Review of Legal Articles

-of the Empire. It is a doctrine of that law,— affirmed many years ago by the Judicial Com mittee of the Privy Council, and in later years by the imperial Parliament,—that under the British system of constitutional govern ment a treaty between Great Britain and a foreign power which provides for the cession, or exclusion, of British territory from the British sovereignty, jurisdiction, and laws. . . can only become legally operative therein in the time of peace after being specially con firmed by an Act of the imperial or colonial Parliament having legislative authority in the matter." Partnership (Real Property). "Partner ship Realty." By Prof. Francis M. Burdick. 9 Columbia Law Review 197 (Mar.) . The results of this study are thus recapitu lated by the author:— "It is apparent from the foregoing study of authorities that the doctrines in this country relating to partnership real estate are most confused and unsatisfactory. To repeat Judge Story's words, already quoted, they are 'open to many distressing doubts.' How are these doubts to be dispelled and this con fusion to be cleared up? The answer, we submit, is very simple. Treat a partnership as a legal entity, at least so far as firm title is concerned; and give full effect to the prin ciple that a partner is not a co-owner of firm property, but that his interest in it is only a right to his proportion of the cash assets of the firm after its debts are paid*" Patent Law. "Suggestions for Amend ments to Our Patent Law." By Isaac L. Rice. Forum, v. 41, p. 189. (Mar.). Favors an amendatory law providing for a federal court with exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction throughout the United States in patent cases, and also for a number of changes and additions to the present patent laws. Problems of the Law. "Conservatism and Progressiveness in Law." By Justice Francis W. Swayze. 32 New Jersey Law Journal 35 (Feb.). Justice Swayze's speech delivered February 5 at the annual dinner of the Hudson County Bar Association in New York. The general constitutional principles of freedom of con tract and inviolability of private property are of little help in solving such questions as these: How far may working men go in com bining for their own advancement or protec tion? What contracts are opposed to public policy? Are the rates that public service com panies are compelled by law to charge im posed as an incident of fair and reasonable regulation or do they amount to confiscation

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and spoliation? "Our constitutional principles are a beacon-light by which we may steer, but they do not themselves guide the vessel," for these great questions must in the end be solved by the courts of justice. Procedure (Actions against Government). "Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the United States." By Charles Chauncey Binney. 57 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 372 (Mar.). The writer, formerly Assistant Attorney of the Department of Justice of the United States, pleads for the entire elimination of political party considerations from the pro fessional staff of the Department of Justice, in order that those representing the interests of the nation in the Court of Claims may stand before their country upon the same nonpartisan level with the men of other learned professions. Legislation governing civil litigation against the government, and procedure in accordance therewith, are described, and information is also given with regard to separate states which have followed the example of the nation in providing for the adjudication of private claims. Procedure (British Empire). "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." By Wal lace Nesbitt, K. C. 45 Canada Law Journal 102 (Feb. 15). Mr. Nesbitt's paper was one of the best read before the New York State Bar Asso ciation at its annual meeting in January. Procedure (Jury Trial). "Jury Trial in Original Proceedings for Mandamus in the Supreme Court." By Professor Henry Schofield. 3 Illinois Law Review 479 (Mar.). "In The People ex rel. Scott Bibb v. The Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 233 Ill. 542, Cartwright, J., writing the opinion and Scott, J., a dissenting opinion concurred in by Farmer, J., it is decided that a party to an original proceeding for mandamus in the Supreme Court has no constitutional right to have an issue of fact tried by a jury; that the mode of trying an issue of fact in such case rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court. . . . "Perhaps it would have been wiser, if the Legislature that passed the Mandamus Act of June 1, 1827, had not taken the mode of trial by jury from the Act of 9 Anne, c. 20, or had confined that mode of trial to issues of fact in original proceedings for mandamus in Circuit Courts, and had enabled the Supreme Court to use its discretion as to the mode of determining issues of fact in original proceedings for mandamus, but the plain,