73&

THE GREEN BAG

was no consideration for the notes at their in ception. SALES (Implied Warranty on Sale of Food). N. J. Sup. Ct. — The much discussed question of the liability of the manufacturer of food products for injuries to a remote vendee, was again con sidered in Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 65 Atl. Rep. 883. The action was brought for injuries from ptomaine poisoning, caused by eating ham put up by defendant, who sold it to a retail dealer, from whom it was purchased by plaintiff. The court referred to some of the seeming discrepancies in statements of legal writers as to the early English law on the subject, and came to the conclusion that plaintiff could have no greater rights than had the dealer of whom the purchase was made, and that as there was no implied warranty in sales to dealers, no recovery could be had. TRADE-NAMES (Illegal use of One's Own Name). N. J. Ct. Err. & App. — In International Silver Co. v. Rogers, 67 Atl. Rep. 105, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals is asked to determine the right to the use of the name " W. H. Rogers," on silver plated ware. Complainants were the successors in interest of several com panies that had been engaged in the manufacture of ware of this description, all deriving their title from three brothers of the name of Rogers. Defendant, whose name was William H. Rogers, had been the president of a corporation bearing his name. Complainants had, in a prior suit, obtained an injunction against the carrying on of the business as done by that corporation. Defendant subsequently bought up all outstanding stock and began to manufacture "in his own name, placing upon his wares the name " W. H. Rogers, of Plainfield, N. J." The court held this did not sufficiently distinguish them from those manu factured by complainants, and notwithstanding he was using his own name, awarded an injunction, unless the defendant should hereafter stamp on his goods, " not the original Rogers," or " not connected with the original Rogers." TRUSTS (Capital and Income — Stock Divi dend). Conn. — An interesting question as to what constitutes a cash or stock dividend came up in Green v. Bissell, 65 Atl. Rep. 1056, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) ion. Green was trustee under the will of Samuel Bissell, who had left an estate consisting partly of certain shares in a joint stock corporation. Some time during the trusteeship, the corporation having in its treasury certain shares of its own stock, received in payment of a debt, divided them pro rata among the stockholders. The Bissell estate received its proportionate number and the question then arose as to whether the stock so •received should be considered as a part of the

corpus of the estate or as a portion of the income. The court stated the general rule to be that cash dividends should go to the life tenant and stock dividends to the remainderman; that the declaration of a stock dividend involves the creation and issue of new shares of stock. The basis of the issue, in so far as payment into the corporation is not required of the recipient, is surplus assets which thus become converted into strict capital with all which that implies. From the process there results an increase of both the number of outstanding shares and the amount of the corporate assets which have had that peculiar dedication to the corporate uses which, as ex plained in Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 60 Atl. 117, 69 L. R. A. 76, 107 Am. St. Rep. 51, entitle them to the name of capital, strictly speaking. It held that in the case at Bar, there being no new issue increasing the number of outstanding shares or the amount of the corporate capital, the distribution should be considered as a cash dividend to be con sidered as income, notwithstanding that in the votes of the stockholders the distribution was designated as one " by way of a stock dividend." TRUSTS (Religious Societies). Ga. — Re ligious organizations throughout the country, will be especially interested in the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Mack v. Kime, reported in 58 S. E. Rep. 184. The case involves a history of the union of the Cumberland Pres byterian Church and the Northern Presbyterian Church. Injunctive relief was sought against transfer of the property belonging to one of the churches in Atlanta and interference with its use by defendants; plaintiffs claiming to be loyal members of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church . The trial judge granted the relief prayed and said that " the action of one of the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church seeking to effect such union, was without constitutional authority and in conflict with the express pro visions of their constitution." The Supreme Court, however, arrived at a different conclusion and held that notwithstanding property rights were involved, they where dependent, upon questions of faith and religious tenets, a decision of which by the highest tribunal of the ecclesias tical body, would be held conclusive; that where property acquired by a religious organization is devoted by express terms to the support of specific religious doctrines, a court will inquire in a particular case, as to whether there is an entire diversion from the purpose intended but that when property has been acquired in ordinary means by a gift or sale, no inquiry will be made as to the specific religious beliefs of those holding it in legitimate order of succession.