The key word in your first quote is "certain". There is a widely held position, called fallibilism, under which no proposition, hypothesis, theory, or whatever, can ever be called truly certain, because it is always possible for us to be mistaken, or to be in a position where we would revise our claim that it is true if we came to possess new evidence. Several pragmatist philosophers, including Peirce and Dewey maintained this position, and also, in a slightly different form, did Popper and Quine.
This is not a skeptical position: it is not saying we don't know anything, or have no reasons to believe what we believe, only that certainty is not achievable. One way to think about fallibilism is that if we supposed the opposite, i.e. that some proposition was infallibly and indubitably true, it would imply that no amount of evidence could possibly persuade us to change our minds about it.
Historically, some rationalist philosophers have attempted to establish some propositions as indubitably true, e.g. Descartes with the Cogito, and some empiricists have attempted to build a kind of foundationalism from experiences that are supposedly primitive and incorrigible, e.g. early Russell and Ayer with the sense-data theory. These attempts have not achieved any wide acceptance, though both still have their defenders, and the question is still debated today.