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Philosophers throughout the history (most known to me are from the German Idealism school) have used the idea of an "intellectual intuition" - often (in German Idealism) the way that a certain "genius" is able to "connect" to the thing-in-itself/absolute self/etc. The idea used to rely on the fact that intuition always seemed to us as something quite mysterious - how can we do something without really thinking about it?

Recent biological/neurological studies have come to the conclusion they can explain intuition (I'd must admit I'm not exactly familiar with the research, so I'm not sure what the exact results were, I just heard about it) by means of sociological, biological, and neurological explanations.

My question is, does the fact that these intuitions can be explained scientifically should inherently reject the idea of such "intellectual intuition"? (and I know about the "science can't affect metaphysics" issue, but this seems deeper than that.)

Edit:

In the second paragraph I've stated that recent studies have found such explanations. I must take my words back and ask instead - if such explanations will be found (of course it could he stated that such explanations simply can't possibly be found, but I hope to see answers that do go down that rabbit hole and assumes such explanations can actually be found), would that necessarily refute the "intellectual intuition" idea?

Edit (2):

I just want to emphasize the point of this question more to the German Idealism kind of intuition - the aesthetic one, the one related to the "genius" (often the example is of drawing "unconsciously", by the pure intellectual intuition).

Yechiam Weiss
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    Do you have any reference to such studies? I can't imagine any meaningful sense that it could be said that they *explain* intuition. They observe neuronal activity in various regions, but that seems pretty far removed from the subjective grasping of experience that we would normally associate with the idea of intuition. –  Feb 27 '18 at 12:52
  • @PédeLeão for example (not exactly a research, but an article that's talking about a research and cites it) - https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080701135820.htm – Yechiam Weiss Feb 27 '18 at 13:00
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    But this article doesn't say that they explain intuition. It says "Intuition, or tacit knowledge, is difficult to measure, so it is often *denigrated*. A new dissertation in education research shows that there is a neurobiological explanation for how experience-based knowledge is created."; so basically the research is supporting the idea of intuition against those who *denigrate* it because it can't be measured. And aren't you denigating it by writing we "should inherently reject the idea of such 'intellectual intuition'"? – Mozibur Ullah Feb 27 '18 at 13:13
  • Do you have any more 'studies' that you have looked at? As I see you have used the word study in the plural. How many studies have you looked at, we can at least measure that...;). – Mozibur Ullah Feb 27 '18 at 13:19
  • @MoziburUllah admittedly, (as I've written in the question,) I haven't exactly read studies on the subject, just heard of them. And the line you quoted from the article isn't exactly going against the view that denigrates intuition, but rather trying to refute the denigration by saying that intuition can indeed be measured (in means of neurobiological studies). But I'll take the criticism and edit the question to perhaps answer the comments. – Yechiam Weiss Feb 27 '18 at 13:51
  • There are several problems with this. Intuition is a notoriously hazy word, it is not clear that colloquial "intuition", which the studies presumably explore, is anything but a homophone of "intellectual intuition". Even if it wasn't this would be analogous to "free will", metaphysical posit can not be "rejected" by empirical studies, it can at best be undermined. And for that the two "intuitions" would have to be intended in a similar sense, which I am not at all sure they are. Even if they were why would explaining "experience-based knowledge" undermine having experience-based knowledge? – Conifold Feb 27 '18 at 20:48
  • Here is a link to [Bjorklund's paper Intuitive Practitioner](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.101.5882) (Science Daily release is based on his study). It is clear that "intuition" he talks about is expertise/knowledge how, which is definitely not what proponents of "intellectual intuition" had in mind. Here is a general review of [theories of expertise](http://users.sussex.ac.uk/~bend/doh/reporthtmlnode5.html). – Conifold Feb 27 '18 at 21:28
  • @Conifold about the paper - yeah, I've stated in the edit that I don't necessarily mean published work, but possible future work. And about your first comment, that was basically my question. I'd ask first, how could it even undermine it? And for your question, explaining experience-based knowledge doesn't necessarily undermine having experience-based knowledge, but it might undermine the idea of intellectual intuition because that idea is mostly building upon the fact that intuition *can't* be explained, so we can think of it in a "mystical" way. At least that's how I understand it. – Yechiam Weiss Feb 28 '18 at 00:39
  • If it was so mystical that it could not be explained we wouldn't understand what we mean by it when talking to each other. Hegel certainly did not explain it mystically. He described it as akin to Kant's intellectus archetypus, which was defined as the kind of intellect where "*the object itself is created by the representation*" (as opposed to our discursive intellect that accesses objects through senses). More precisely, our intellect is mixed, and the non-discursive side that "co-creates" objects is "intellectual intuition". Minus the term it is a common idea in social constructivism. – Conifold Feb 28 '18 at 02:33
  • This seems like a category error that separates 'real' things from 'derived' things as if everything weren't derived from something. Does a scientific explanation of how your legs work prevent you from having control over them? –  Feb 28 '18 at 20:01
  • This hits me as the kind of thing that creates pointless conflict between science and other things. –  Feb 28 '18 at 20:17
  • @jobermark no it won't prevent you from having control over them, but might prevent (or undermine) some special explanation to them, such as "your legs work because you must go where you're destined to go" or something like that. – Yechiam Weiss Mar 01 '18 at 01:04
  • But the vast majority of idealist notions don't give an explanation, they claim that it is obvious that there is no need for one, and that our ability to function in the world via thinking makes mind the primary focus of inquiry in philosophy. Both accounts can still be true in different terms. We don't know that matter is not made up of information -- in fact for certain kinds of physics, it is -- by knowing how matter, once it is constituted, then functions. –  Mar 01 '18 at 15:46
  • @jobermark I'm not sure I follow your thoughts. Are you saying that idealist notions don't require explanations, hence explaining them is practically unrelated to the notions themselves? – Yechiam Weiss Mar 01 '18 at 16:07
  • But biology does not examine such ideas. Psychology does. And intuition is an unconscious reasoning - unconiscious because you don't know the derivation your brain had, only the result, this is how intuition is different from logic. – rus9384 Jul 28 '18 at 17:34

2 Answers2

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It has been argued that most of our reasoning is based on intuiting conclusions, and only then using reason to back them up https://www.skepticink.com/tippling/2013/11/14/post-hoc-rationalisation-reasoning-our-intuition-and-changing-our-minds/ From this perspective intuition faces a range of problems, as being potentially irrational biased or partisan, and stopping us listening properly to the reasoning of others who's conclusions we may have already spontaneously decided to disagree with.

Another angle on intuition is to look at the psycological state of flow, which seems to be about mind and body working together, and skilled intuitive thought and action https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flow_(psychology) This suggests a more positive view of intuition, or at least the potential for it.

In the philosophical context you are talking about though, intuition is often used for justification where reasoning alone cannot be used. Hume concluded "Reason Is and Ought Only to Be the Slave of the Passions", because reason alone cannot motivate us, or give us the cornerstones for our morality, which must both be fundamentally intuitive.

I suggest intuition is a flawed tool we all rely on more than we realise, but which can be educated. Buddhist practices like generating bodhicitta, compassion for all beings, will shift intuitive patterns. Daoism seems to be aimed entirely at educating intuition. But these kind of lived practices seem more to the point than justifying assumption/conclusions or gaps in reasoning.

CriglCragl
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I find the question difficult because of the various assumptions. Transcendental or Absolute Idealism places the source of intuition beyond the intellect as does the Perennial philosophy as a whole so 'intellectual intuition' may not be the best phrase for what you're after.

Recent neurobiological studies have not explained intuition and I predict that such studies never will. It is possible that one day science may explain such things but this will require a major paradigm shift. While natural scientists cannot explain or even find consciousness it isn't going to happen.

I'm tempted to propose that there is no such thing as 'intellectual intuition' but it might depend what you mean by the words.

The final paragraph of CriglCragl's answer raises many of the underlying issues. To understand intuition we would need to find its source, and like everything else it would come down to understanding consciousness and its source. Or at least this is a widespread view.

  • I'd admit this definitely isn't one of my better questions, but I think you might've not addressed the "intellectual intuition" I'm talking about (the major issue with this question is the obscurity of my definition/usage of "intellectual intuition"). When Kant talks about a "Genius" that paints without acknowledging what he did physically, but rather explain it by some apparently mystical intuition, he calls it an "intellectual intuition" (the translation might be flawed from Hebrew) that comes from the thing-in-itself (/God), as the only connection we may have with It. – Yechiam Weiss Jun 28 '18 at 17:10
  • @YechiamWeiss - Apologies. My answer was pedantic and probably misses the point. The idea that intuitions may originate with the thing-in-itself and emerge into the intellect as a mysterious 'feeling' is fine by me. It just seems misleading to call this 'intellectual' intuition. I find some of Kant's terminology unhelpful at times. Your comment about Hebrew is interesting. Does Kant's terminology here come from a Hebrew phrase? . –  Jun 29 '18 at 10:17
  • well, I translated it to English from reading it in Hebrew, there's no special relation between the term and Hebrew (as far as I know). If you'd like to try to translate it to a better term maybe, the herbrew term is "אינטואיציה אינטליגנטית", but I'm quite sure the term I use is the correct one in English, as when I looked it up it did present results such as this [PhilPaper](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORTIO-10). – Yechiam Weiss Jun 29 '18 at 11:21
  • @YechiamWeiss The article addresses my niggles. I dislike the phrase as it seems misleading but do see the point of it. It seems to suggest that intuitions are purely intellectual but this would not be the case when it is paired with the idea of a transcendental source. . –  Jun 30 '18 at 11:39
  • almost, it's more like that those intuitions are purely intellectual, where the only pure intellect would be the thing-in-itself, so that intellect comes from the transcendental source (this is basically the main problem with Kant's philosophy, or more specifically the Critique of Judgment, which the Neo-Kantians tried to solve). – Yechiam Weiss Jun 30 '18 at 13:01
  • @YechiamWeiss - I would want to argue with the idea that the intellect is the thing-in-itself. I can make no sense of it. It could be a terminology issue but it seems a lot deeper. I've never read Kant as suggesting this but then I only skimmed the Critique. I admire him for his courage and insightful analysis but see him as struggling towards a coherent view rather than arriving at one. –  Jul 01 '18 at 10:57
  • which is exactly the issue the Neo-Kantians tried to solve, main examples would be Schelling and Hegel. But for Kant, the idea isn't that the intellect is the thing-as-itself, but rather that it's the way to "communicate" (although that communication is one-sided) between the thing-in-itself and the subject (and the human subject that's able to achieve such communication is called "Genius", for Kant). – Yechiam Weiss Jul 01 '18 at 16:37
  • It should be noted that the Neo-Kantians altered that view and tried to blend the dualistic view of Kant into a monistic (for Hegel, for Schelling you may call it perhaps "non-dualistic") view, and "fixed" the "intellectual intuition" and the "Genius" accordingly. – Yechiam Weiss Jul 01 '18 at 16:37
  • @YechiamWeiss - That's roughly how i see things also. Hegel would be a step forward from Kant. I must check out Schelling since I don't know him. –  Jul 02 '18 at 11:42
  • I think you'd love him. I recently gotten into reading articles from a CIIS professor that blogs at footnotes2plato.com that's taking Whitehead and process philosophy as a direct continuity from Schelling, which is very interesting. – Yechiam Weiss Jul 02 '18 at 15:15
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    I've conducted a short tour of Schelling's thoughts and you're right, I love him. He seems to be well ahead of Kant and Hegel. I'd put him well ahead of Whitehead just on the basis of the quotations listed on Wiki. Thanks for the heads-up. –  Jul 03 '18 at 10:38