my conscience he stole . it, or I am thor oughly convinced he stole it, or I think he stole it, or I dreamed he stole it, or for aught I know he stole it, it will amount to the same thing as though I had said he stole my pocketbook and is a thief. It won't help my case either if I make positive proof that my pocketbook was only trash. As the world seems to have plenty of people upon it who are possessed of a habit of speaking ill of their neighbors, it might at first blush be supposed that such would be continually running foul of a slander for which he or she would have to answer in damages. Such is not the case, however, for two reasons. First, a large majority of those who possess this characteristic do not have this world's goods in abundance, so that after a recovery of damages there would come a default in the collection. In conse quence the injured one considers the source, and as there is no other remedy turns the other cheek. All of us generally do turn the other cheek when there is nothing else left to be done. Second, language is elastic enough to furnish many expressions which will answer the purposes of those slander ously inclined without any risk of being called upon to answer for the same. For instance so long as you do not speak of one swearing falsely in court, thus prac tically charging him with perjury, you may generally and repeatedly say of any one you have a mind to say it of that he is a liar, or that he is sixteen liars. You may be knocked down for having said it, but it is no slander if you spoke in general terms. So likewise you can call the man you pick a quarrel with a cheat, or a rascal, or swindler, or a blackleg or many other opprobious names, yet if such terms are not spoken of him in reference to any official character he may bear or in reference to his business, no action lies for such words. If you call your victim a rascal and say it with a meaning look, and add that you could tell something, if you wanted to, and shake your head or

wink your eye darkly, your slander is not a legal one, within the jurisdiction of the law of the land. Courts are continually drawing distinctions in the matter of slander. Where they are in doubt as to the meaning of the words, all they have to do is to turn to the jury kept on tap beside them to advise the court of the fact of the intention with which the words were uttered and the meaning sought to be conveyed. Where one said, " I think the present business ought to have the most rigid inquiry for he murdered his first wife, that is, he administered improperly medicine to her for a certain complaint, which was the cause of her death," it was said that it does not follow because one person caused the death of another that to give utterance to that fact will be a slander per se. The death might have been caused in some way in which the party would not be held criminally for in any court, so words to be actionable per se must be used in their usual sense to import a charge of murder or manslaughter. The court submitted to the jury the meaning of the above words. The jury were of the opinion that they were uttered with the in tention to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff was guilty of murder or manslaught er, hence the words were slanderous. In two other cases the words were : " In my opinion the bitters that D. fixed for S. were the cause of his death " and " Old lady you gave my father four double doses of morphine on the day he made his will, you said, ' Old man you had better be fixing up your business.' If it hadn't been for your giving the mor phine your daughters would not have gotten what they did," were held not to be action able in themselves; the words did not im port a charge of murder or manslaughter, or any crime for which the party could be in dicted or punished. It is no slander to say that A had stolen growing corn, or that A stole windows from B's house. The words were not actionable in either case. Only a trespass was commit