In this case the counsel for the millionaire had been persistent. He insisted that the rules of chancery gave a party the right to discontinue a defective bill for the express purpose of filing a new bill curing the de fects by proper averments, and that the court had no power to nullify his right by the present decision. He had cited the rules and many statutes and decisions in support of his point. The Court wished to have the Bar under stand that it did not approve of this method of presenting cases. The citation of au thorities, especially decisions of this Court, was embarrassing and enormously increased the labors of the Court in conforming a de cision to decisions already made. It had sometimes happened that this could not be done with any amount of labor. The Bar should acquiesce in the decisions and speak of them only with respect. When the Court is asked how it can distinguish this case from one where a bill is dismissed under the rules, the Court replies that it will deal with such a case when it arises. It has had trouble enough to decide this case in favor of the Frenchman to lead it utterly to de cline the consideration of supposed cases. It might at first sight appear, said the chancellor, that some of these views of the Court rested upon rather narrow founda tions, but when a party, after writing out the contract in his bill, claimed that it was void because it was not in writing, he, too, stood upon narrow ground and should take heed to his footsteps. Chancery was designed to supply the defects of the law. It was bound to do its work effectually, and it could not if it was constantly hampered by statutes, rules and precedents. What was the use of chancery if it could not protect a poor Frenchman against a rich million aire? If it could not defeat such mischiev ous and technical objections as a statute or a legislative notion of public policy? Chan cery was like number nine in the root prac tice of medicine, nobody knew exactly

what it was, but it was intended to be re sorted to when all other remedies failed. Another point had been pressed by coun sel. The Frenchman was insolvent; he had agreed to give security for the $1,400 which he was to pay for the trees. It had been argued that this agreement was material, that had it not been made the owner would not have consented to the sale. This might be true; it was true that the security had not been given, but that was not the fault of the Frenchman. He had shown due diligence. He expected to sell to the railroad company for a profit of two thousand dollars. He was ready to make the contract, but the agent put him off with a letter until week after next, when he would try to meet him and make a contract; meantime, he could go on with his work. The Frenchman sent this letter to the owner, who never returned it. This was all he could do. The agent said he could go on with his work. True, he had no right to say so, but when the knowledge came to the owner that the agent was giving directions about it, and he did not object, chancery would assume that he consented to the Frenchman's going on with his work. In chancery that which ought to be done is presumed to be done. The wood agent ought to have signed that contract with a provision in it that a part of the payment for each cord of wood should be paid to the owner. That would have given the owner security, and that chancery presumed had been done! Upon the whole case, then, the decree must be reversed, and a mandate be issued declaring the parol contract valid, and that the Frenchman might go on and cut the wood. The mandate directed the wood agent to execute his contract, but upon a suggestion that he was not a party to the action, and might object to any de cree against him on that ground, that part of the mandate was withdrawn. Only one event prevented this case from passing into legal history as the greatest