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Given a materialist view on things (the mind cannot exist separate from the body), it seems on the surface that an afterlife is possible. However, the SEP entry on afterlife seems to provide some pretty good objections to this idea. How can any of these problems be surmounted for a theist? One of the objections is this: if God created multiple beings the same as the one on Earth, how would our consciousness be preserved? This question is not asking if mind-body dualism is right or wrong, rather I'm asking whether afterlife is possible given materialism.

Edit: When I say "materialist", I mean the idea that our bodies go to heaven with our minds, not just our minds "by themselves". And this question is mostly aimed from a Christian perspective.

APCoding
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    From a Christian perspective the idea that our bodies go to heaven along with our minds sounds very odd, while there are some disagreements on afterlife there is pretty much a consensus that the body is destroyed (which is rather obviously the case upon cremation) and only the soul lives on. And theists are very rarely, if ever, materialists, so I do not see why they should care. If one really wants it one can postulate a material soul made of "subtle matter" like [Stoics](http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicmind/#SH2a) or recently [Pullman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/His_Dark_Materials) did. – Conifold Dec 07 '16 at 20:14
  • @Conifold Well, I'm thinking more of the idea that our bodies are "recreated" in heaven. If that's not the case, how could you solve certain problems like the fact that our mind cannot exist independent of our bodies? The SEP entry has more arguments, too. – APCoding Dec 07 '16 at 20:22
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    If I had to I'd take Baker's "first-person perspective" identity but declare that it is a [haecceity a la Duns Scotus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haecceity), which eliminates SEP objections. Alternatively, I'd ditch the qualms about having multiple body instantiations of the same "person", if teleportation can do it why not God. But again, materialist afterlife is an idiosyncratic position of interest only to few. As SEP says "*proponents of an afterlife, it seems, would be better served if they were able to espouse some variety of mind-body dualism*", or plain idealism, for that matter. – Conifold Dec 07 '16 at 21:02
  • @Conifold If it's a haecceity, what about [these](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/#6) problems? – APCoding Dec 07 '16 at 21:41
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    "*But individual natures in Ockham's view can indeed be primarily diverse, and this surely amounts to a form of haecceitism — nothing other than an individual nature's own self-identity explains its distinction from all other such natures...* [this amounts] *to accepting a form of haecceitism that, like Adams's, does not involve ontological commitment to the existence of real haecceities*". Materialists certainly wouldn't want "real", i.e. immaterial, haecceities. Ockham's nominalistic twist gives them exactly what they need. – Conifold Dec 07 '16 at 21:59
  • @Conifold When you say Christians mostly use a variety of mind-body dualism, what about all the problems with that? Also, do they believe therefore that we don't have bodies in heaven? Or does the reasoning not follow. If we get transferred directly from our body here to our body in heaven, isn't that essentially the same as my question? – APCoding Dec 09 '16 at 02:07
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    There are problems with everything, and objections even to the most "obvious" things like the laws of logic. But body gets destroyed and disembodied soul goes somewhere (perhaps to be reembodied later) seems simple enough compared to contortions needed on a purely materialistic view. – Conifold Dec 11 '16 at 20:34
  • @Conifold When you quote SEP with the fact that proponents of an afterlife would accept mind-body dualism, is that really mind-body dualism? Is the idea that a mind can exist regardless of the body really mind-body dualism? If I understand correctly, mind-body dualism says a mind can exist independent of a body. Do proponents of an afterlife have to accept that? – APCoding Dec 14 '16 at 01:21
  • There are [varieties of dualism](http://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism) with subtle distinctions. But if mind and body are separate substances (substance dualism) then it is highly plausible that one can persist without the other. [Kripke's modal argument](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#ModArg) is for the converse. Traditional metaphysicists (Aristotle, Plotinus, Aquinas) held that matter is not even a substance, but mere potentiality or lack, Peirce called matter "*effete mind, inveterate habits becoming laws*", which puts them closer to plain idealism. – Conifold Dec 14 '16 at 01:53
  • @Conifold Is it really right to call that dualism though? Dualism seems to say the mind can exist separate from our bodies, which I think is not needed for an afterlife. I think all that is needed is the ability for a mind to get "transferred" to a new body, which doesn't have the need for a mind to exist separate from a body. If dualism is needed, that presents some problems because apparently it is considered a dead theory, which has no grounding (a SEP article said something like this, but I can't find it right now). – APCoding Dec 14 '16 at 23:38
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    *Substance* dualism says that mind and body are separate entities, possibility of disembodiment then more or less follows. On property dualism disembodiment is problematic but "transferability" isn't (indeed we can transfer patterns from say acoustic to optical waves, but not "disembody" them). [Chalmers](http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/chalmers) is a prominent modern proponent. – Conifold Dec 16 '16 at 05:05
  • @Conifold If we reject substance dualism, isn't that rejecting God's mind, because it would be a "substance" (even a metaphysical substance)? If we say God does not have a mind like hours, I think some of the main arguments against dualism still stand. – APCoding Dec 18 '16 at 16:22
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    "*Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing*", [Spinoza](http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/37149/what-is-attribute-as-used-in-spinozas-ethics/37150#37150). God's thinking can be a property ("attribute") of his monistic substance. There are even more subtle positions, like Thomistic one, where "soul" is a "substantial form" of the body but with independent "agency", ability to act on its own, albeit only through the body. – Conifold Dec 18 '16 at 22:41
  • @Conifold I don't think you understood my question. I'm asking whether the common definition of God is compatible with the rejection of substance dualism. – APCoding Dec 18 '16 at 22:43
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    Well, "*the supreme or ultimate reality, the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness*" of Merriam-Webster is compatible with pretty much any metaphysics, Thomism is the official metaphysics of Catholic Church, so I'd say yes. If you mean naive notions of rank and file believers they are too undeveloped to qualify as anything definitive, although substance dualism might be an approximation, the same applies to naive realism of everyday life or platonism of mathematicians. – Conifold Dec 18 '16 at 22:56
  • @Conifold Is it compatible with the idea God exists in a metaphysical way? Isn't that metaphysical existence some kind of a "substance" (not using the regular definition of substance, as in like a physical item). – APCoding Dec 19 '16 at 00:17
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    The common idea of God? Sure, many believers would be lost on what a "metaphysical way" or "substance" even are. Higher power exists somehow, sets and numbers exist somehow, are the kinds of beliefs that philosophers ought to leave as is, by Wittgenstein's quip. But even on philosophers' terms God's substance need not be dualistic, it can be idealistic, it can have dual properties, it can be beyond the matter/mind distinction as in Oriental philosophies, etc. – Conifold Dec 19 '16 at 01:27
  • @Conifold Sorry, I know this answer is a few years old, but I was looking through some of my old questions and I'm wondering if you can answer a few other questions about this topic. 1) If the afterlife is interpreted in a materialist way, physical laws may be changed by God, but would these changes in physical laws affect us? Is consciousness (or a continuation of our consciousness) still possible in a world without eternal inflation, for example? Some theories suggest that eternal inflation is necessary, so it would seem so, but eternal inflation causes problems such as an ending of time. – APCoding Jul 13 '19 at 23:31
  • @Conifold As to the last sentence, [here](https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/10/101027-science-space-universe-end-of-time-multiverse-inflation/) is a source on that. 2) [SEP](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmology-theology) says that there are attempts to prove the "impossibility of a temporal infinity", and calls a widely accepted theory (the multiverse) "clearly ... theologically disturbing." How are these objections solved for those who accept a materialist idea of the afterlife? – APCoding Jul 13 '19 at 23:36

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The typical objection to a material afterlife is that "flesh is corruptible." In other words, the material body can get sick or damaged. Since even elementary particles are predicted to decay, it's difficult to picture a workable material afterlife.

Nevertheless, there are some (reasonably orthodox) interpretations of the Christian scriptures as predicting a bodily resurrection at the end of time, rather than an immediate spiritual translation to heaven. The expectation in that case is that the bodies will be remade or transformed into a new form of matter that will not age or decay. That's arguably compatible with even a physical reductionist view of the mind/soul, but it would require that heaven and its denizens be formed of some completely different kind of matter currently unknown to us.

Interestingly enough, many of the Gospel references to the "Kingdom of Heaven" can be read as primarily describing an earthly state of existing in relationship with God, and not as referring to an afterlife at all.

Chris Sunami
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  • Couldn't God, if he is all-powerful, simply stop humans from getting sick or damaged? And also stop elementary particles from decaying? – APCoding Dec 07 '16 at 21:11
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    It's a little unorthodox, but I don't see any immediate objections to it. However, any conception of the afterlife that is primarily an extension of material life as we know it runs into the issue that it's hard to imagine it extended into eternity without eventually seeming hellish. – Chris Sunami Dec 07 '16 at 21:17
  • OK, thanks. Thanks for the answer! One last question: do any of the SEP objections apply to the solution you proposed? – APCoding Dec 07 '16 at 21:23
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The answer to your main question is, yes, a materialistic afterlife is possible.
Most objections to this answer can be resolved by noting that God has a very simple solution to the, "a copy is not the same as the original," problem. All He has to do is return a person's time to just before dying, and change the "path" so the person does not die. This would be one way of "resurrecting" a person with "no complications." However, a non-materialistic afterlife, would not only be more desirable, but more probable. As I understand it, we would become a form of "sentient energy," wherein our consciousness/identity would reside. We would then be part of, and of the same nature as God, and would "reside" in Him - for ever!

Also, it seems that there will be both groups. Those that are resurrected, and those that are "left" as "sentient energy."

Guill
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