0

In discussions related to Pascal’s wager, which I’m hoping most of you are familiar with, one of the objections against it is to simply refuse to assign a probability to God’s existence. The argument is that in a state of complete epistemic nullity, any probability assignment would be meaningless. See article here

But why should a refusal to assign a probability imply epistemic nullity? What if one thinks there are good reasons to not believe in God and refuse to assign a probability to it anyways due to the meaninglessness of probability here? How would one put a “measure” to this?

This brings me to the next question. Are we completely clueless as to whether God exists or do we have current evidence against His existence? By God, I am referring to the traditional Abrahamic conception of God. If one does think that evidence suggests that God does not exist, how does one put a measure to this if one also thinks that probability is meaningless here?

thinkingman
  • 6,354
  • 19
  • 53
  • Blaise Pascal was a man of his time, as was Abraham. I no longer believe in the traditional Abrahamic concept of God, taught as a child, and I have no need to justify it or to offer proof: I don't believe it. That is not to say I do or don't believe in God, but if someone asks me to justify that, I'll ask them to explain what God is, and then it is always "no", because one thing that remains from my early teachings is that God is beyond human understanding. It has nothing to do with how likely it is that God exists, because you first have to define "God". – Weather Vane Aug 25 '23 at 21:17
  • Questions of possible metaphysics are answered by logic and physics. You might want to talk about a concrete physical object, like [Russell's teapot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot), instead. Otherwise, the theory of probability you'd have to use would be the one that your metaphysics gives you. (To the extent that logic and physics disprove the existence of God, they do so in non-probabilistic ways.) – Corbin Aug 25 '23 at 22:01
  • @Corbin "*physics disprove the existence of God*". Physics does not delve in theological matters whatsoever. If anything, the standpoint in Physics is epitomized by Laplace's response to Napoleon: There is no need for that hypothesis [i.e., of a god]. – Iñaki Viggers Aug 25 '23 at 23:27
  • @IñakiViggers: Physical experiments can disprove metaphysical claims. For consideration, see [this answer](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/100175/48431) and [this answer](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/99773/48431). Note that neither of these answers prove the non-existence of Russell's teapot; this is why I recommended a shift in perspective. – Corbin Aug 26 '23 at 16:34
  • @Corbin "*For consideration, see this answer and this answer.*" Both answers are premised on logic, not on physics. My comment is about physics. Your allusion to quantum mechanics in the latter answer is unavailing, since a hypothetical omniscient being does not need to measure a particle: That omniscient being knows beforehand what an accurate measurement will reveal. Measurements are for the benefit of *non-omniscient* observers. I agree that the notion of omniscience leads to nonsense, but that is different from ascribing to Physics something that is not even its object of study. – Iñaki Viggers Aug 26 '23 at 19:43

0 Answers0