I read subvaluationists think that P can be both true and false (unlike supervaluationists, who think that P is neither true nor false), but it's completely unclear (because I can't read symbolic logic and haven't found an introduction) whether they - or indeed anyone else - claim that borderline cases are both P and not P.
For subvaluationists are logical quantifiers of borderline cases true for both P and not P? e.g. if some people in my family are borderline bald then are some people in my family borderline not bald?
I am asking because I think it likely (won't bother saying why) that my consciousness is vague and necessarily not everything. I am trying to work out whether (for any treatments of vagueness) with borderline cases of consciousness a quantifier is true of both consciousness and its negation.
Because if so, borderline cases of consciousness are necessarily not absent from everything. And I think I find that interesting (and equivalent to saying that borderline states of consciousness necessarily exist), perhaps pending finding out that it also isn't.
