thereupon confessed that he had done the deed and thereafter on numerous occasions repeated his story, which was to the effect that he had gone to the house of the old lady in the afternoon to borrow a gun, which she refused to lend him, using abusive language to him for his impudence in approaching her on such a matter. He thereupon became incensed and struck her with the horse yoke, which caused her to fall, and he then became afraid that she would report the assault to his mistress and that he would be punished severely for what he had done. He there fore resolved to complete the job and re turned to the prostrate form of the woman, striking her on the head repeatedly with the yoke until he thought she was dead. These confessions were the only evidence upon which the State could rely for a conviction. Although the first confession was excluded as having been induced by threats the subse quent ones were admitted in evidence. The boy was convicted, his case was appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, where the judgment was affirmed, and he was sub sequently put to death for this crime. Now let us see what the tragic features of this case were to the lawyers and the judges who were interested in it. In the first place, from time immemorial the law had presumed that all children of tender years were incapable of committing crime. There is a general pre sumption, of course, that all persons, whether adults or children, arc innocent of the crimes with which they are charged, but in the case of a boy under fourteen years of age the presumption extends further and clothes the infant with the protection of his supposed incapacity to know the difference between right and wrong and consequently his inca pacity to commit murder or any other crime/ These presumptions may be overcome by evidence showing the precocity in the child, and there are many instances where children have been executed for murder. But how was the presumption of innocence and inca pacity overcome in this case? A man's con

fession of his innocence may not be used in his behalf, but his admission of his guilt may be used against him in a criminal case. Nevertheless, if an admission of guilt is superinduced by threats or the equivalent thereof it cannot be used against the accused. In the case under consideration it was shown beyond doubt that such language had been used toward the boy in the first instance as to have probably produced terror in his mind and it was on this ground, as above stated, that his first confession was excluded. It was not shown that the boy ever saw a jail, that he knew anything about an execution, that he had the remotest practical concept of the workings of the criminal court, or that he had any comprehension of the appalling consequences of his talking against himself. Moreover, at that time under the criminal law it was not possible for a person accused of murder to give evidence in his own behalf. While the State could offer the admissions of the accused, made out of court, against him, yet the accused could not take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf. It therefore happened in the case of Guild that while his confessions were being used against him, he had to sit mute beside his attorney and in a certain sense permit his life to be taken away by default. His attor neys were powerless to help him. No wonder the judges of the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction, "under a deep sense of responsibility," felt the awful gravity of the burden put upon them and expressed their lament in their decision. Here was a possible judicial murder which must have touched the minds and hearts of all the people who knew of it. Here wa;; one of those awful tragedies in law illustrating the need of enlightened legislation and show ing the responsibility that rests upon every man for the kind of laws which are enacte,d in the place where he lives for the protection and control of himself and every other man. Here was doubtless one of those frightful instances of justice so-called which shook