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The common sense understanding of action is causal, i.e. action is some change between being in condition A to being in condition B. The two static conditions of being allow people to differentiate distinct kinds of change, the being that embeds the change seemingly giving the change an intelligible structure and stable identity.

Can this definition be done away with or is it essential to understanding what is meant by 'action'?

If there is a sense of action that isn't already embedded in static being how can this action be referred to or talked about philosophically?

Manwe Elder
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  • We had a couple of users, [Goob](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/users/23257/goob) and [Mithrandir](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/users/24130/mithrandir), who asked questions very similar to yours, with similar lines of reasoning. You may want to take a look. On this particular question look at [Would a pragmatist allow that meaning is representational of things in its use?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/38721/would-a-pragmatist-allow-that-meaning-is-representational-of-things-in-its-use) – Conifold Apr 23 '17 at 23:21
  • There's two strains I can think of that might be sympathetic to your thesis or at least have worked on it: process thought and American philosophy (pragmatism). But I'm not sufficiently informed about how they do so to answer your question. – virmaior Apr 24 '17 at 02:26

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