In "The Ultimate Origin of Things," Leibniz' motivates his claim that
nothing in the world could be the ultimate reason for things
by asserting that
We can’t find in any individual thing, or even in the entire collection and series of things, a sufficient reason why they exist.
The argument appears to continue by assuming that there exists such a "sufficient reason" and proving that it is God. The essay as a whole reads to me as Leibniz' attempt to answer "what is the final cause of the universe?"
I don't understand what the problem with a universe that does not have a final cause would be. What is the conclusion that Leibniz is trying to exclude with his argument? Why would it not be acceptable if the universe happened to be the kind of thing that doesn't have a final cause? Does he accept it as a given that it does have a final cause and proceed from there, or is there an argument in the text (or elsewhere) that I'm missing that supports this claim?