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(For context, last year I had someone close to me die. He was a very sentimental person, with certain valuables to which he was very attached. He specified certain property to be liquidated in a certain way and the proceeds to be given directly to the poor. Since my job moved into the Loop in Chicago about the same time and I pass a dozen panhandlers a day, I have been doing it one dollar at a time in person, in a way in which I think he would approve. I have no problem doing as he asked in a way that I think he would do it himself. But I am not sure, on another level, that this is a good idea. I would not have chosen this as a means had he not said 'directly', or if he were not a strong proponent of going out and meeting people in person, and dealing with them directly.)

Kant seems like the kind of person who believes in institutions like tithing.

But to me, this seems to be an odd place where the two versions of the Categorical Imperative do not fit together well.

Surely, were I destitute, I think I would prefer to have someone help me out. And I don't see a problem with folks giving away money they have over and above their needs. I don't mind being begged from. And I would feel demeaned by the act of begging -- but it seems to be an autonomous choice.

At the same time, I fail to see how the person giving alms is not being used as a pure means. And I am not sure that the process does not do a certain moral damage to the person asking.

Does Kant (or some later commentator on him) reconcile this gap somewhere?

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Kant, in 'Lectures on Ethics' is reported to have said that "in giving to an unfortunate man we do not give him a gratuity but only help to return to his that of which the general injustice of our system has deprived him." So he would appear to be framing giving in terms of restitution and therefore firmly within the duty of the giver, not on the actions of the beggar themselves. The concept here would be that where evidence of past injustices are presented one has an imperfect duty to rectify them, the beggar's actions are simply the presentation of that evidence.

He also says “We shall acknowledge that we are under obligation to help someone poor; but since the favour we do implies his well-being depends on our generosity, and this humbles him, it is our duty to behave as if our help is merely what is due to him or but a slight service of love, and to spare him humiliation and maintain his respect for himself” (6:448) Metaphysic of Morals.

In both these statements Kant refers specifically to the poor man, not charity or social institutions in general. One cannot see how our giving to charity would directly humble a person, nor how any action on our part could spare him such humiliation, so he must be referring to direct giving.

Of course, being Kant, he contradicts himself elsewhere, "Alms-giving is a form of kindness associated with pride and costing no trouble, and a beneficence calling for no reflection. Men are demeaned by it."

Lucy Allais reconciles these seemly opposed views by arguing that it is the lack of information within a begging exchange which makes it unreasonable. The beggar is offering the potential giver no evidence of injustice and so placing them in a position where they themselves are being used as a means to an end (the relief from poverty) rather than an end in their own right (respecting that they would want some evidence that their giving will actually achieve their objective of alleviating poverty). Her paper is reproduced here, but it is still quite critical of begging and so may not give you the answers you're looking for

  • The English volume (both the older Hackett and newer Cambridge) called *Lecture on Ethics* is not something Kant authored per se but rather a compilation of student notes, so at least for my 2 cents, it's better to avoid producing sentences that make it seem like he authored it (see the preface to it for confirmation of this). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 06:17
  • The almsgiving point and the helping the poor are not contrary as these are conceptually distinct for Kant. In fact, they're the same point -- that we need to respect humanity in all its forms and that Kant views giving money in the form of alms as showing a *lack of respect* for the rationality and independence of that person. – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 06:19
  • @virmaior With regards to your first comment, what Kant actually said might be of interest to the biographer or idolotrist, but what is of interest to the ethicist is that the two positions on alms giving exist (that it rectifiers a financial injustice of the economic system, and that it demeans the giver) and what the implications are of each. Whether the first position is that of Kant himself or an over zealous student is largely irrelevant. –  Oct 22 '17 at 07:54
  • This is exactly the problem with this site. What's of interest here philosophically is Lucy Allais's argument reconciling the two positions and the way in which she has turned it into an argument about information. I think this is a fascinating insight with plenty of ethically interesting implications, but in the space of a month the only interest in the answer has been to try and defend the integrity of some long dead writer –  Oct 22 '17 at 07:54
  • Three thoughts on this. First, I only saw your answer because I saw on meta that you complained your philosophically technical answers weren't getting the votes they deserved. Second, with respect to my comment, you could just edit your answer. A slight fix in wording would resolve an implication that is potentially problematic or misleading. Instead, there's no edit and some weird diatribe in the comments that seems to assume I made my suggestion because I'm a Kantian (I'm not a Kantian or at least don't consider myself one). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 08:28
  • Third, I actually find the answer pretty hard to follow because as I suggest the top two treatments of Kant are presented as in disagreement when I don't see how they are. The crux of what Lucy Allais says sounds interesting but I don't quite follow how it relates to the top part. Maybe to make the point clearer, the pair at the top say "help the poor." The third one says "don't give alms." Can you edit your answer to make clearer why those two things mean the same thing? Further is Allais' article premised on this being something where Kant contradicts himself? – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 08:35
  • @virmaior I'm not trying to offend anyone I've got every respect for those who work exegetically, I just find it frustrating when it dominates the debate. I agree about the edit, but I've mostly lost interest in this site for these exact reasons so improving the answer is not something I'm particularly motivated to do, I will do so nonetheless as you're right in that it would be ornery not to. –  Oct 22 '17 at 09:01
  • You've misunderstood my meta answer though. I'm not interested in votes, I'm interested in ethics, I joined this site hoping to read interesting and varied answers and perhaps engage in some discussion (in chat of course), which may result from the issues such answers raise. I'm more disappointed really is that no-one else has provided an alternative answer to this question from any other contemporary position (perhaps one I've not yet read about), than I am about the votes on this particular answer (it being the only answer, the votes don't really matter). –  Oct 22 '17 at 09:01
  • If you can't see how the positions are contrary, nor how Allais's work relates to this, I'd be fascinated to hear why, I would have been fascinated at any time over the last month, during which probably a hundred discussions have been held here about what the name of some fallacy is, or whether we're all just dreaming. –  Oct 22 '17 at 09:01
  • `If you can't see how the positions are contrary, nor how Allais's work relates to this, I'd be fascinated to hear why` ... because I don't see how (a) don't how the poor in way B and (b) don't help the poor are contradictory. (a) is merely one way, which there may be reasons to reject without contradicting the broad theme of (b). Can you explain more clearly why you see them as contrary? (i.e. raise an argument as to why responding to beggars is the only way to meet (b) ?) – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 11:00
  • But I look at it and some of your more recent answers to see if there was some reason that I could ascertain why the questions you'er answering get little attention (where votes are a form of attention). In the case of this question, I'd say the following: *it's too hard for the casual user* (too hard meaning both too hard to answer and too hard to grasp). In my own case, my attention lies elsewhere for the most part, and I don't recall running across anything about this in the literature (and I've read a decent amount of Kant primary and secondary). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 11:04
  • In contrast, fallacy and logic questions take mere seconds to answer and depend generally on really common misunderstandings (such as the meaning of validity or what crying "fallacy" means). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 11:04
  • @virmaior Kant refers to "the poor" and "what is due", the poor are so defined by their economic status and so "that of which the general injustice of the system has deprived him" is ultimately money. I see the contradiction being that if we suggest some other act of kindness become an imperfect duty on the grounds that the system has deprived the beggar of such acts (and so caused his poverty), I cannot see why the bequeathing of money is not one of those things. After all, the rich are primarily rich because their parents bequeathed them money. –  Oct 22 '17 at 11:42
  • This is where the imbalance of information becomes so important, an act of kindness can be an expression of a person's duty to develop their own virtue (straying slightly from Kant here), but bequeathing money cannot be a perfect duty (otherwise one would end up with no money) but must depend on the financial need of the other, which is not known for sure in the case of the beggar. To give some other act of kindness does not so necessarily depend on the neediness of the recipient. –  Oct 22 '17 at 11:47
  • I suppose a simple summary (at the risk of missing out on the intricacies that make this interesting) is that one can run out of money but not kindness, so the relative states of two parties's finances needs to be known prior to any assessment of the duty of one to another, this is not so with other forms of kindness. –  Oct 22 '17 at 11:51
  • I don't think I would accept that Kant thinks what the poor are most fundamentally deprived of is "ultimately money" It's that poverty means they lack autonomy; it'd be difficult if not impossible to textually defend that Kant thinks possessing money qua money is a good for moral selves (Cf. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and its treatment of the "rabble"). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 13:13
  • Second, It's telling that to defend it you need to make a parallel about "bequeathing" which is not necessarily a rational action. I think you'd be hard pressed to find Kant saying anything about it being an imperfect duty to "bequeath money" to anyone (even if by point of fact people do do so to their children). – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 13:15
  • If your claim is that some contemporary philosopher has this view (that alms-giving is bad because of an information gap), then sure I can imagine such a view. If your is that Kant was trying to say anything like this, then no, this seems to me indefensible, but at a least you've made no textual attempt to defend it. – virmaior Oct 22 '17 at 13:17
  • @virmaior My argument that Kant sees money as ultimately the mechanisms of one's duty to the poor comes not from his duties of beneficence, but of justice. In The Doctrine of Right, he argues that the state's rights to take taxes (unequivocally money) to aid the poor is and extension of the individual duty, the state having taken over. I know this is not a popular view, but it is held by some (Ernest Weinrib), but I think that the possession of certain material goods to meed one's basic needs are solidly part of Kant's views of property and so lack of them requires distributive justice. –  Oct 22 '17 at 14:35
  • With regards to bequeathing being irrational, I think we would have to use Onora O'Neill's description of the duty of beneficence varying in an unjust world. The fact that people do bequeath money to their children is the world in which we live, a duty of beneficence must take account of that, including if such action needs to be redressed. –  Oct 22 '17 at 14:37
  • My claim that Kant actually contradicted himself is restricted to a textual one, I don't doubt that Kant had some intricacy that resolved such a textual contradiction, and I think Allais's suggestion as to what that might be is as good as any. As I said, what matters to me is that two such positions exists, they contradict one another and there are ways out of that contradiction. Who said what, or even who *meant* what is only of interest to me insofar as the *correct* meaning answers a puzzle set by the incorrect one. –  Oct 22 '17 at 14:41