19 at 12:45
  • @PeterJ I think that would be similar to Anscombe's perspective as well. I don't think either unhappiness or happiness could be a principle of utility for moral philosophy. I am more looking at unhappiness because it appears to be the opposite of what utilitarianism offers to see how that challenges utilitarianism. – Frank Hubeny Mar 02 '19 at 15:17

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Goodness, Aristotle defines as that beyond ends. (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/)

Suffering is not intrinsically bad, as it doesn't always hinder or prevent the Good, that is, the fulfillment of Man. As man is a composite being, both of matter and form, and as the spirit is the form of the body, it is Good for man to suffer if doing so is Good for his soul, which is superior.

However, unhappiness, if taken as the opposite of happiness, which is Good, as defined by Aristotle, is intrinsically evil. If, however, it is taken as simply the emotion of being unhappy, it is not intrinsically evil for an unhappy-feeling person can still gain the Good.

Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas have explored the nature of Good, Evil, and Suffering in their works in the realist tradition, most notably, Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle and the Summa Theologica by Aquinas.

user96931
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  • Thank you. +1 Would you have a place in the Summa Theologica where Aquinas discusses this? – Frank Hubeny Mar 02 '19 at 00:34
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    A Guardian article (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/12/thomas-aquinas-question-evil) glosses over Thomas' thoughts on suffering, which can be a form of evil, and he defines evil (by its cause) in the Summa Theologica Q.49 (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/12/thomas-aquinas-question-evil). There's a concise summary of what he said here (https://philosophyclass.net/aquinasonevil.htm) along with an flow-of-thought. – user96931 Mar 05 '19 at 18:15
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    Aquinas also comprehensibly covers this here, Summa Theologica Question 18.(http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article1) – user96931 Mar 05 '19 at 18:16
  • Thank you! That gives me a place to go for more information. – Frank Hubeny Mar 05 '19 at 20:44