I'm not surprised that you are struggling to apply the term "category mistake".
I think it is most helpful to focus on Ryle's use of the term. It is, as you say, how the term was introduced into modern philosophical discourse.
At the time he wrote, there was a widespread consensus that there was a clear distinction between correct and incorrect English (and for other languages, of course). That idea has been widely questioned and is now very much in retreat. So, as you have found, the term is now used in many ways, which do not correspond exactly to Ryle's use of it, and are not always particularly helpful. However, I do not think it is appropriate to rigidly classify all these uses as correct or incorrect by reference to Ryle's use of it.
You will find a useful article at Category Mistakes - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosohy. This may not bring the clarity you are looking for, but will show how complicated this topic has become since Ryle wrote.
The best help I can offer is to look more closely at Ryle's use of the term, which is relatively clear.
Ryle was articulating a demolition of Cartesian dualism of mind and body. The key element in this theory is the claim that mind and body are different substances. For Descartes, this was a technical term, originating in Aristotle's metaphysics.
Ryle is adapting "category" which is another technical term, also originating in Aristotle. His philosophical programme was to return philosophy from the traditional forest of technical terms, including the technical terms of formal logic, to "ordinary language". But in this argument, his philosophical heritage is important to understand what he is saying.
Ryle's diagnosis of Descartes' mistake is that Descartes is misled by the grammatical similarity between the word "mind" and the word "body" into thinking that a mind is something rather like a body.
To make this clearer, we have to appeal to analogies. Hence his famous slogan about the ghost in the machine. Another famous example that he cites in the classic book "The Concept of Mind" is the visitor to Oxford who tours the city and sees the various colleges and the Bodleian library and so forth and then asks, "But where is the University?" This is a misunderstanding. There is no building that is the University. The University is the institutional organization of the buildings that they have seen.
The SEP article above shows how people have tried to articulate his idea in more detail. What you are grappling with is the complication and variety of ideas that have been produced by this process. It would have been good to have pinned his idea down, but I'm afraid that philosophy is not very good at producing that kind of answer, or rather it is very good at producing many answers.
A philosophical category mistake can be thought of as an ordinary category mistake on steroids. There's no philosophical problem about the mistake of putting tomatoes in the vegetable aisle, even though tomatoes are actually a fruit and belong with the apples and pears. But in philosophy, such mistakes promote misleading and unhelpful comparisons - even what is plainly nonsense.