NOTES OF RECENT CASES

and further, that there was no evidence as to the meaning of the foreign words. A verdict was" returned for the defendant and on appeal the Supreme Court says: "There is no doubt that when libelous words are written in a foreign language they should be set out in that language and translation given, and it is also necessary to prove that the translation of the foreign words in the declaration is correct." In support of these principles the following cases are cited : Hickley v. Grosjean, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 351; Wormouth v. Cramer, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 394; Keenholtz v. Becker, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 346. TRADE UNIONS. (Strikes.) Mass. — Another case involving the rights of organized labor is Pickett v. Walsh, 78 N. E. 753. The facts 'as gathered from the opinion show that bricklayers' and masons' unions in the city of Boston and vicinity adopted a rule that no bricklayer or mason should work for any firm or contractor who would not employ bricklayers or masons to do the pointing of brick, terra cotta, and stone masonry, the trade of brick and stone pointing being one which in the neighborhood of the city of Boston had been carried on to some extent as a separate trade for about one hundred years, and there being at the time of the adoption of the rule in question about forty-five men engaged in that trade in the city and vicinity. As shown by the evidence, the trade of a brick or stone pointer consists in going over a building (generally when it is first erected) to clean it and to put a finish on the mortar of the joints. After the adoption of the rule, the unions ordered a strike on a building being erected by contractors who were having the pointing done by pointers instead of by brick layers or masons, and caused a strike on a building which was being erected by general contractors because on another building which was being erected by such contractors the pointing was being done by one other than a member .of the unions, under a contract between such person and the owner of the building. Several pointers then sued to enjoin the officers of the unions from conspiring to interfere with plaintiffs in pursuing their trade, and it was held that the unions might lawfully compete for the additional work of pointing the buildings in the exercise of their right of competition and might lawfully refuse to lay brick and stone unless given the work of pointing, though the contractors might prefer to give the work to regular pointers, and though the effect of complying with the demands of the unions apparently operated to destroy the pointers' business: but it was further held that the unions could not legally strike merely because the con

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tractors were working on a building on which work was being done by non-union pointers employed by the owners of the building, inas much as the organized laborers' right of coercion is limited to strikes on persons with whom the organization has a trade dispute. At the com mencement of the discussion as to the first point this right of one or more citizens to pursue his or their calling as he or they see fit is said to be limited by the existence of the same right in all other citizens. Another general principle is stated to the effect that the result of the power of coercion on the part of a combination of individ uals is that what is lawful for an individual is not the test of what is lawful for a combination of individuals, or, in other words, that there are things which it is lawful for an individual to do which it is not lawful for a combination of indi viduals to do, and reference is made to the case put in Allen v. Flood (1898) A. C. 1, 165, of a butler refusing to renew a contract of services because the cook was personally distasteful to him, whereupon, in order to secure the services of the butler, the master refrains from reengaging the cook, whose term of service also had expired and in this connection it is said: " We have no doubt that it is within the legal rights of a single person to refuse to work with another for the reason that the other person is distasteful to him, or for any other reason, however arbitrary. But it is established in this commonwealth that it is not legal for an employer to agree with a union to discharge a non-union workman for an arbitrary cause at the request of the union." The court then proceeds to the question as to whether the unions had a right to refuse to lay bricks or stone where the pointing of the materials laid by the union is given to others, and it is considered that the effect of such position on the part of the union is to demand all the work or none. In sustaining the right of the unions in such respect, the court says: " So far as the labor unions are concerned the contractors can employ pointers if they choose, but if the contractors choose to give the work of pointing the bricks and stones to others, the unions take the stand that the con tractors will have to get some one else to lay them. The effect of this in the case at bar appears to be that the contractors are forced against their will to give the w-ork of pointing to the masons and bricklayers. But the fact that the con tractors are forced to do what they do not want to do is not decisive of the legality of the labor unions' acts. That is true wherever a strike is successful. . . . Further, the effect of complying with the labor unions' demands apparently will be the destruction of the plaintiff's business. It