A Glance at Legislative Contempt.

from the time of one William Thrower, whose deviation from the path of rectitude, in 1559, took the shape of uttering words against the dignity of the Commons, for which he was pronounced summarily guilty of contempt, — down to very recent cases of libel, of assault upon members, of bribery, and of other dreadful enormities. (A Trea tise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 7th Ed., Chapter VI.) The journals of Parliament, we are told, be gin in 1547. Since that date the Commons have exercised the power of commitment in perhaps a thousand instances. A not infre quent cause of offense has been that of molesting an officer of the House while attending to his proper business. Mr. May details the circumstances attending these indignities, and tells us what the Lords did by way of vindicating their authority. "The last case of the kind," he says, "was that commonly known as the um brella case." Readers of The Green Bag, I dare say, one and all, are sufficiently in terested in the subject matter of umbrellas to justify my citing the remainder of the paragraph, as follows : " On the 26th of March, 1827, complaint was made that John Bell had served F. Plass, a doorkeeper, when attending his duty in the House, with process from Westminster Court of Requests, first to appear, and afterwards to pay a debt and costs awarded against him by that court, for the loss of an umbrella, which had been left with the doorkeeper during a debate. Bell, and the clerks of the Court of Requests, were summoned; the former was admon ished, and the latter, not being aware of the nature of the complaint, were directed to withdraw." It must have been a lesson to Bell .— not to lose another umbrella. It seems that the Bishops, the Lords, and the knights and burgesses, a long while ago, used to sit together in one chamber, — an arrangement that for the winter season prob ably effected a saving in the item of fuel and lights. When so assembled, these digni

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taries were called the High Court of Parlia ment, and as such exercised the functions of a court of judicature. One function, as everybody knows, is the privilege His Honor enjoys, when there has been a contempt of his court, of telling the sheriff to take the body of the offender, and lock it up in jail for safe keeping. After Parliament had con cluded to separate into the Lords and Com mons, each House, so it is thought, carried along with itself somewhat of the judicial habit. To a parliamentary delinquent of a reflec tive turn of mind, it must be gratifying to be able to account for his being behind prison bars by a reference to the law and customs of Parliament, resting as they do on the solid basis of history. He will also be pleased to remember that the House of Commons can decide what constitutes a contempt, and then commit therefor, — a power that is not inherent in a merely colo nial assembly. By an open contempt of legislative au thority one may contrive to put himself in jeopardy here in the United States, quite as effectually as if he had selected London as the scene of his notoriety. Congress and our State legislatures are alike jealous of their rights and privileges. We must not blame them if they prefer to have them selves respected, and their orders obeyed. A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1880, modified the views that had been entertained previously of the powers of Congress in this regard. I refer to the very important case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, that grew out of an investigation where the House of Represen tatives undertook to look into what had been done in a "real estate pool," so called, hav ing some relation to the dealings of Jay Cooke & Company, debtors of the United States. The learned justices express their opinion that there is not found in the Con stitution of the United States any general power vested in either house to punish for