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In Kant, is the value you have form being human the same as the duty I have to you, such that someone I have more duties to has more value?

Or is this nonsense anyway, because there is no sense I have different duties toward different people?

  • i would suppose that in principle no, but in practice yes? –  Jun 26 '17 at 17:16
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    Related: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/41650/for-kant-why-are-all-preferences-only-conditionally-valuable/41661?#41661 You have absolute worth because of your autonomy constituting dignity and duties towards you alike. As duties are constituted by general laws within the kingdom of ends (i.e. expressions of autonomy), they are the same for and against all rational beings. – Philip Klöcking Jun 28 '17 at 15:01
  • @PhilipKlöcking thank you for the note. "Kant and Fichte soar to heavens blue" –  Jun 28 '17 at 15:08
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    Actually, taking aside the wording and idealistic implications not necessarily meant (at least by Kant), it is not that far away from common conceptions imho. You just have to keep in mind that we speak of moral duties here, not what could additionally be good or "duty" in ethical or prudential sense. That means it is about matters where our intuition is "that is the right thing to do, not because I think so or the situation is so special, but because it is about being a decent human being and everyone should do so". That's the specific understanding of morals and moral duty by Kant. – Philip Klöcking Jun 28 '17 at 15:33
  • @PhilipKlöcking hm yeah. thinking about ethics mostly just gives me a headache as it invariably seems straightforward. thanks for the note –  Jun 28 '17 at 15:38

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