Does anyone say that Being is a primitive, unanalyzable, term?
That probably would make Being and Time the greatest work of nonsense of all time. I certainly feel able to imagine that Being is unanalyzable, even that Being and Time is almost entirely nonsense. Has Heidegger or any Heideggerian responded to any such complaint?
Let's start by considering the existence as quantification point of view. In this case, "X exists," can be paraphrased as, "There is at least 1 X" (or, if we want to allow degenerate amounts, "There are not 0-many Xs"). Seems simple enough; and quantification might seem qualitatively primitive (insofar as the quantitative-qualitative distinction itself is relevant to the whole question of conceptual break-down analysis).
"Alas," this is not quite so. Consider the Stanford EP article on quantifiers and quantification overall. There are about 30+ sections/subsections in this article. The SEP also contains entries focusing on generalized quantifiers or plural quantification. So it turns out that the notion of quantities-as-existence/quantities-of-existence, if not "analyzable" in the break-down sense, certainly can be "analyzed into" a plenum of further mysteries. (With respect to general quantifiers, there is an option where we would have infinitely many special quantifiers in place, e.g. as assigned their value from various transfinite cardinals. The types of sets in the higher infinite could be construed as higher forms of existence, as quantification, itself.}
And so that's just starting with the quantification view (c.f. problems with the related, or perhaps (ultimately) equivalent, concept of reference). Consider modal logic, now. Aren't possibility and necessity in roughly the same category as actuality? But is actuality different from existence? Meinongianism is (in)famous for two subcategories of being/existence/actuality, one involving an existence-type predicate and the other just being(!) the existential quantifier; or we might speak of broader "degrees of existence". And actualists will wage war across the multiverse with possibilists until all other possible-worlds talk goes down in flames, if need be.
Note that Kant's theory of modality epiphenomenalizes not only being/existence directly, but the possible and necessary forms of this to boot. He would not have countenanced ontological arguments from God's supposed self-necessity anymore than he countenanced such arguments as were grounded on God's supposed self-actuality. Regardless of whether these issues are truly resolved by Kant/his inheritors, the very question of how modal predicates work (substantially or epiphenomenally, so to say) adds depth to the "analysis" of existence. Moreso when with Meinong we layer actuality, or with fringe logicians of our day we nontrivially iterate the modal operators.
A last moment of reflection: the uncreatable/uncreated/created trichotomy also seems to bear on (or be borne upon by) the "category" of generic existence. That is, if the concept of existence is an essentially self-pluralizing concept, or such as to have all these many and varied natures to its pure name, then I would think the theistic existence-predicates might be situated in the entire array, though where and how exactly is not totally clear to me, right now. Note that it is not immediate to the creation-theoretic trichotomy as displayed that it also incorporates the concepts of destructible and indestructible being into their representation; but note that destroying the destruction of something could also be styled a recreation of said thing.
So the concept of destruction is also an analyzable "content" of our reflection on the concept of existence, with all the dark complexity that it should bring to our questions.
Derrida answers this while on the subject of history, in Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, page 209
Being in general is nothing, but the multiplicity of beings and of types of beings could not be thought as such, beings could not be thought as such without pre-comprehension at least of the meaning of being in general.
And the fuller context of the quote.
each determinate historicity, each determinate historial line, has its irreducible originality, its own movement and temporal rhythm: the historicity of equipment, of technology, the historicity of institutions, the historicity of works of art, and within the historicity of art, the historicity of different types of art, and so on. ... To speak of historicity in general is not to affirm that there is a general history; it is to affirm that there is a meaning to historicity, not a meaning of history, but a meaning of historicity without which I could not even speak of determinate historicities. ... To speak of a meaning of historicity in general is no more to affirm that there is a general history than to speak of the meaning or the question of the meaning of being in general signifies for the beingness of Being in general. Being in general is nothing, but the multiplicity of beings and of types of beings could not be thought as such, beings could not be thought as such without pre-comprehension at least of the meaning of being in general.
So, just as there is meaning of being, just as the meaning of being comes about only because Da-sein ek-sists, so the historicity of history and therefore of histories only comes about because Dasein produces it and is produced (both things have to be said at once) in the historicity of its In-der-Welt-sein. Precomprehended meaning of historicity and not of history in general.
Furthermore in Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) 270 The essence of beyng, p381
Beyng is nothing "in itself" and nothing "for" a "subject." Only beingness can appear as this sort of an "in itself" and can do so only in the form of an effete φύσις [phusis/nature], i.e., as ιδἐα, the Καθ' αὐτo ["for itself"], something represented, an object. An extreme confinement in objectivity befalls all attempts to find "being" and its "determinations" (categories) in the manner of something objectively present.
