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I am wondering about traditions of ethics which might incorporate naturalism or skepticism.

As far as I understand, the Academic Skeptics, in particular Carneades and Cicero, held that there was no way to know anything for certain, but also held that you could draw conclusions about good and evil from available evidence. They did not think that the existence of a moral good was completely subjective, and they also did not think that the existence of moral goods required a supernatural agent. From the position of the Academic Skeptics, you could derive an ought from an is.

This point of view seems to be consistent with metaphysical naturalism. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it,

From the Hellenistic point of view, theology is part of physics. An account of god is part of an account of the natural world (as such, it is unrecognizable as ‘theology’ from the point of view of later theologies). Human beings and their cognitive faculties are natural parts of a natural world. They are organic and functional parts, interconnected with the other parts of the large whole which the universe is. A mind-world-gap (of the kind envisaged in the Cartesian tradition) is inconceivable. Each ‘mind,’ and that is, rational soul, is an integrated physical part of the physical world.

My question is two-fold. First, is my understanding of the ethical position of Cicero correct, and second, are there modern schools of philosophical thought that follow this tradition? To clarify the second question further, are there modern metaphysical naturalists who maintain that questions of good and evil are meaningful?

philosodad
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  • What do you mean by "a naturalistic view of metaphysics"? – Michael Dorfman Jul 21 '12 at 23:52
  • Metaphysical naturalism, as defined here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_naturalism – philosodad Jul 22 '12 at 03:55
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    You might find this question useful: [Are there non-divine objective standards of good/evil?](http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/1416/are-there-any-non-divine-objective-standards-of-good-evil/1419#1419) – stoicfury Jul 23 '12 at 22:29

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I don't know of any philosophers who fit the criteria, largely because "metaphysical naturalism" implies a physical reductionism when it comes to mind, which leaves no room for free will. Thus, there are no ethical issues to be considered: "ought" reduces to "is".

EDIT: Since the question has been reframed a bit, I'll attempt to flesh out my question in a slightly different direction.

It seems, from reading between the lines, that the question is actually about the grounding of an ethics that does not rely on a supernatural agent (such as a deity.) This is actually quite different than specifying metaphysical naturalism, which is a much more constrained view.

For example, Kantian ethics do not require reference to a deity, nor do Aristotelian ethics or Buddhist ethics; however, none of them insist that mind can be reduced to physical phenomena. The latter is an extreme position held by very few philosophers, and raises all kinds of problems, not the least of which is a nexus for free will-- if the mind is purely physico-mechanical, we are forced into a determinist position, and ethics becomes irrelevant.

This latter argument is made quite eloquently by Raymond Tallis in his recent book, "Aping Mankind", which shows very effectively the limits of physical reductionism when it comes to minds.

So: if you are looking for an ethics which is compatible with atheism, there are many to choose from. But if you are insisting on a metaphysics which is purely physical, there's no real need for ethics, as there are no persons to speak of: only so many atoms bouncing off each other in varying conglomerations.

SECOND EDIT: To clarify: Cicero and Carneades are not, in my reading, physical reductionists. Although they reject supernatural agents, they do not reject human agency, and this agency is tied up in a conception of mind that allows mind to influence matter-- which violates physical reductionism.

Physical reductionism is an extreme variant of non-supernatural metaphysics. There are a number of notable non-supernaturally-grounded ethical systems out there, but these all require an ethical agent who is capable of choice. This cannot be reconciled with physical reductionism, as there is no locus of choice-- how can a mechanical process make a free choice? Even those philosophers who claim to hold a reductionist position (like Penrose) get all hand-wavy when it comes down to these matters (i.e. quantum stuff). If one believes that the mental supervenes on the physical, then conscious decisions cannot be causative, but must simply be side-effects of physical objects following the laws of physics; one must either be a dualist, or an eliminativist (and argue that mental events do not exist at all.) Jaegwon Kim makes this case quite cogently.

Michael Dorfman
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  • Which philosopher would you cite to support this conclusion, and what metaphysical model do they support? – philosodad Jul 22 '12 at 13:45
  • @philosodad I thought I might mention that [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_naturalism#Mind_as_brain) cites an interesting text by Stace in the context of metaphysical naturalism and the reduction of mind to brain. – Joseph Weissman Jul 22 '12 at 15:01
  • @JosephWeissman I understand that metaphysical naturalism implies that the mind is a physical phenomena. I don't see how that neccessitates the elimination of all ethical issues. Who says that it does, and what is their metaphysical stance? – philosodad Jul 22 '12 at 15:12
  • @philosodad I'm having trouble seeing the link between this concern and the one above about which thinkers asserted you can infer an ought from an is. Maybe we could merge some of this back into the question? – Joseph Weissman Jul 22 '12 at 15:17
  • @JosephWeissman It's relevant in the context of Mr. Dorfman's answer. He maintains that metaphysical naturalism implies that there *are* no ethics, and I am curious as to who says that this is true, aside from Mr. Dorfman. – philosodad Jul 22 '12 at 15:21
  • @philosodad right -- maybe you could develop your own concern a bit further in turn? What might you be reading or studying that would lead you to suspect or intuit that there *would* be thinkers or writers meeting the criteria you indicate? Developing this a little more would definitely help potential answerers like Michael respond directly to the challenge you're encountering in your study of philosophy, and provide an explanation with the appropriate focus, granularity, etc. – Joseph Weissman Jul 22 '12 at 15:24
  • Well, there are a number of philosophers that fit the criteria. The one that, as far as I am aware, has a more interesting, well-developed view is Richard Boyd. His "How to be a moral realist" outlines a promising reconciliation between realism about morality and naturalism. This paper appears in a collection about moral realism that @philosodad might want to check out too. – Schiphol Jul 23 '12 at 16:30
  • @Schiphol could you make your comment into an answer? Thanks. – philosodad Jul 23 '12 at 17:01
  • @philosodad Sure, I'll try to find time to elaborate on it later. – Schiphol Jul 23 '12 at 17:57
  • -1 for reading between the lines of a very carefully phrased question. I'm *only* concerned with metaphysical naturalism and ethics, and if very *few* philosophers are metaphysical naturalists it should be simple to find one who agrees with you that metaphysical naturalism negates ethics. – philosodad Jul 23 '12 at 22:40
  • @philosodad: Sorry, my bad. I thought your bringing the skeptics into it opened the door for those other than metaphysical naturalism, as I don't see how they are committed to physical reductionism. As for finding one, I already pointed out Raymond Tallis's new book, which makes that argument (regarding physical reductionism, free will, and ethics) quite explicitly. Naturally, he doesn't hold that position himself (as it would be self-defeating) but finds it in others. – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 08:38
  • @MichaelDorfman Carneades disagreed with the epicurean position that physical reductionism deletes free will. It's an old argument. My problem with your answer is that you state that a certain class of philosopher *does not exist* because Tallis thinks that they must be *wrong*. – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 10:51
  • @philosodad: How do you claim Carneades as a physical reductionist? Carneades (according to Cicero, at least) argues *against* what he sees as the physical reductionism of the Epicureans, and their recourse to the *clinamen*, and *for* a voluntary movement of the mind which is *not* bound by the regular physical movement of atoms. If one wishes to avoid determinism, one must have a locus of free will--i.e., something which is not mechanical. This can be conceived of as the Epicurean swerve, or as Carneades voluntary movement, or as Penrose's appeal to quantum things, but it is necessary. – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 11:15
  • @MichaelDorfman Okay. So if my understanding of Carneades and Cicero is in error, you could perhaps state that in your answer, since that is part one of my question. Second, you miss my second point entirely, which is that you state that a certain class of philosopher does not exist because a philosopher you agree with asserts that they are wrong, and this is a fallacious position. – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 12:33
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    @philosodad: I'll try to update the question with regard to Carneades. In the latter matter, you are mischaracterizing my argument. I do not know of any philosophers who simultaneously (a) hold physical reductionism, and (b) write about normative ethics. The reason for this absence is clear, and Tallis does a nice job of laying out the territory. Philosophers who deal with ethics are usually open on the question of the basis of mind, and those that are extremists with regard to materialist metaphysics tend to avoid discussion of free will, as it is highly problematic for them. – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 12:41
  • @MichaelDorfman also, you misunderstand Epicurus. He did in fact maintain that human actions were autonomous and that we had moral agency. http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/epicurus/letter_to_menoeceus.html#agent-causal – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 12:50
  • @MichaelDorfman The fact that you do not know of any such philosophers does not mean that they do not exist. As pointed out by others, they very clearly *do* exist, and in the articles I read about Tallus, they are named (Daniel Dennet, for example). Please note my update to the question, which supports my assertion that Ancient Skepticism implied metaphysical naturalism. – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 13:12
  • let us [continue this discussion in chat](http://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/4219/discussion-between-michael-dorfman-and-philosodad) – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 14:14
  • I'll remove the -1 because I think this is a useful answer, but to deny that Carneades and Cicero were metaphysical naturalists who believed in a wholly natural brain without an attendant supernatural mind--over the objections of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy--is a bold statement that could use much more support. – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 16:43
  • My point is not that Carneades or Cicero believed in a supernatural mind--but the issue here is what we consider a "wholly natural brain". As I pointed out elsewhere, both Carneades and Epicurus permit mental events to have causal effect over matter-- Carneades explicitly, and Epicurus implicitly through the swerve-- which means that they are not material reductionists, but must be read as supporting a mind-matter monism (or weak dualism). Neither appeals to the supernatural, but both recognize a limit to explanation on purely regular physical grounds. And this is what allows an ethics. – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 18:04
  • @MichaelDorfman monism is weak dualism? Look, either there is a supernatural mind or not. If there is *not*, then the mind is *wholly natural* and falls within Metaphysical Naturalism. – philosodad Jul 24 '12 at 19:38
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    @philosodad: if your monistic substance is a hybrid of mind and matter, there's not much difference between that and dualism. As I've tried to point out, "wholly natural" does not necessarily equal "wholly material"-- and that's the distinction that makes a difference. There are tons of people who think the mind is natural, and yet do not subscribe to physical reductionism or eliminativism when it comes to minds. – Michael Dorfman Jul 24 '12 at 20:19
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Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff hold both these views that you can get to an is from an ought and that morality is objective.

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/morality.html

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/logic.html

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/is-ought_dichotomy.html

As for metaphysical naturalism, I'm not sure what you mean, but whatever you mean this will answer your questions about these philosophers...

"The branch of philosophy that studies existence is metaphysics. Metaphysics identifies the nature of the universe as a whole. It tells men what kind of world they live in, and whether there is a supernatural dimension beyond it. It tells men whether they live in a world of solid entities, natural laws, absolute facts, or in a world of illusory fragments, unpredictable miracles, and ceaseless flux. It tells men whether the things they perceive by their senses and mind form a comprehensible reality, with which they can deal, or some kind of unreal appearance, which leaves them staring and helpless."

John Tate
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  • I linked to a Wikipedia article that describes metaphysical naturalism. Perhaps after reading the first sentence or two you could modify your answer? – philosodad Jul 22 '12 at 13:47