PRACTICE WORK IN LAW SCHOOLS

instruction in practice, exclusive of those features which are supposed to be taught only by mock jury trials. Regarding the value of the latter, in view of the time they take, I am skeptical. It is true an elaborate system of such trials has been in existence at the University of Michigan for several years, and has been introduced in some other schools; and it is true that members of the Michigan law faculty for whose judgment I have • the highest respect, believe in their value. In .spite of this, I think one may have serious -doubts. The ability to try jury cases even fairly well is far more an art than a science, and is to be acquired only by'an amount of experience and observation far greater thaa any law school can afford time for. The .school at best can give students but a slight start in this direction — how slight appears when we consider the artificial conditions under which mock trials must be held. The witnesses are all intelligent young men, somewhat versed in law. There is among them neither the 'variety of intelli gence, training, age, sex, occupation-, social' condition, or even of character, which marks the ordinary witness and is the distraction of the trial lawyer. The same is true of the jurors. The mere fact that they are accus tomed to legal ways of thinking makes them totally different material from the juries of • our courts. Then there is the evidence. If it is merely learned by the witnesses there will be almost no element of reality in their examination. If, as at Michigan, the wit nesses actually see the facts to which they testify acted out before them, this is better; but even here there can be no real element -of passion, bias, or interest to color their testimony, to induce falsehood and conceal ment, and to be exposed by cross examina tion; and there is an additional artificiality in that the witnesses know beforehand that they are to observe what goes on in order to tell of it in court. Such observation must be much less casual and less likely to be mistaken than is that of most real wit

531

nesses. Finally, the sense of responsibility on the part of the attorney, which is so great an educational factor in real trials (as in all real life), must be largely lacking in the imitation. It is hard to believe that many students can obtain such benefit from taking part in a few mock jury trials that the third or fourth case they try in actual practice will be affected by it. The cases that are adapted to mock trials lie in a narrow compass. The classes of facts most difficult to deal with in actual litigation are in general those least suited to the moot court, such as questions of negligence, value, damages, mental states, expert opinion, and the like. I do not sup pose it would be claimed that students can get from this exercise much practice in the art of handling questions of fact before a jury. Its value must rather consist in giv ing them some knowledge of the processes of this branch of litigation : how to empanel a jury and open a case, how to present va rious kinds of evidence, in what form ques tions should be put, how objections should he made and exceptions taken, and so forth. Now these matters are very easily learned. Some of them may be treated in the course on evidence, and any bright boy who has had a year or two in a law school can get a fair theoretical knowledge of the others in a few days by attending some actual trials and reading a small treatise on trial prac tice. He can do this in vacation, and de vote his time in the law school to more difficult matters and those which better repay theoretical study. The trouble with the young lawyer is not that he does not know these things in cold blood, but that he doesn't remember some of them at the right time in the excitement of trying a case. He will lack sel-f-possession more than knowledge, and until he has tried enough cases so that certain processes have become almost habitual he will continue to make simple errors. A ready command of trial procedure is to be gained only like a ready command of the rules of evidence — by con