A Century of Rnglish Judicature.

A CENTURY

OF

355

ENGLISH JUDICATURE.

V. BY VAN VECHTEN VEEDER. FROM THE COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT TO THE JUDICATURE ACT. A WELL defined change in the adminis tration of English law occurred shortly after the middle of the century. Years of agi tation against the anomalies and abuses of the prevailing legal system culminated about that time in a series of practical reforms which brought the administration of justice into something like accord with the world of affairs. From this time forward the law largely ceased to appear to be designed as a restraint upon human activity. First and foremost was the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. This great measure and its immediate successors largely trans formed the ancient procedure. Adjective law, as its name implies, exists for something else. Under these reform acts this objective point ceased to be prolixity, delay and the profit of the lawyers, and -became more like the realization of substantive rights. Causes of action by and against the same parties were permitted to be joined, and several equitable defences were allowed. Special de murrers were abolished, together with much of the ancient verbiage, and only such state ments as must be proved were essential in pleading. In 1851 that final absurdity in the law of evidence which closed the mouths of the very persons who knew most about the matter in dispute was abolished, and the testimony of interested witnesses became at last a matter of credibility instead of com petency. In equity a series of practical re forms removed many of the most obvious de fects of procedure; additional vice-chancel lors were appointed in 1851 to cope with the burden of arrears, and above all, in the same year, a permanent court of appeal in chan cery was established. The confusion and absurdities of the ecclesiastical administra tion of probate and matrimonial affairs were

finally removed in 1858 by the creation of an independent court for probate and matri monial causes; and about the same time the demand for the infusion of new blood into the court of final appeal was recognized. The Court of Crown Cases Reserved, where points of criminal law could be reviewed, dates from 1848. But institutions are of little utility unless they are administered by men who are in sympathy with their purpose and spirit. From this point of view the middle of the century is of even greater significance as a turning point in legal history, for it marks the advent of Willes, Bromwell and Black burn in common law, and of Knight-Bruce, Turner and Page-Wood in equity. Under the guidance of such minds, in which techni cal learning and common sense were com bined in a rare degree, the law ceased to act as a sort of surprise upon mankind, and the realization of rights became practicable. And a few years later the larger interests of the law in the court of final appeal were for the first time adequately administered by the master minds of Westbury and Cairns. This period has been aptly termed by Sir Fred erick Pollock the classical period of English law.

COMMON LAW COURTS. The central figure in the Court of King's Bench throughout this period was Black burn. But he was ably assisted and in some respects supplemented by the Chief Justice of the Court, Sir Alexander Cockburn (185980). Cockburn came to the bench with a repu tation as a jury advocate second only to Erskine's. Although it cannot be said that he