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I think a combination of science and philosophy alone leads to closer to truth.

Why is it that it is wrong to think that science alone leads to truth? Isn't empirical truth the only one we can be sure about? If there is any absolute truth at all, isn't it to be uncovered through the scientific method?

BlowMaMind
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    There is also *a priori* knowledge which is what makes empirical knowledge possible, as Kant held: "There is no danger of [the possible discovery that there is no *a priori* cognition at all]. It would be tantamount to someone's wishing to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we say that we cognize something by reason only when we are conscious that we could have known it even if we had not encountered it thus in experience; hence reason's cognition and *a priori* cognition are one and the same." –  Feb 26 '18 at 15:01
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    You said that science leads to *empirical* knowledge: this is true. We have also *mathematics*: it seems not empirical, but for sure it is a huge field of "knowledge". – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 26 '18 at 15:16
  • But it is hard to maintain that both empirical and mathematical knowledge can attain "absolute truth" (if any). – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 26 '18 at 15:17
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    @Mauro ALLEGRANZA I think that math and philosophy are kind of rational pure truths while science is empirical truths; and pure truths + empirical truths = Absolute truth?? – BlowMaMind Feb 26 '18 at 15:37
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    Not clear... I read "absolute truth" as certainty, indubitable knowledge. If so, no absolute truth at all. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 26 '18 at 15:40
  • Don't forget to add some history books. – Gordon Feb 26 '18 at 18:03
  • Is **truth** specifically the ultimate aim of philosophy? What about justice? For example, the infamous Trolley Problem is not a question or determining truth, but of deciding what is just (or moral or good or something else depending on your viewpoint). – Todd Wilcox Feb 26 '18 at 18:49
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    See also the fact that the principle of scientific induction is exactly as self-justifying as its negation ("if it's happened this way in the past, it won't happen this way in the future"). http://lesswrong.com/lw/s0/where_recursive_justification_hits_bottom/ – Patrick Stevens Feb 26 '18 at 20:06
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    What is truth? I'm not kidding. What is truth? Can you define that concept using science alone? If you're interested in this line of thinking, I can turn it into an answer, but it would probably be a better answer if I could get your opinion on the answers to those questions and tailor the answer to fit them. – Cort Ammon Feb 26 '18 at 20:26
  • @Cort Ammon Actually I am finding it pretty difficult to define truth. Maybe, that which can be empirically derived and/or logically deduced is truth?? – BlowMaMind Feb 27 '18 at 10:28
  • @Mauro ALLEGRANZA Ok. There is no _absolute_ truth, in the sense of being _completely_ certain. But surely, there is some form of _truth_, isn't there? Are you saying there is no meaning to the word _truth_? – BlowMaMind Feb 27 '18 at 10:42
  • @Patrick Stevens But the justification to the working of science is not self-justification, I think. It is justified if one assumes Empirism, I guess. – BlowMaMind Feb 27 '18 at 10:44
  • NO; I agree that we have a "reasonably" clear understanding of the concept of *truth*. Where I disagree with you is in speaking of "absolute truth". – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 27 '18 at 10:48
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    I'd say a person who thinks that science alone leads to truth is not worth arguing with. They wouldn't be capable of following the argument. It is surely blindingly obvious that this view is ridiculous. It's just the last refuge for people who are not capable of doing philosophy. –  Feb 27 '18 at 12:02
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    @PeterJ Fine. You could have ignored the ridiculous post. You didn't have to leave a worthless comment – BlowMaMind Feb 27 '18 at 12:04
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    Your question is very deep and funny -- these are the best! It is **self-referential** because you *do practice philosophy* -- not just science! -- in asking it; and it is therefore **self-answering** with a resounding **"NO":** You demonstrate that you cannot know whether science (i.e. science *sans* philosophy) is good enough to find the truth without transcending it. Very nice. – Peter - Reinstate Monica Feb 27 '18 at 14:54
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    this is a loaded question because it implies it is wrong. – amphibient Feb 27 '18 at 18:11
  • @BlowMaMind The justification to the working of science is "science seems to lead us to understand how the world works". Implicit is "science has always taught us more about the world in the past, so it will continue to do so in the future". But that is only justified by application of the principle of scientific induction; we only believe science works because we are already built to believe the principle of scientific induction. If we were instead built to believe its negation, we would continue to believe the negation for exactly the same reason: "it's never worked before, so it must now". – Patrick Stevens Feb 28 '18 at 00:29
  • @BlowMaMind - I think it is important to give common sense a voice, even if it ruffles feathers. But you may be right. Perhaps it does no good. I'm with Peter A Schneider on this one. . –  Feb 28 '18 at 11:06

10 Answers10

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The problem with scientism is that it's generally philosophically incoherent. Examine your own statements of scientistic dogma:

Isn't empirical truth the only one we can be sure about? If there is any absolute truth at all, isn't it to be uncovered through the scientific method?

Laying aside the thin veil of casting these as rhetorical questions, neither statement is an empirical truth, nor has been uncovered through the scientific method (if you disagree, describe to me the experiment that confirms them). They are therefore self-undermining statements of belief. You could have instead said "The only truths I accept are the ones that have been empirically confirmed," or "The scientific method has been the most valuable method of intellectual inquiry for the human race," but those statements rescue themselves from self-negation only at the price of making their value judgments more explicit.

There isn't necessarily anything demonstrably wrong with affirming science as your own personal belief system, as long as you understand that is what you're doing. But the belief that science itself confirms scientism, or is even capable, structurally, of confirming scientism is incorrect. That's not the kind of thing it was designed to do --those are exactly the kinds of pronouncements it withholds.

Chris Sunami
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    Also, if a scientist discovered a better method of learning than the scientific method, they would start using that. 500 years from now history books would say "For many years, research was predominantly done via the scientific method, an elementary form of research using experiments and drawing conclusions." And if that sounds ridiculous, well, consider all the work that was done without the scientific method, especially a formalized one. – corsiKa Feb 26 '18 at 18:30
  • Lol, saying something like "Science is the only way to obtain knowledge/truth." is wrong for exactly the same reason that saying something like "Philosophy is the only way to obtain knowledge/truth." is wrong. – industry7 Feb 26 '18 at 19:17
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    @corsiKa "consider all the work that was done without the scientific method, especially a formalized one" The Scientific Method is a metaphor, rather than a single method. Different areas of science use radically different methods. – CriglCragl Feb 26 '18 at 20:19
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    @CriglCragl No, the scientific method is a standard series of steps used across all science. Define your hypothesis, design an experiment that tests that hypothesis with predicted results, perform the experiment using controls, record observations, and compare observations with predictions. Then the process begins of explaining deviations between predictions and observations. It's not a metaphor, and the fact that it isn't common knowledge what the scientific method is is a failing of our school systems. – corsiKa Feb 26 '18 at 20:41
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    @corsiKa Read up. This is a big rabbit hole, that sadly for everyone few scientists go near, fostering scientism and causing replication of many of the tactics scientismists claim to be against https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem – CriglCragl Feb 26 '18 at 21:30
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    @CriglCragl I fail to see how your links support your claim that the scientific method is a metaphor. The opening paragraph of your demarcation article even says the people who disagree even have broad agreement on the scientific method. – corsiKa Feb 26 '18 at 21:51
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    @MartinArgerami I promise you I have a marvelous retort to your baseless insult that this comment is too narrow to contain. – corsiKa Feb 26 '18 at 21:56
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    @corsiKa You say "scientific method is a standard series of steps used across all science. Define hypothesis, design experiment that tests that hypothesis with predicted results, perform experiment using controls, record observations, & compare observations with predictions. Then begin of explaining deviations between predictions and observations" Article says "broad agreement on the basics". You imply these are the same. They are not. There are exceptions to every 'step' you have given, accepted as valid science. Scientists generally only learn their discipline, & not understand big picture – CriglCragl Feb 26 '18 at 22:05
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    @CriglCragl While it's certainly true that the implementations of each step are different across fields, that the steps exist across fields is not in question. There are no fields of science that lack hypotheses, none that lack experiments, none that lack observations, and none that lack comparing results to predictions. (There *are* individual scientist who lack them, and their work is filtered out via peer review, assuming infallible humans doing the checking.) Further, I fail to see how even if it were true that they were that the scientific method is metaphoric in any way. – corsiKa Feb 26 '18 at 22:58
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    @corsiKa Because it is not 'a method' but many methods. A lot of cosmology is done with simulations, and not even compared with the world but just testing for outputs of given assumptions. There are a million examples, and this isn't the place, and I am not interested in giving them. Scientific Method is like 'game' for Wittgenstein; yes we all think we know what it means, and that it's easy to identify what is in and out, but edge cases get very fuzzy and the point is culture of use in fact, not a stone tablet from the mind of the universe. – CriglCragl Feb 26 '18 at 23:10
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    @CriglCragl there are many methods (experimentation, simulation, gathering of fossils), but that does not mean that the scientific method is a metaphor. – RonJohn Feb 27 '18 at 03:28
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    @CriglCragl "*The Scientific Method is a metaphor*" what is it a metaphor of? – RonJohn Feb 27 '18 at 03:29
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    @CriglCragl "a lot of cosmology is done with simulations": this is true. But there would be little (scientific) point in those simulations if they were not based on previous observations and designed to make predictions in order to test hypotheses. There are many steps involved in studying something scientifically, and not all of them by themselves involve every component --- but the term "the scientific method" refers to the whole thing, when you put it all together. – N. Virgo Feb 27 '18 at 04:50
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    (When you say "not even compared with the world but just testing for outputs of given assumptions", that's just testing a meta hypothesis. Eventually, someone somewhere will use those simulation results to form a concrete hypothesis about the world that can be tested. Or at least, that's what we typically hope for.) – N. Virgo Feb 27 '18 at 04:54
  • @CriglCragl just terminology that I think would help, I don't think saying the "scientific method" is a metaphor, but rather a generalized term that essentially mean nothing in its generalization, only by a given specific context. – Yechiam Weiss Feb 27 '18 at 14:31
  • @corsiKa: funny that you use the words of a non-scientist (according to your definition) to assert your point. – Martin Argerami Feb 27 '18 at 14:47
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    @Nathaniel: and, moreover, we expect a *good* scientist to be aware of (and maybe even to point out) the limitations of "intermediate results" (such as findings from simulations) pending comparison(s) to real-world experiments. (In addition, coming from an experimental science, I also have to point out that "proper" experiments also frequently have implicit assumptions built in, so the situation isn't radically different there, anyways). – cbeleites unhappy with SX Feb 27 '18 at 15:53
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    How does "The only truths I accept are the ones that have been empirically confirmed" avoid self-negation? It seems to rely on introspection, which isn't subject to empirical confirmation. – John Coleman Feb 28 '18 at 12:17
  • Couldn't you dodge the problem by defining a "Scientism+" which is stated as "The only truths I accept are the ones that have been empirically confirmed, and also this statement"? – Ben Aaronson Feb 28 '18 at 12:53
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    @Ben Aaronson, kinda yes, but your definition is a bit incomplete. What does "empirical confirmation" constitute? Has that definition been empirically confirmed? If not, you need to add the definition to the statement. Is it the same definition for every field? Also, what is the definition of 'truths', do you deny your own experiences until they're empirically confirmed? A playful example of the issues: do you need to follow the steps for empirical confirmation before you accept as truth the observation that you are being beaten by a man with a pipe; the observation that you saw a ghost? – JustAnotherSoul Feb 28 '18 at 15:33
  • @JohnColeman I'm construing it as a performative statement --"I accept empirically confirmed truths." – Chris Sunami Feb 28 '18 at 15:47
  • @MartinArgerami Out of curiosity, to which words are you referring? Also just because someone doesn't fit a certain definition of "scientist" doesn't mean they can't say something valuable on the subject. – thanby Feb 28 '18 at 20:31
  • @thanby: the "margin" quote is notably by Fermat, a mathematician. CorsiKa's definition of science does not include mathematics. – Martin Argerami Feb 28 '18 at 20:34
  • "nor has been uncovered through the scientific method (if you disagree, describe to me the experiment that confirms them)" Well, the fact that science *works* is a pretty big factor. On a meta-level, we are observing that "using scientific method => able to uncover truths about the world". I believe that this provides evidence to the statement "If there is any absolute truth at all, isn't it to be uncovered through the scientific method?" since the things we *do know*, they all come from the scientific method – Ant Mar 01 '18 at 09:59
  • @Ant All the things *you* know, perhaps... – Chris Sunami Mar 01 '18 at 14:01
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    I think if you want to approach this from a purely scientific AND philosophical standpoint, the whole argument on both sides is moot, because we simply can't *know* anything for sure. That's an entirely unproductive way to go about things. – thanby Mar 01 '18 at 15:09
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    @thanby Exactly. To paraphrase dawkins, "How do you justify the scientifc method? Because it works". And if you object and say that we can't *really know* if the scientific method works, then you also have to point out that we can't know *anything* and we may as well stop talking, as thanby points out. In short, if "scientism" on his own is lacking, how does philosophy help? By just introducing the assumption "the scientific method works"? – Ant Mar 01 '18 at 15:37
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    @Ant It's fine to say "science is justified because it works," but that itself is a philosophical statement *not* a "scientific" statement (using the term "scientific" in a technical sense). Science *qua* science is reliable *precisely* because it refrains from making statements of the type you (and Dawkins) would like it to make. // As far as the "meta-level" you mentioned earlier, it does exist, and is called "the philosophy of science." In general, the meta-level of any field is the philosophy of that field. Failing to honor that distinction does no favors to science. – Chris Sunami Mar 01 '18 at 15:57
  • @ChrisSunami I do agree with you on a technical level. On the other hand, if all philosophy has to offer is the assumption "scientific method works", then it seems pretty limited in scope. Sure, technically is a philosophical statement, but at this point the distinction seems more semantic than anything else. – Ant Mar 01 '18 at 16:13
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    @ChrisSunami I don't see any need to make the statement "science is justified because it works,". Why any need to "justify" it? It seems that "science works" is enough and that this is a perfectly empirical and scientifically determined statement. But then reading the answers and comments on this question has me realizing my conception of what "science" means is wildly different than philosophers. I see science as not much more than "learning about the universe" and "the scientific method" as nothing more than a heuristic to keep you from making dumb mistakes. – Shufflepants Mar 30 '18 at 21:07
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    Shufflepants - I believe the OP's statement was closer to "nothing but science works." Your statement isn't self defeating, but it's considerably more modest. – Chris Sunami Mar 30 '18 at 21:14
  • So why then do too many scientists seem to accept "scientism" if science itself "withholds exactly that" - i.e. being able to demonstrate such a thing? What makes this different from any religion? (Not that there's a problem there - I think _anti-religion_ can be as zealous and toxic as religion. Sure, a war hasn't been fought over it, to which I'd only append one qualifier: "yet". And the idea that because religion is _non_-rational, it is therefore some sort of diseased state to be eliminated, similarly, I refuse...) – The_Sympathizer Jan 22 '20 at 04:29
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While the notion of reproducible results under specific conditions does redeem science from having its methods be entirely faith-based, initial presuppositions are always necessary in order to form a coherent paradigm. So, if you start with one (or many) axioms, then you've imported several implications from the axioms into the paradigm itself, which means that it does include some form of untested or "untestable" belief.

You might enjoy (or be driven mad by) this podcast between Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson on epistemology.

JacobIRR
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Your question is confusing and badly written. Your first sentence:

I think a combination of science and philosophy alone leads to closer to truth.

contradicts your second paragraph:

Why is it that it is wrong to think that science alone leads to truth? Isn't empirical truth the only one we can be sure about? If there is any absolute truth at all, isn't it to be uncovered through the scientific method?

Your position is that there is a process called "science" that leads to something called "empirical truth" by the "scientific method". There are several problems with this argument.

Let's consider this process that you say leads to truth. You have some set of facts and some rule that you apply to them that produces truth somehow. The results of that process are only correct if your facts and rules are correct. But then you have to know that the facts and rules are correct or your conclusions may be wrong. At this point you face a problem. You either (1) say the facts and rules are correct by fiat or (2) say the facts and rules are shown to be correct by some other process. If you choose option (1) then you're a just a guy saying stuff on the internet. If you choose option (2) then you have to show the truth of the facts and rules used in your new process: process 2. You then have the same dilemma with process 2, and with whatever process you use to show process 2 is correct, so you get an infinite regress. There is no process that guarantees truth or correctness, and that includes science.

There is a further problem with your position. To decide what is true according to your position, you have to distinguish between science (true) and non-science (false). But whatever process you use to make that distinction isn't science since you can't tell science from non-science before you have it. So your worldview can't consist solely of science.

Philosophers say a lot of stuff about induction and justification of science, and almost everything they have written doesn't answer the problems I have pointed out above. One philosopher whose work does not suffer from this problem is Karl Popper. Popper proposed that all knowledge is created by spotting a problem, guessing solutions and criticising guesses to eliminate bad ideas. This doesn't require any process of showing ideas to be true. If you have two conflicting ideas, then at least one of them is false. In two books "The Fabric of Reality" and "The Beginning of Infinity" physicist David Deutsch elaborated Popper's ideas pointing out that when you set up an experiment you need an explanation of what is happening in reality in the experiment to interpret its results and without such an explanation your 'results' are worthless. This means that the empirical truths are all guesses too: they are not a secure foundation for certainly true ideas. You can improve your ideas indefinitely, but you can't have proof or certainty. For a guide to Popper's writings, see

http://fallibleideas.com/books#popper

alanf
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    Science is the search for facts based on observations with a given degree of uncertainty from which predictions may be made, not truth, and nothing more than that. – Mazura Feb 27 '18 at 19:44
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    @Mazura No. Science attempts to explain how the world works, not just make predictions. For example, current scientific theories make statements about events we can't observe and will never be able to observe, like what's going on in the core of the sun right now. In addition, you can't make predictions without explanations that involve unobserved events. Two samples of a chemical are the same chemical if they contain the same kinds of atoms even though you don't observe the atoms. – alanf Feb 27 '18 at 20:07
  • "Science attempts to explain how the world works" - Not really. What you're talking about are scientific models, and while they are a long lived and important tradition in science, it's not at all "what science does." "In addition, you can't make predictions without explanations that involve unobserved events. " In the sense that predictions are by definition about things that have not yet been observed. But like, you can make predictions about cars, which obviously you've seen before. "even though you don't observe the atoms." -> symantics – industry7 Feb 27 '18 at 20:38
  • @alanf - That's a conflation of what science *is* and what *scientists* do. But yeah, we're way into semantics by now ;) – Mazura Mar 01 '18 at 23:53
  • @mazura The point of science is to find truth. You have to judge whether a theory or observation is good by some set of standards and one of the standards is whether the theory or observation could correspond to reality, i.e. - whether it could be true. – alanf Mar 02 '18 at 13:24
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Chris Sunami's anwer is excellent. I would like to add to it by pointing out the fact that "the scientific method" isn't as well defined as you may think, and defining this method is in the realm of philosophy.

While some people argue that you should just "Shut up and calculate", others (notably Nancy Cartwright) would argue that the Scientific Process isn't just the building of a mathematical model, but also the building of a philosophical model and understanding how the two relate (explained quite well in this book).

Technicalities as to how the scientific method works means that you not only have divisions between philosophers arguing on the subject, but even people who say they believe in "scientism" also have contentions on. For example, you have the split between the people who think that all scientists are discovering something about reality and those that disagree that anything they discover is "real", since it is not the final Fundamental Unification theory.

As you study more science, you discover that interpretation of theories (and choice of the theories you deem worthy to interpret) cannot be based on any ground truth implicit to the theory without resorting to some philosophical principles.

Michal Paszkiewicz
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  • "defining this method is in the realm of philosophy" - It is definitely not. Fundamentally, the scientific method is "reality based", meaning no amount of philosophy could ever make up for the fact that a particular method doesn't work. – industry7 Feb 27 '18 at 20:33
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    Au contraire - if the scientific method only took into account whether something "works", we would still be using epicycles to describe the solar system. When Heliocentrism was adopted by Copernicus, Galileo and their contemporaries, it didn't produce concrete results to the same accuracy as Ptolemaic astronomical models. A philosophical paradigm shift was needed, where it was pointed out that it was far more aesthetic to have simpler circles around the sun. When Kepler's laws allowed a better precision in astronomical predictions, heliocentrism finally caught up. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 27 '18 at 23:38
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    But a complicated enough system of epicycles could also describe the solar system. Of course, it is obvious that we must reject theories that do NOT describe reality at all. But even that is contended - some proponents of scientism would reject the scientific results obtained from biology and neuroscience, because they haven't been achieved through a study of their parts beginning from physical theories. And how do you pick between two theories that have the same results but different ontological implications? Most scientists resort either to Occam's razor (which is a philosophical concept)... – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 27 '18 at 23:42
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    ...or to the aesthetics of a theory (also a philosophical concept). Science used to be called "Natural Philosophy" and the only reason scientists would distance themselves from philosophy is if they are too scared to defend the philosophical position they hold while they work - as can be seen in Tegmark's ignorant position presented in his "Shut Up and Calculate" ( https://arxiv.org/abs/0709.4024 ) – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 27 '18 at 23:45
  • @MichalPazkiewicz That is simply not true though. The reason for abandoning epicycles was not due to philosophical 'neatness', but because of observations of comets which could never fit into an epicyclic model. The scientific method drove the adoption of a scientific model which could fit observations. Philosophy (in the form of the Catholic church) attempted to consciously **suppress** this; to the extent that philosophers argued whether observations of physical objects through a telescope were actually real. – Graham Feb 28 '18 at 00:35
  • @MichalPazkiewicz The scientific method fundamentally can *only* consider whether something works. People will naturally throw out hypotheses, and see where they lead; but only with evidence from observations can any hypothesis be accepted. Even then it may not be 100% correct and there may be more work to do; but it only has to be a little better than the previous version. Einstein found a solution to where observations didn't match Newton's laws, and we still need a solution to observations that relativity can't handle. It's all based on evidence though, not philosophy. – Graham Feb 28 '18 at 00:42
  • @Graham I just double checked, but there is definitely no mention of comets in "De revolutionibus orbium coelestium". Similarly, Galileo's main argument was that of sunspots. Furthermore, even comets couldn't necessarily provide a strong enough argument to abandon epicycles, since ANY ellipse can be modelled by an epicycle ( http://www00.unibg.it/dati/bacheca/63/21692.pdf ). Therefore, the concept of neatness IS undoubtedly a necessary one to jump from epicycles to ellipses. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:15
  • As I mentioned before, epicyclic theory was for more accurate (due to the amount of work that had been put in) at the time that heliocentric theories were taking off. Because of this, a proponent of scientism would have no doubt been a *suppressor*. Blaming Philosophy for the actions of a Pope is also a bit odd... Do you also blame Political Science for Tyrants? – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:21
  • Interestingly, your comment suggesting that the Catholic Church "consciously suppress[ed]" science is a bit silly really. If you are talking about the Galileo affair, it is definitely not so clearly cut - I highly recommend purchasing a copy of "The Galileo Affair" by Finocchiaro, which is a compendium of all of Galileo's correspondences, without any theory attached to it. Reading it, you will see that it is hard to defend an argument that this was a case of routine suppression - The Pope was originally interested in Galileo's theories and had many private audiences. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:26
  • Noone is sure why the Pope eventually switched sides against Galileo, but leading theories suggest it is either because of Galileo's slanderous wit in his rather amusing publications, or as a political symbol to politically calm both France and Spain by punishing the Medici. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:30
  • @Graham , you ARE right that the scientific method can only consider whether something works. And any serious philosophy of physics has to take the information gained from scientific practice into account. But you also have to consider that "The Scientific Method" differs vastly between fields of science. Biologists and Neuroscientists mainly look at mechanisms and cannot therefore use the same "scientific method" as physicists. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:35
  • And Quantum Mechanics has brought about a plethora of interpretations (Copenhagen, De-Broglie-Bohm, Many Worlds, Many Minds etc.) and it may not be possible to ever figure out which could be correct by measurement (although I hope someone finds a way to do it). In fact, all interpretations of measurements gained from an experiment are philosophical by nature and not provable scientifically, because they are qualitative and not quantitative. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:40
  • @Graham Finally, I'd just like to point out that Newton definitely considered himself a philosopher (and also a theologian - he published many books on philosophy), while Einstein often attributed his successes with relativity to his interest in the writings of philosopher Ernst Mach. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 08:42
  • @MichalPaszkiewicz Copernicus was throwing out a hypothesis, sure. That initial hypothesis was faulty primarily because he did not have data - it wasn't until Brahe, Kepler and others had gathered the data that this was refined. But Brahe's observation of comets was key for Galileo's generation, because it was direct observational evidence against epicycles. And yes, the Catholic church did directly attempt to suppress heliocentrism. – Graham Feb 28 '18 at 10:51
  • @MichalPaszkiewicz But biologists and neuroscientists *can* use the same scientific method. The scientific method is simply to find something which best fits the available data, and then make testable predictions based on your hypothesis, and see whether your predictions work out. That's as true for quantum physics (which still needs that testable hypothesis which fits everything) as it is for biology, medicine - or even "soft sciences" like economics. – Graham Feb 28 '18 at 10:57
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    @Graham I'm not sure you read what I wrote, you seem to be avoiding all the points I made. You write about Brahe, but Brahe had a Geocentric model of the universe with the planets orbiting the sun, which orbited the earth. This raises another interesting point - the universe can be described from any reference frame, and if it is described from the reference from of a stationary earth, the universe rotates around it, and the solar system moves somewhat similarly to Brahe's model. This can be done with any modern theory too, including General Relativity. The fact we say the Earth orbits the Sun – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 11:39
  • is because it makes more sense.... it is more aesthetic. As soon as you judge movements to be relative, reference frames can only be taken using a philosophical argument. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 11:39
  • Please provide evidence for your statements, because you claim there was a suppression, but it seems to stem from your own bias, since you do not know what to cite. You seem to be entirely unaware that a large part of Galileo's opposition was made up of scientists ( https://aeon.co/ideas/opposition-to-galileo-was-scientific-not-just-religious ), which is not surprising, since part of his theory was wrong ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_tides#Galileo's_attempt_to_explain_the_tides )... – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 11:49
  • ... and funnily enough, Brahe was one of his enemies due to the fact he had an alternative theory ( https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/opposition-to-galileo-was-scientific-not-just-religious/504335/ ). – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 11:50
  • And your claim that "the scientific method is to find something which best fits the available data, and then make testable predictions based on your hypothesis, and see whether your predictions work out" is exactly what many physicists dispute, since they argue that biology and neuroscience do not have theories that have substantial predictive power - they are mainly only applied to describe systems. – Michal Paszkiewicz Feb 28 '18 at 11:51
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    "to the extent that philosophers argued whether observations of physical objects through a telescope were actually real." This is about the proposed introduction of a thoroughly new tool of which around the time the Galileian/Dutch variety had small field of view, no real image (i.e. you cannot produce the image on a screen) wheres Kepler's variety had larger field of view and real but inverted image. And with the means lens production, they probably all produced blurry and distorted images. Given this, I consider it proper **science** to discuss reliability and limitations of these tools. – cbeleites unhappy with SX Apr 02 '18 at 16:08
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Sorry, I had to make my comment into an answer. In short:

Did you just ask an epistemological question wondering whether we need epistemology? The Vietnam generation had a similar paradox regarding peace and reproduction.

Peter - Reinstate Monica
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    I understand (and like) the sentence that you've written in bold, but I'm a little confused about how the sentence that follows it is linked with it. That it is linked appears to be the case because you write 'similar'. It might be worth explaining it in a little more detail. – Mozibur Ullah Feb 27 '18 at 15:09
  • Well, you can't dismiss epistemology through epistemology any more than you can do away with war by fighting. – Peter - Reinstate Monica Feb 27 '18 at 15:20
  • Ok, got you. That makes much more sense. – Mozibur Ullah Feb 27 '18 at 15:23
  • @PeterA.Schneider I sounds like you're alluding to the American-Vietnam war era slogan 'Make love, not war'. If so, I don't see the paradox. Can you explain? – Mitch Feb 27 '18 at 21:04
  • @Mitch Peter is implying that the "Make love, not war," saying is a statement about the paradox of ending war using war, that war will not lead to an end to fighting, and he's drawing a parallel to the sentiment by saying that asking epistemological questions does not lead to making epistemology irrelevant. Agree the answer doesn't make this clear at all, although the comment helps. – jpmc26 Feb 28 '18 at 04:50
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    @jpmc No, I was saying that fighting for peace is like fucking for virginity (is like using epistemology towards a pure nature-science based thinking). – Peter - Reinstate Monica Feb 28 '18 at 06:09
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    @PeterA.Schneider Never heard that, and wish I still hadn't. Apparently, a significant portion of your readers don't know it, either. – jpmc26 Feb 28 '18 at 06:35
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    @jpmc26 That the main takeaway of that era has apparently fallen prey to the oblivion may explain current U.S. policies. – Peter - Reinstate Monica Feb 28 '18 at 08:31
  • @PeterA.Schneider I think we disagree about what the main take away should be, but more to point of the phrase itself, there's no reason that an important point needs to expressed crudely. It is the vulgar nature of the statement that makes me wish I hadn't read it, and that may have something to do with why it was forgotten. – jpmc26 Feb 28 '18 at 11:21
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    @PeterA.Schneider I also do not understand what is paradoxical of ending a war via fight. You might be influenced by selecting a war with which you do not agree. Take WWII instead - we *did* end the WWII by fighting Hitler. We *did* end the Napoleon wars by fighting Napoleon. There is not anything paradoxical. The statement "fighting for peace is like fucking for virginity" is a pure nonsense, it's only a witticism. – Honza Zidek Mar 01 '18 at 17:03
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Many excellent answers here, but I just want to address this one question in your post:

Isn't empirical truth the only one we can be sure about?

No. Not even close. Empirical confirmation is a form of inductive reasoning. We run many tests, and if they consistently pass, we accept the hypothesis as true. But inductive reasoning has a fundamental weakness: it is never absolute. It is always, always, always susceptible to new information coming to light.

Incredibly famous examples are the rise of quantum and relativistic physics. After several hundred years of studying Newtonian physics, we started to discover situations it could not explain: the orbit of Mercury and why atoms didn't collapse from constantly radiating electromagnetic waves are good examples. Yet up until this point, the empirical evidence suggested Newtonian physics were fully correct. And even though Newtonian physics isn't really wrong (It's really good at solving problems at the scales humans normally work at.), its incompleteness means that its predictions are not absolutely true. Quantum and relativity are also incomplete: quantum cannot predict cosmological scale events, and relativity cannot predict subatomic events.

In other words, embracing empiricism means you're never completely sure your existing knowledge applies to any new situation you encounter. You never know if your empirically confirmed model is missing some important factor you've never needed to account for before. Empirical evidence is only a useful tool in gradually reducing the flaws in your understanding; it can't eliminate all of them.

jpmc26
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  • I would also disagree with the OPs statement - because it is a Straw Man. Scientific experiments do not deliver _the truth_ - whatever that might be; rather, they produce a model that is confirmed for the range of values studied in the experiment. Study the motion of the planets with a telescope and stopwatch and you get Newtonian mechanics. Move to density scales of a Black Hole and you get Relativity. Try again with sub-atomic particles and you need Quantum Gravity. None of them are the _Truth_. They are just increasingly precise models that depend on the scale of the experiment. – Oscar Bravo Feb 28 '18 at 11:12
  • @OscarBravo It depends on what you mean by "the truth." Someone who emphasizes empiricism would probably be satisfied with that approximation as "truth," especially since it's often information that can inform decisions about how to achieve our goals. But yes, if by "the truth" you mean something like "every aspect of objective reality" or "all facts that exist," I agree. – jpmc26 Feb 28 '18 at 11:25
  • You are presupposing that some kind of objective _truth_ actually exists. If we restrict ourselves to the physical universe, it could be there is no truth. There might only be increasingly more refined models, each of which breaks down at some smaller/faster/more energetic scale. This could go on forever... – Oscar Bravo Mar 01 '18 at 08:35
  • @OscarBravo I do believe there is an objective truth, but my comment itself presupposes nothing. It merely discusses a couple of different viewpoints and their consequences with regard to this topic and notes that your comment didn't wasn't entirely clear what it meant. As for, "this could go on forever," of course. All systems of logic presuppose a set of axioms, which can be challenged endlessly. That's nothing new. – jpmc26 Mar 01 '18 at 09:06
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Why is it that it is wrong to think that science alone leads to truth?

Simple counter example: the problem of induction. We have no reason to believe that inductive reasoning is valid, except for our past observations that inductive reasoning had proven useful to us. Extrapolating these past successes to claim that "induction will continue to be valid", is itself an argument using inductive reasoning, making it a circular argument.

In other words, there's no non-inductive proof that proves that inductive reasoning is valid. Science is all about classification and discovery of the world through observation and inductive reasoning. There's no way the scientific method could be applied to prove that the scientific method is valid.

Of course, these are extremely skeptical view points. You could never live your life under the belief that induction isn't valid, it just isn't possible. The mere existence of human memory, learning, education, etc. is reliant on the idea that the mistakes of the past can be learned from to better inform decisions of the future. Nonetheless, from an abstract/philosophical perspective, the issue remains.

Alexander
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Scientism is also scientifically wrong in so far as it is (at least partially) a scientific question how homo sapiens acquire knowledge. "Through science alone" is not a good scientific hypothesis for how knowledge is obtained.

John Coleman
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I am not decided on the issue. What I will do here is attempt to work out a consistent and non-absurd scenario in which moderate empiricism is true and we come to know it. After developing an account, I will see if it holds water. I'll be happy to receive improvement suggestions. Note that I am at best familiar with the discussion.

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I. Suppose moderate empiricism is true. Here is a relaxed, impressionistic attempt at formulating it: Our only source of justification for matters of fact (and not of definition) comes from repeated interaction with reality. I suggest that a creature inhabiting this scenario could conceivably learn about its brain, its reasoning capabilities, and features of the world it inhabits in general. Then it could infer moderate empiricism as the best explanation for what it has learned.

Of course, the creature could only do that if it knew (or was epistemically justified in believing) that its explanatory judgments are reliable, i.e., that the theories they judge to be great explanations are very often true. How could this occur?

If there couldn't be any simple set of experiments to confirm them, then the creature could learn of the reliability of its own explanations by observing that they very often lead to predictive theories.

Quine proposed something similar to account for how we are justified in believing certain fundamental statements in mathematics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, but not justified a priori. His point is that these statements are central to the way we reason when interacting with reality, and that since we interact successfully with reality, it must be because they reflect something of reality. The argument given for the creature's explanatory practices above follows a similar trail.

Finally, the creature's modes of explanation could conceivably lead it to discover moderate empiricism. It is difficult to work out how, since it would require spelling out what kind of evidence would call for moderate empiricism as the best explanation. However, all I needed to show is that basic tools of reasoning could be justified in a moderate empiricist scenario. This opens the possibility of arguing we do live in this scenario. Have I at least suggested how such showing could be done?

—

II. The problem with the above account is that it does not seem the creature could get off the ground. The creature in question would need to employ a set T1 of reasoning tools in getting from (a) its immediately-known empirical knowledge that, by using a set of reasoning tools T2, it has come to be a successful predictor and controller of reality, to (b) the conclusion that tools T2 are truth-conducive. Having established 'b', the creature would be many steps closer to being justified in the conclusions it draws out by employing T2.

Yet, a b-like statement is necessary for having epistemic justification in employing any set of reasoning tools. Thus, a b-like statement for T1 would need to be obtained (probably from an a-like statement that mentions it). Yet, that would require a previously-justified set of reasoning tools T0. Since this obviously leads to an absurd regress, it follows that the creature has no justification for any of the tools of inference it employs, and so no justification in drawing out its conclusions!

So it seems it cannot learn about moderate empiricism after all. It cannot learn about anything it does not immediately perceive. Perhaps it can barely do any interesting empirical psychology (which Quine thought was integral to empiricist epistemology), since it cannot immediately perceive many of the entities and mechanisms postulated in good psychological theories.

—

III. Could the above conclusion be averted for the creature? I can imagine three possibilities.

(1) Perhaps the tools' reliability can be discovered non-inferentially. Maybe just observing them work in varied situations, plus the fact that they do work, is already direct acquaintance with their truth-conduciveness. It needn't be inferred using tools of reasoning, and so regress does not surface.

(2) Perhaps a moderate coherence theory of justification is correct. Given a web of beliefs full of direct observational knowledge of the world, and given that the web is stratified by tools of reasoning, the mere fact that it managed to stay consistent, let alone coherent, is already an immense signal that such tools are correct. Coherence theories have been developed, AFAIK, in which an agent can acquire justification from coherence without being previously justified in believing the coherence theory. (The agent needn't even know that its set of beliefs is coherent or consistent, given objectively correct standards of coherence and consistency.)

(3) Maybe a holistic theory of justification is correct, and a creature's belief-system obtains justification as a whole when the creature employs it in engaging successfully with reality. This way, the reasoning tools the creature uses could acquire derivative epistemic justification, since they are an integral part of that web of beliefs.

The regress of section II might be avoidable given '1', '2', or '3'. What do you folks think?

Daniel Coimbra
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  • "since we interact successfully with reality, it must be because they [the fundamental statements] reflect something of reality" or, mabe, we call that subset of *the world* [better term anyone?] reality which is reflected/accessible via this system of fundamental statements. – cbeleites unhappy with SX Feb 27 '18 at 16:00
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If there is any absolute truth at all, isn't it to be uncovered through the scientific method?

No. The scientific method focuses on observable "objective" truths and presumes that the set of observable truths and truths yet to be scientifically proven are the entirety of "absolute truths". This results in modes of thinking and mental frameworks that eventually result in deviations from actual underlying truths and can be observed in science's failure to accurately and consistently predict and anticipate observable outcomes in marginally complex systems.

For example, a byproduct of this mode of thought is that characteristics and qualities of a thing are contained within that thing. For example, elements have innate qualities, animals have innate qualities and... people have innate qualities.

But what's the innate quality of an "In-N-Out" burger? Or a Chick-Fil-A sandwich? Is it good b/c of the balance of saturated fats and salt? Or is there some element of quality that exists between the observer and the observed? Two individuals may observe a favorable taste in either. Two hundred thousand may observe the same. But apart from surveys and statistics, science is, at best, a blunt tool in measuring the "burger-ness" of the In-n-out double double or Chick-Fil-A Deluxe Sandwich.

Yes, science has broken down the beef patty to the extent that we can recreate a plant-based version to a surprising level of similitude (Impossible Burger yum!). But what about presentation? What about the employee's level of service? What about the supply chain that delivered that burger? How do those factor into this feeling of quality that some of us feel towards In-N-Out (or pick your favorite restaurant chain)?

This is where science starts to strain itself as it tries to break down each of those component mechanisms and factors and back into some quantifiable sum of the parts. Whereas we, as observers, can simply and factually say whether a particular restaurant is good, ok or bad quality.

Science would counter by saying our observation in that case is merely subjective opinion and not scientifically valid. It is not a "truth" by absolute and objective means. But what if it was? If they could predict the elements of success, why wouldn't a scientist want to be able to predict whether a chain or store or product would be massively successful? Wouldn't this be a worthwhile area of study? I think they would it's just that science, as currently practiced, is hamstrung and fundamentally unable to do so.

Why? B/c it too often conflates quality with measurable innate-ness, whereas, in truth, quality exists between things, it exists in the relationships between things.

To date in history we have pursued measurable innate truths to their logical ends where deeper discoveries require orders of magnitude more time and energy to reap infinitesimally smaller benefits. At a micro level we are bumping against quantum behaviors and the inconsistencies that creates. At a macro level our current technology can only see so far into the distance.

Personally, I think we are at a critical juncture in history where, if we accept a more holistic framework for reality, one that includes both the subjective and objective within the same model and with the same level of validity, it will open up a whole new world of discoveries and truths for us to explore.

chuey101
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