2

I'm trying to write a philosophy essay and I'm trying to distinguish between three different ways in which agents may accept or believe in a rule:

  • That a rational agent seeking the best outcome (for everyone affected) would agree to follow the rule
  • That an agent is morally obligated to act according to the rule
  • That the relevant authority is justified in coercing others to act in accordance to the rule

Are there standard philosophical terms to describe these three kinds of acceptance?

Casebash
  • 559
  • 1
  • 6
  • 15
  • 1
    People also follow rules out of habit. The Pragmatists found this type of rule following interesting. – ben rudgers Sep 02 '14 at 11:16
  • 1
    See [tacit knowledge](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_knowledge), and perhaps [unarticulated background](http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/14319/what-is-an-unarticulated-background). – labreuer Oct 02 '14 at 16:04
  • @labreuer Why see that? How do they apply? I don't get it. –  Oct 03 '14 at 16:21
  • 1
    @jobermark: Michael Polanyi developed the idea of [tacit knowledge](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_knowledge) in understanding how scientists do science (IIRC, especially experimentalists). See also his [Personal Knowledge](http://www.amazon.com/Personal-Knowledge-Towards-Post-Critical-Philosophy/dp/1614275378). When experimentalists follow protocols, they are following part explicit, part implicit rules. And so, I thought that would be relevant, even to something which may be closer to philosophy of language. – labreuer Oct 03 '14 at 16:39
  • @labreuer OK. I get the relevance, but I think that whether or not your rule following is conscious, or above-board, you have the same mixed motivations, and these three options encompass the bulk of them. –  Oct 03 '14 at 19:06
  • @jobermark: No doubt! Michael Polanyi was a scientist _and a philosopher_, and thus I suspected he has indeed inspected this issue, with the above two places being good starting points. Are there just these three options, and do they have formal names? If I knew, I would post an answer, instead of merely providing a promising route of research. :-) – labreuer Oct 03 '14 at 20:31
  • 1
    @labreuer I think as noted below that they represent 'alethic', 'deontic', and 'doxastic' modes in the sense of modal logic. I do not think they are the only options, but they predominate very heavily -- so much so that they have correlates in the pychoanalytic tradition of Lacan, the personality theory of Jung, Germanic language modal verb structure, and part of the traditional alchemical labeling of the astrological signs. –  Oct 03 '14 at 20:37

2 Answers2

2

Traditionally these alternatives capture the three primary modes -- cardinal, fixed, and mutable; or deontic, alethic, and optative (more commonly volative, but I prefer the Greek word); or symbolic, realistic, and imaginal; or 'should/may', 'could/must' and 'would/might'... These also coincide with some personality theorists division of people into Jungian types of SJ, SP and N, which splits the population roughly in thirds.

The first option is fixed or alethic or realistic or 'could/must' -- it is a matter of survival or advantage in material reality to comply. 'One could do better by...'.

The second option is cardinal or deontic or symbolic or 'should/may', it is a matter of social convention, duty or symbolic obeisance to comply. 'One really should...'.

The third option is mutable or volative or imaginal or 'would/might', there is no reason to comply other than the whim of those in the position to command. If he is truly justified, we somehow trust the vision and obey. 'His majesty would rather that...'.

The last case is more complex, because if the leadership is not truly justified, obviously it then becomes a fixed position to comply when the commander is free to use force or a cardinal position when he is in his position for traditional, religious or political reasons. But the rule itself, and the argument for it, is mutable.

Another way of looking at option 3 is that it represents a more evolved, less pure version of the mutable principle, a relativistic posture, or a doxastic mode, where I work from belief. Instead of responding directly to the idealistic world, I comply, am willing to be coerced, or allow/cause others to be, when the directions resonate with my own ideals, in that they either excite or conform with my imagination.

Then I find an authority justified when its ideas are consonant with my ideas, either purely when I subjectively feel they are likely to be right, or when those ideas have been shaped by other modes, but are now past consideration, and have become guiding ideals that shape my imagination. (Basically, this is intuitive behavior that is not rootless or flighty, but instead firmly attached to what one is passionate about, to the point that logic is not what would change ones mind.)

Since alchemy, modal logic, psychoanalysis, philology, etc. have different ways of putting the same thing over and over, I would say there is no 'standard' set of terms. But the set of deontic, alethic, or optitive/doxastic modality are most likely understood by a lot of philosophers.

1

I guess I'm struggling to see the difference in these acceptances.

I believe a rational agent will always act in its own enlighten self-interest, which intrinsically accounts for any considerations that would be considered moral, as morality (to me) is simply a set of loose guidelines to facilitate the understand of actions from unenlightened to enlightened self-interest.

So I believe a rational agent will always behave morally and a moral agent will always behave rationally.

Likewise, any legitimate authority gains its legitimacy from its ability to facilitate a higher degree of possible enlightened self-interest within the confines of a group. If any members of the group suffer, then the group is not Pareto-optimal and therefore not legitimate. An authority would, for example, prevent tragedy of the commons but not force some members of a society into slavery to maximize global output (unless of course those members themselves still benefit due to the scale of the global gains).

So I believe a legitimate authority will always incent moral and rational action.

In case of following a rule that is not moral/rational, the agent is behaving arbitrarily and actions may be considered effectively random. Following a rule from a illegitimate authority, to me, is no different than behaving randomly.

Calvin
  • 536
  • 3
  • 9
  • Not everyone believes this. Perhaps a perfectly rational and altruistic agent wouldn't get a coffee, but getting a coffee wouldn't be immoral per se. Perhaps people should brush their teeth, but an authority wouldn't be justified in making people brush their teeth – Casebash Sep 03 '14 at 05:40
  • @Casebash Really this was more of a comment that didn't fit in 600 characters. I'm hoping we'll have enough discussion to develop a clearly answer and this may serve as a starting point. I do, however, object to your examples, as I don't find either to be correct (personally). – Calvin Sep 03 '14 at 15:06
  • Eh... A lot of people's morality consists in 'because I said so', in not deceiving or being disloyal. We are seldom truly free to pursue our own enlightened self-interest, because we have bound it up with others'. It is questionable whether this is rational, but it is a big part of morality for most of us. Most authority proceeds not from rational selection, but from de facto loyalty that becomes a trust in someone's vision. He is a legitimate leader under that morality. So while ideally, you are correct, in practice these are hugely different motivations on a day-to-day basis. –  Oct 02 '14 at 20:09