SOME MODERN TENDENCIES

of the thing would be amusing had it not become so serious a matter. Justice must be sacrificed that kindness may be shown, and that kindness shown only in liberality with other people's funds. An institution which in certain classes of cases habitually results in injustice surely cannot long be toler ated without change. Is it conservatism or lethargy that makes it possible for abuses to last so long? When we can wrap up any question, put it in a pigeon hole and mark it "finally settled," there is such a comfort able feeling of relief that the dust of centuries may accumulate upon it; the times may completely change, and an institution now irrational and obsolete may remain as a revered relic of a once living reform. When some one strong enough and courageous enough arises — shall I say to improve a system which exacts unwilling and often burdensome service, from those having no special qualifications to perform it, some progress will be made in the administration of justice. In speaking of notable tendencies, I could not ignore specialization, though I have little to say further than to mention it, I think we all have a sub-conscious prejudice in favour of the all-around man as he is familiarly called. He may never be particu larly brilliant, but his opinions are generally reasonable and sound, and we would all be sorry to see him disappear or relegated to the background. But of all things which we should be ready to admit, none are more obvious than the limitation of human capacity, and the ever increasing volume of possible knowledge. My own young hope ful after his first week at school said: "Father, do I know now, as much as I don't know?" And he seemed much dis couraged when I was unable to assure him that he had already mastered the fair half of human knowledge. In the realm of our own profession we may well stand aghast in the height and breadth and 'length and depth of the sphere which confronts the law student. By the mastery of principles, he

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may be able to do something in most branches of the law, but there remains a great mass of learning upon each question, and of this he must not be ignorant, if he wishes to rise above mediocrity. To be expert in every branch of the law has ceased to be a possibility, and specialization is the result of necessity wherever the centres of litigation are sufficiently large to permit of it. Medicine and surgery have already become almost distinct professions, with specialization in their respective branches, and it would be idle to deny that in law specialization has produced more exhaustive, if not always, more profound learning. The elder Disreali asks: "Are the original powers of genius, then, limited to a single art, and even to departments in that art? May not men of genius plume themselves with the vain glory, of universal ity' .... Cicero failed in poetry, Addison in oratory, Voltaire in comedy, and Johnson in tragedy Such in stances abound and demonstrate an import ant truth in the history of genius that we cannot, however we may incline, enlarge the natural extent of our genius any more than we can add a cubit to our stature. We may force it into variations, but in multiplying mediocrity or in doing what others can do we add nothing to genius." If there be a singleness in genius, as Disraeli calls it, how much more shall the average lawyer find his powers unequal to the task of attaining excellence in the many and diverse fields of his profession. As I said, a moment ago, it is only in the large centres of litigation that this inevitable tendency will be felt, for some time at least. Before passing from the question of specialization, may I be forgiven if I refer to a very important per sonage in many modern trials — the expert witness. He must be a very important person, or he would never have attracted so much attention, even provoking observa tion upon the positive, the comparative, and the superlative of veracity. The motherin-law would never have headed the list of