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It is claimed by a lot of philosophers that because we are normative creatures, it is impossible to explain our minds in purely causal terms. Jerry Fodor writes (in LOT2)

... contents of symbols emerge from conventions that control their use, thereby determining what it is to use them correctly. Since causation per se is neither correct nor incorrect, content can't reduce to causation

I can't seem to understand this line of thought. A computer can be programmed to learn a language by use. it can even be hardcoded that "no" means a negative response (hence "normative") and "yes" means a positive response. The computer, a purely causal machine, can then have norms. Why doesn't the argument from normativity accept it?

Amit Hagin
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  • I would need some more explanation of the words in order to comment. I do not understand Fodor's point and perhaps this could be explained here rather than by asking me to google it. If everyone else understands it then ignore me. –  Apr 12 '17 at 11:30
  • Maybe useful [General Objections to Causal Theories of Mental Content](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-causal/#GenObjCauTheMenCon) as well as [The Language of Thought Hypothesis](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/). – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Apr 12 '17 at 12:07
  • Computers don't actully learn languages; they simply process data by mechanical means, so I don't know how you can justify your assumption that they could be hard-coded "that 'no' means a negative response." The data has no [*meaning*](http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/39443/3017) whatsoever for the computer. Fodor is simply speaking of a version of the [naturalistic fallacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalistic_fallacy) –  Apr 12 '17 at 13:14
  • In the case of computers normativity derives from humans, they decide which use of language is "right" or "wrong" and provide training sets accordingly. Same with hard coding. To aliens, who do not know what yes or no "means", operation of computers would look no different in principle than air currents in the atmosphere, just going through the motions. And humans (presumably) have nobody to train or code norms into them, other than "society", i.e. other humans. – Conifold Apr 12 '17 at 18:45
  • it is possible to violate norms - do or say the "wrong" thing. it is not possible to violate causal laws. people can lie, computers cannot. –  Apr 12 '17 at 18:54
  • @Conifold, also mobileink: I still don't see the point. Humans can be created evolutionary to create each other norms because they are created as social creatures and care about their society. But it's a physical creation, I don't see anything non-causal here. Therefore, they can causally be lead to "lying". In the physical level it's just a physical response, while in the cultural level it's consider as a lie, or as a violation of a norm. – Amit Hagin Apr 13 '17 at 17:10
  • Humans can be created by evolution to move around and do their things. What can not be created by evolution is classification of those things into "right" and "wrong", "good" and "bad". Even when we say that something (social behavior, say) is "evolutionary advantageous" and something else isn't *we* inject a value into it, namely that survival of the species, etc., is a "good" and extinction is a "bad". Evolution as a purely causal process could not care less. – Conifold Apr 13 '17 at 17:30

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The reason you can not understand the "line of thought," is that you are convinced that a computer "can be programmed to learn... hence 'normative'".
It is true that a computer is purely a "causal machine," that's why a computer can not "learn" anything, it can only processes data. Once you realize this, you will understand that because "we are normative creatures, it is impossible to explain our minds in purely causal terms."

Guill
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  • I understand that this is the gap in my understanding of the problem. I just can't see how Normatively is such a deep issue, and not only, say, an issue of social behavior. – Amit Hagin Apr 18 '17 at 13:19
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    @AmitHagin The quote is about ontology. The author simply states that normative judgements are not following the rules of causation and are nevertheless real and have real consequences. This is but one possible philosophical position. Others hold that the whole talk about freedom and normativity is a descriptive behaviour that just talks about essentially causal stuff going on we simply do not understand yet. Problem being: reality of normativity is rather obvious. Existence of strict causality in a relevant sense underlying this is nothing but a bold claim that is yet to be proven. – Philip Klöcking Apr 18 '17 at 18:05