ferior nature." This is the real lever which helps on the progress to the modern idea. But it appears early, and apparently as a borrowing from the Roman law. . . . III. However, one step still remains to be taken. As yet—say, in the 15005—this the ory is applicable to "matter of a higher na ture," ». c., specialties, sealed documents, and not to writings as such. How and when did this last extension of ideas occur? The Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, in 1678, seems to mark the modern epoch's full beginning. . . . The significance of the statute for the present purpose, then, was in the main, first, that it abolished the practice of creating estates of freehold by oral delivery qf seisin only, and, secondly, that it permitted the re quired document (for leases) to be a writing without seal. . . . The scope of these provi sions was limited; but their moral and logical influence was wide and immediate. The statute now began to be appealed to, in all questions of "parol evidence." as setting an example and typifying a general principle. The important consequence was that for that great mass of transactions which were not affected by the statute, but were none the less put into writing by the parties, though not sealed—/'. e., transactions for which by the older idea trie writing would merely have benn "evidence,"—the writing now came to be treated and spoken of as the constitutive thing. The modern view had come into com plete existence; and the period of this seems to be about the end of the i6oos. ••ACCORD and Satisfaction" is the subject of a scholarly discussion by Professor Samuel Williston in the May number of the Harvard Law Review. On one phase of the question Professor Williston says: It seems obvious that nothing can operate as a satisfaction unless both debtor and credi tor agree that it shall, but there is one com monly recurring state of facts where this principle seems to be lost sight of by many, courts. The case is this: A debtor sends to a creditor whose claim is unliquidated or dis puted a check with a letter stating that the

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check is sent in full satisfaction of the claim, and that if the creditor is unwilling to accept it as such he must return it. The creditor takes the check, but immediately writes a letter stating that he refuses to accept the check as full satisfaction, but will apply it in reduction of the indebted ness. Upon these facts the English Court of Appeal held that there was no satis faction of the cause of action, and a few jur isdictions in the United States have made the same ruling. But the great weight of authority in the United States is to the con trary. It is said that the acceptance of the check necessarily involves an acceptance of the condition upon which it was tendered. If the parties are dealing orally with one another and the debtor offer the creditor a check in full satisfaction which the creditor takes, it must be interred that he assents to the terms. If the creditor refuses to receive the check in full satisfaction and yet takes it, either he must have assented to the terms, or the debtor must have assented to the cred itor's refusal, for the voluntary giving of the check by one, and the taking it by the other, if neither misunderstood the words that were spoken, necessarily indicate assent, and it becomes a question of fact, what the bargain was to which they assented. But if the debtor laid down the check and departed, saying, if this is taken it is full satisfaction, it is hard to see why the creditor may not steal or convert the check. Doubtless, if he take the check, saying nothing, his taking will be equivalent to an expression of assent to the offer, what ever his mental intent, and even if he indicate by some act or word at the time that he takes the check that his intention is not to treat the debt as satisfied, he should still be re garded as assenting to the terms of the debtor's offer, for under the circumstances the debtor has reason to suppose that the taking of the check is an expression of assent unless informed to the contrary. But if as soon as the check is taken, notice is promptly given to the debtor that it is not taken as satisfaction, it seems impossible to find the elements of a bargain. The most forcible argument upon the other side is that the