GENERAL ARBITRATION TREATIES

scope of The Hague Convention, shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with, the terms of that convention. 6. The argument thus far has been con fined to the question of power. A few words on the subject of the advisability of general treaties will close this part of the report. In general, it may be said that jurists are agreed that general legislation is likely to be wiser than special legislation. The abuses to which the latter is subject have led many of the states to adopt constitu tions prohibiting many classes of special legislation. Formerly, for example, all cor porate charters were special. These are now prohibited in many of the states. Even before constitutional amendments to that effect were adopted, general laws under which individuals could incorporate were passed. Certainly the grant of a corporate franchise is a legislative power. But it was never doubted that a legislature could ex ercise this by general law as well as by special charter. And the general laws are certainly far wiser in their provisions, and more considerate of the public interests, than special charters. It is always better to arrange matters beforehand, on general principles, than to decide on the spur of the moment. In the case of the civil service of the country, it has been found advisable to pro vide in general terms for its administration, and to confer upon the President the power to make from time to time, regulations for its further government. By these regula tions he has greatly extended the scope of the classified service. His power to do this has been questioned. The validity of the civil service legislation has been assailed. But it has been sustained by the courts.1 1 People v. Civil Service Boards, 103 N. Y. 657; aff'g s. c. 41 Hun. 287. People v. Common Council, 16 Abb. N. C. 96. Foreman v. Union etc. Co., 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 385. Opinion Justices, Supreme Court, 138 Mass. 601.

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So it has been found expedient to confer upon the Secretary of the Treasury power to make regulations respecting the importa tion of foreign goods. The supervising in spectors have been authorized to prescribe rules for inland navigation. The pilot com missioners of a state have been authorized to make rules for the pilotage of vessels entering and leaving its ports. In all these cases, it has been found that the exigencies of the situation could best be served by the action of public officials, which could be modified from time to time without the necessity of a resort to Congress. In all these cases, the rules promulgated under the statute are held to have the force of law.1 The reasoning in these cases is especially applicable to treaties of arbitration. When a matter in difference arises between two nations, the passions of each are apt to be come excited. It is claimed on each side that the national honor is at stake. And then the platitude is brought forward that a nation must never arbitrate a question involving its honor. As Hamilton said when this objection was made to the Jay Treaty: "It would be a horrid and destructive principle that nations could not terminate a dispute about the title to a particular parcel of territory by amicable agreement, or by submission to arbitration as its substitute, but would be under an indisputable obliga tion to prosecute the dispute by arms till real danger to the existence of one of the parties would justify, by the plea of ex1 " This court has too repeatedly said that they have the force of law to make it proper to dis cuss that point anew." Gratiot v. United States, 4 How. 80. Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13. United States v. Barrows, i Abb. (U. S.) 351. Matter of Moore, 108 N. Y. 280. Sturges v. Spofford, 43 N. Y. 446. Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292. United States v. Williams, 6 Mont. 379. United States v. Fuellhart, 106 Fed. Rep. 911.