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I'm asking about the proposition "Animal is human" (as opposed to "Human is an animal"). All predicates are amongst the five predicables, i.e. they are either essential or accidental to the subject. Here, human is neither essential nor accidental to animal. Thus, there is a problem. My guess is that medieval philosophers would argue that the predicate must be more general conceptually than the subject. How do medieval philosophers approach this issue?

Mauro ALLEGRANZA
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Shahram
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2 Answers2

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Humans and beasts are members of the animal genus.

A human's essence is that sort of entity which is typing this answer.

Some humans have blue eyes, but not all, nor are all things with blue eyes human; this relationship is accident.

All humans have the property of having eyes, unless they are survivors of an injury or deformity.

Unlike birds, no humans have feathers; this is one of the differentia that separate humans from beasts.

g s
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    I'm familiar with what the five predicables are. I'm asking about the proposition "Animal is human" (as opposed to "Human is an animal"). All predicates are amongst the five predicables, i.e. they are either essential or accidental to the subject. Here, human is neither essential nor accidental to animal. Thus, there is a problem. My guess is that medieval philosophers would argue that the predicate must be more general conceptually than the subject. – Shahram Jul 12 '23 at 19:32
  • @Shahram that's how categorizing works, the overall category has to be more general. Not all vehicles are cars, sorry to say. – Scott Rowe Jul 13 '23 at 10:56
  • @ScottRowe So they would reject this type of predication? Do you have a source for the specifics of how these kinds of propositions are rejected? – Shahram Jul 13 '23 at 12:17
  • @Shahram I looked outside and there were some vehicles that weren't cars. Not sure what you are getting at? – Scott Rowe Jul 13 '23 at 14:03
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I'm not medieval scholar of logic, but if recollection serves, a proper strategy for definitions includes the genus-differential definition. From WP:

A genus–differentia definition is a type of intensional definition, and it is composed of two parts... a genus (or family): An existing definition that serves as a portion of the new definition; all definitions with the same genus are considered members of that genus... the differentia: The portion of the definition that is not provided by the genus.

So to answer your question, yes, one starts with the genus, and proceeds through differentiation. On some level, you already know this, because in your methodology, YOU started with the genus, and then ended with differentia. Perhaps what you needed is to be assured that your methodology is not only sound, but historically useful, one clue being that both genus and differentia are terms from the Latin, the language of philosophy in the Middle Ages. Again, from the article:

The use of a genus (Greek: genos) and a differentia (Greek: diaphora) in constructing a definition goes back at least as far as Aristotle (384–322 BCE).

It is of course, a well accepted fact, that Medieval Scholasticism was very deferential to Aristotle. :D

J D
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  • how could you, when you're not medieval? a nice enough answer –  Jul 13 '23 at 07:33
  • @doot_s Ha! I had intended scholar of medieval logic, but since both are true, I guess they're equivalent statements. ; ) – J D Jul 13 '23 at 14:02